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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on macroeconomics with microeconomic
heterogeneity.
In Chapter 1, I empirically investigate the extent to which regional economic activ-
ity responds to fiscal shocks. Exploiting state-level variation of military procurement,
I apply an instrumental variable local projection method extended to the panel data
context to estimate the dynamic causal effects of a military spending shock. These
estimates, which are referred to as regional impulse responses, indicate three main
empirical findings. First, regional output displays a large and lengthy response over a
decade to a regional military spending shock, despite the fact that military spending
has returned to a normal level after five years. Second, regional population gradually
grows over the decade after the shock. Third, the response of construction to military
spending is proportionately much larger than that of total output and also represents
an important share of overall output responses. This evidence suggests that labor
reallocation across regions can be very important for the impact of fiscal policy.
v
Chapter 2 quantitatively analyzes the regional and aggregate implications of the
empirical findings in the previous chapter. I first study a simple model of regional
reallocation to build intuition. Then I develop a multi-region New Keynesian model
with labor migration and housing construction and calibrate a U.S. economy with 51
regions. The model reveals that labor reallocation amplifies regional output through a
boom in construction spending and amplifies aggregate output through a positive co-
variance effect arising from net directed migration towards booming regions where
population and regional output per resident are rising simultaneously. To circum-
vent high dimensionality, I propose a new method to tractably solve spatial dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Using this method, I quantitatively
find that in response to a national military buildup that affects regions differentially
in a manner consistent with U.S. expenditure, labor reallocation amplifies the aggre-
gate output effect of government spending by 30 percent relative to a model without
it.
Chapter 3 proposes a new method to study the macroeconomic impact of mi-
croeconomic shocks. I show in what conditions and how to represent a disaggregate
stochastic dynamic model into a recursive aggregate system by approximation order.
This method provides a sufficient-statistic characterization of macro state variables
or shocks in terms of heterogeneous micro shocks and structures. The first- and
second-order macro shocks can be shaped by the average and the dispersion of the
micro counterparts weighted by their micro impact intensities. I apply this method
in several applications to illustrate the importance of micro heterogeneity and nonlin-
earity in macroeconomics. First, I provide a first-order decomposition of the aggre-
gate consumption function when consumers have different marginal propensities to
consume. A new redistribution channelthe asset position adjustment channelis
identified and the magnitude of this channel relies on the variability of capital invest-
vi
ment and the persistence of shocks. Second, I show that permanent income inequality
alters aggregate demand responses mainly at the second-order, instead of the first-
order. Non-homothetic preferences and the dispersion of permanent income income
jointly determine the impart on aggregate consumption response.
vii
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Chapter 1
Regional Impulse Responses to Fiscal Shocks: An Empirical Investigation
1.1 Introduction
The economic consequence of fiscal policy is one of the central questions in macroe-
conomics. The effect of government spending on output is often summarized by
a multiplier, which represents the percentage increase in output when government
spending increases by one percent of GDP. This multiplier can be estimated by ag-
gregate time series data but there is a wide range of this estimate in the literature
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1988; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher, 2004; Barro and Redlick, 2011; Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2013).1 The
effect of government spending varies according to different macroeconomic policies,
in particular monetary policy. In the past decade, a wave of empirical research (Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2014; Shoag, 2016; Suarez Serrato and Wingender, 2016) exploits
the variation of cross-sectional fiscal spending to estimate the local fiscal multiplier,
which measures the effect of an increase in spending in one region of a monetary
union. An advantage of this cross-sectional approach is that it yields the potential
for much greater variation in policy across space than over time and more plausibly
exogenous variation. However, most of the studies on regional fiscal multiplier focus
1In this literature, some studies exploit military spending associated with wars, which are plausi-
bly unrelated to macroeconomic conditions. Others apply the structural VAR approach to identify
the multiplier.
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on impact multiplier and try to translate the impact regional multiplier into the ag-
gregate multiplier. It is still unclear how fiscal policies affect local economic activity
over time and how to map regional dynamic effects to the aggregate level.
In this chapter, I empirically investigate how local economic activity responds to
regional fiscal stimuli over various horizons. I exploit state-level variation of military
procurement following Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) (hereafter, NS) to estimate
the dynamic causal effects of a military spending shock. The econometric method
is an instrumental variable local projection method as in Stock and Watson (2018)
extended to the panel data context.2 The estimates are referred to as regional im-
pulse responses and are natural dynamic counterparts of NS's open economy relative
multipliers.3 As in NS, my identification takes advantage of heterogeneous state-level
exposure of national military spending. For instance, when national military spend-
ing rises, state military spending increases systematically more in California than in
Illinois. The regional impulse responses are inferred from differential responses of
output in California relative to Illinois when military spending rises nationally.
I have three main empirical findings. First, regional output displays a large and
lengthy responseit peaks at 4 years and only mean reverts after 10 yearsto a re-
gional military spending shock, despite the fact that military spending has essentially
returned to a normal level after 5 years. Second, regional population gradually grows
over the decade after the shock. This finding is consistent with the result in Blanchard
and Katz (1992) that regional demand shocks lead to a persistent effect on regional
employment, mainly due to labor reallocation across regions. Third, responses of
2The local projection method is originally proposed by Jorda (2005). Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2013) and Ramey and Zubariy (2018) apply the local projection method with instruments
to estimate aggregate fiscal multipliers in OECD countries and the U.S. Stock and Watson (2018)
summarize some technical details when using the local projection method with external instruments.
3By using an instrumental variable regression for panel data, NS estimate the effect that an
increase in government spending in one region of the union economy relative to another has on
relative output and employment. They refer to this as the open economy relative multiplier.
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construction to military spending are proportionately much larger than those of total
output and also represent an important share of overall output responses. This finding
suggests that the construction sector plays an important role in shaping the aggregate
response to asymmetric regional shocks when migration happens, consistent with the
findings in Howard (2018). The estimated regional impulse responses to fiscal stimuli
are robust across a battery of specifications, including alternative specifications by
adding lag controls, alternative instruments following a Bartik approach, and placebo
tests to falsify whether the baseline instruments are valid.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides some econometric
foundations for my empirical investigation, which includes an illustration of local
projection method with instruments for panel data, the baseline specification, and
the identifying assumption. Section 1.3 displays the baseline estimates of regional
impulse responses. Section 1.4 shows some robustness of regional impulse responses.
1.2 Econometric Foundations
This section first discusses how the local projection method works with instruments
for panel data. The baseline specification is then provided as well as the identifying
assumption and the validity of instruments.
1.2.1 Local Projection with Instruments for Panel Data
Denote {Yjt} as a stationary macroeconomic variable in region j at time t, {xjt} as
the region-specific structural shocks of interest, and {ξt} as economy-wide common
shocks. By definition, the structural shocks {xjt} are unforecastable and uncorrelated
with other region-specific structural shocks {vjt}. The Slutsky-Frisch paradigm rep-
resents the path of observed variables as arising from the entire history of structural
3
shocks. Therefore, an observed macroeconomic variable Yjt can be described by a
structural moving average representation in terms of the structural shocks:
Yj,t+h = Yj +
S∑
s=0
(βsxj,t+h−s + ϑsvj,t+h−s + φsξt+h−s), (1.1)
where Yj denotes a region-specific constant term, {xjt} are i.i.d. structural shocks
of interest with zero mean, S is the number of lags, which can be finite or infinite,
and h represents the horizon. The coefficients {βh} capture the causal effects of those
structural shocks of interest over time, which are referred to as regional impulse
responses.
Let Xjt be an observed regressor related to the structural shock of interest xjt. As
pointed out by Stock and Watson (2018), the scale of xjt over Xjt is indeterminate.
This scale ambiguity is resolved by adopting, without loss of generality, a normaliza-
tion for the scale of xjt such that a unit increase in xjt increases Xjt by one unit.
Therefore, to estimate the dynamic causal effects {βh}, a local projection regression
can be specified as follows,
Yj,t+h = α
h
j + γ
h
t + βhXjt + u
h
j,t+h, (1.2)
where αhj and γ
h
t are region and time fixed effects that absorb region-specific terms
(e.g., Yj) and economy-wide common shocks {ξt+h−s}s≥0, and the error term uhjt+h is
a linear combination of region-specific shocks {xj,t+h−s}s 6=h and {vj,t+h−s}s≥0.
In general, Xjt is likely to be endogenous and correlated with {xj,t−s}s≥1 and
{vj,t−s}s≥0. But with a suitable instrument, βh can be consistently estimated by IV
regression. Let Zjt be a vector of instrumental variables. In line with Stock and
Watson (2018), these instruments can be used to estimate the dynamic causal effects
4
if they satisfy
(i) E(xjtZ
′
jt) = λ
′ 6= 0 (relevance)
(ii) E(vjtZ
′
jt) = 0 (contemporaneous exogeneity)
(iii) E(xj,t−hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 (lag exogeneity)
E(vj,t−hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0
(iv) E(xj,t+hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 (lead exogeneity)
E(vj,t+hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 .
Conditions (i) and (ii) are conventional IV relevance and exogeneity conditions.
Condition (iii) and (iv) arise because of the dynamics. The key idea of lead/lag exo-
geneity conditions is that Yj,t+h generally depends on the entire history of structural
shocks, so if Zjt is to identify the effect of xjt alone, it must be uncorrelated with all
shocks at all leads and lags.
1.2.2 The Baseline Specification
Following NS, my empirical work employs state-level time series in military procure-
ment, principally from the DD-350 military procurement forms of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense for fiscal years 19662006. In addition, the time series data for
calendar years used in this analysis includes state-level GDP constructed by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), state-level employment by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), and population by state from the Census Bureau. More details on
the data set are provided in Appendix A.
I apply the local projection method discussed above to estimate the regional im-
pulse responses to a military spending shock over various horizons h. The baseline
5
empirical specification is4
yj,t+h − yj,t−2
yj,t−2
= αhj + γ
h
t + βh ·
gjt − gj,t−2
yj,t−2
+ uhj,t+h (1.3)
where yjt and gjt are real output and real military spending in state j in year t
respectively, and αhj and γ
h
t stand for state and year fixed effects. All variables in
the regression are measured in per resident terms and are deflated by the national
consumer price index (CPI) for the United States. The inclusion of state fixed effects
absorbs state-specific time trends in output and military procurement. The year
fixed effects control for aggregate shocks and aggregate monetary and tax policies.
As the dependent variable in equation (1.3) is specified in difference, the coefficients
of interest {βh} are cumulated impulse responses, which are also the same as the
impulse responses for levels.5
NS estimate a biannual difference specification rather than a dynamic panel re-
gression with fixed effects in annual differences, arguing that their approach is more
parsimonious and mitigates measurement error in the timing of the procurement vari-
able.6 My baseline regressions adopt this biannual difference specification. Section 1.3
shows that the empirical results are robust to using an annual difference specification.
The dependent variable of regression (1.3) is the growth rate of regional real output
relative to national price levels, which combines the impacts on regional inflation and
real output relative to regional prices. In order to get rid of the regional inflation
4Following Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011), I construct the government spending vari-
able by the difference of per-capita government spending relative to per-capita output in last period.
This approach helps to control for heteroscedasticity especially across states in the case of panel
data.
5Appendix B.1 shows the equivalence between cumulated impulse responses for differences and
impulse responses for level.
6As discussed above, the procurement data are recorded for the federal government's fiscal year.
Since 1976, this has been from October 1 to September 30. Prior to 1976, it was from July 1 to
June 30.
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impact, I adopt the state-level inflation measures in NS (2014) as a regional price
deflator.7
Alternative Dependent Variables. To gauge the strength of labor reallocation
over time, I also estimate the regional impulse responses of employment and pop-
ulation using an analogous approach. For employment, the regression is analogous
to equation (1.3), except that the dependent variable is the growth rate of regional
employment per resident, (nj,t+h−nj,t−2)/nj,t−2, where njt is the ratio of employment
over state population. For population, the dependent variable is the growth rate of
regional population, (µj,t+h−µj,t−2)/µj,t−2, where µjt is the population share in state
j in year t.
1.2.3 Identifying Assumption and Validity of Instruments
Endogeneity is a key challenge to identifying the causal effects of government pur-
chases, since military spending is notoriously political. In the presence of reverse
causality between regional output and military spending, OLS estimates may be bi-
ased and inconsistent. But as NS stress, regional military spending displays system-
atic heterogeneous sensitivity to national military spending. These heterogeneous
sensitivities across regions can be used to identify the effects of government-spending
shocks. Their identifying assumption is that the United States does not embark on
a military buildup because states that receive a disproportionate amount of military
spending are doing poorly relative to other states.
Following this identifying assumption, I instrument for state military procurement
7Before 1995, they rely on state-level inflation series constructed by Del Negro (1998) for the
period 1969-1995 using a combination of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) regional inflation data and
cost of living estimates from the American Chamber of Commerce Realtors Association (ACCRA).
After 1995, they construct state-level price indexes by multiplying a population-weighted average
of cost of living indexes from the ACCRA for each region with the U.S. aggregate Consumer Price
Index.
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in using total national procurement interacted with a state dummy. The first-stage
regression is given by
gjt − gj,t−2
yj,t−2
= δj + ηj · gt − gt−2
yt−2
+ νt + εjt, (1.4)
where δj and νt represent state and year fixed effects. Weak or many instruments
may be a potential concern, because a large number of instruments is used in the
baseline specificationone for each state. The first stage results suggest that the
baseline regressions do not suffer from bias associated with weak or many instru-
ments.8 The Appendix also reports results using the limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) estimator, which are larger than my baseline estimates.
Another concern is autocorrelation of the identified shocks, which can cause a
violation of the lead/lag exogeneity conditions. If the identified shocks are serially
correlated, this may lead to a biased estimate because the identified shocks pick up
some of the past variation. To address this concern, I use auxiliary regressions akin
to the first-stage ones but using leads and lags of observed regressors instead.9 Six
states (Connecticut, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia) fail the
lead/lag exogeneity conditions and I have re-run the baseline regressions excluding
those states.10
8The performance of the first-stage regression indicates that the baseline instruments satisfy
relevance conditions. The R2 is 0.26, adjusted R2 is 0.21, and the partial R2 is 0.12 for the baseline
specification. Given a large number of instruments used in the baseline specificationone for each
state, the Cragg-Donald first-stage F statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) is roughly five for
the baseline specification, where the critical value for less 30 percent bias at 5 percent significance
for 51 instruments is roughly 4.
9The auxiliary regressions are akin to the first-stage ones but using leads and lags of observed
regressors instead. As the difference is constructed at a biannual frequency, the leads and lags are
specified at h = ±2, 4, 6, 8 in the auxiliary regressions. Hypothetically, if the lead/lag exogene-
ity conditions hold, the fraction of significant slope coefficients should be small for all auxiliary
regressions.
10The result of auxiliary regressions indicates that for each auxiliary regression, there are 4 to
8 states (out of 51) that fail the lead/lag exogeneity tests. In particular, the violation of lead/lag
exogeneity conditions mainly come from the following states: Connecticut, Mississippi, Montana,
8
1.3 Baseline Estimates of Regional Impulse Responses
Figure 1.1 plots the baseline estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} to a military
spending shock. Column (a) displays the estimates in the restricted sample, which
excludes the states failing the lead/lag exogeneity tests, while Column (b) shows the
estimates in the full sample.
The first row of Figure 1.1 displays the estimated regional impulse responses of mil-
itary spending to a national military spending shock interacted with a state dummy.
In response to a 1 percent national military spending shock relative to output, re-
gional military purchases go up on impact and return to a normal roughly after five
years. The implied AR(1) coefficient of military procurement is consistent with the
NS's estimate of 0.75 at an annual frequency, indicating that the impact on regional
military spending vanishes in the medium run.
1.3.1 Large and Lengthy Responses of Regional Output
The second and third rows of Figure 1.1 show that there are large responses of re-
gional output and employment over the medium run to a military spending shock,
even though the impact on regional military procurement dies out after five years.
Consistent with the estimated impact multipliers in NS, state output per resident
rises by 1.32 percent on impact, in response to 1 percent military spending shock
relative to output. The expansionary effect on regional output persists and reaches
a peak around 3 percent after four years and then gradually mean-reverts over a
decade. State-level employment per resident displays a similar pattern in which re-
gional employment goes up by 1.28 percent on impact and around 3 percent after
five years. Over the medium run, the impact of government purchases on regional
North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia.
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Figure 1.1: Baseline Estimates of Regional Impulse Responses
Notes: The circle and cross are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} and the gray
area is a 95 percent confidence interval. The square represents NS's estimates. Standard errors
are robust and clustered by state. A shorthand for the dependent variable is stated at the top
of each panel. The dependent variables are
gjt+h−gjt−2
yjt−2
,
yjt+h−yjt−2
yjt−2
,
njt+h−njt−2
njt−2
, and
µjt+h−µjt−2
µjt−2
,
where h is the horizon. The sample period is 1966-2006. Local military and output are per resident
state military spending and GDP by state deflated by state-level CPI measures, employment is the
number of employed divided by population. In column (a), the restricted sample excludes the states
that fail the lead/lag exogeneity testsCT, MS, MT, ND, UT, and VA; column (b) covers all states.
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economic activity is even larger and lengthier than the existing literature indicated.
1.3.2 Gradual Responses of Regional Population
The fourth row of Figure 1.1 shows that estimated regional impulse responses of
population are large and gradually increase over the medium run, indicating a strong
regional reallocation in response to a military spending shock. As pointed out by
NS, in the short run, regional military spending shocks do not cause a significant
impact on regional population. However, in the medium run, regional population
increases by 1 percent after five years and 2.5 percent after ten years, in response
to a 1 percent military spending shock relative to output. This result is consistent
with Blanchard and Katz's (1992) findings that a regional labor demand shock leads
to a permanent impact on regional population and that regional reallocation is the
dominant adjustment force that drives a persistent impact on regional labor markets.
1.3.3 Particularly Large Responses in the Construction Sector
What leads to a large and lengthy response of output? To shed light on this issue, I
estimate regional output impulse responses by major SIC/NAICS groupings.11 Panel
(a) in Figure 1.2 plots the regional impulse responses of sectoral output to a regional
military spending shock, for construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, service,
and FIRE (finance, insurance, rental, and estate).12
Panel (a) shows that responses of construction to military spending are proportion-
ately much larger than those of total output. At the four-year horizon, the response
of construction output is over 12 percent, which is roughly four times larger than
the total output response. This evidence suggests that the construction sector plays
11Appendix C.6 also reports the estimates for sectoral employment.
12Other sectorsmining, agriculture, transportation and utilities, and governmentdo not have
statistically significant responses.
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(b) Output Responses by Sector
Figure 1.2: Regional Impulse Responses of Output by Sector
Notes: Panel (a) shows LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} of sectoral output
and Panel (b) reports a breakdown of overall output response by sector. The dependent
variable is
ysjt+h−ysjt−2
ysjt−2
, where h is the horizon and s denotes the sector. The sample period
is 1966-2006 for all states. Sectoral output is per capita state-level GDP by sectors deflated
by state-level CPI measures.
an important role in the impulse responses of regional economic activity to military
spending. In addition, those sectoral estimates indicate that the large and lengthy
response of output is robust across those sectors that have statistically significant
responses.
Panel (b) indicates that the construction sector makes an important contribution
to the overall output response. Despite the fact that the construction sector accounts
for only 5 percent of total output on average, it contributes roughly 20 percent of the
overall output response to a regional military spending shock. This contribution is as
large as the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 20 percent of total output.13
13The output weights by sectors are 5 percent for construction, 20 percent for manufacturing, 16
percent for wholesale and retail trade, 18 percent for services, 17 percent for FIRE.
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1.3.4 Summary of Empirical Results
The dynamic responses are large and lengthy, while the impact responses match those
of NS. By year 4, regional output rises over 3 percent in response to 1 percent shock
of local government purchases relative to output, despite the fact that government
purchases have essentially returned to normal at this horizon. Further, estimated
local population responses are large at the four-year horizon and continue to grow
afterwards. Finally, responses of construction to government purchases are propor-
tionately much larger than those of total output and represent an important share of
overall output responses.
1.4 Robustness of Regional Impulse Responses
The estimated regional impulse responses to fiscal stimuli are robust across a bat-
tery of specifications, including (i) alternative specifications by adding controls, (ii)
alternative instruments following a Bartik approach, and (iii) placebo tests to
falsify whether the baseline instruments are valid. The estimated regional impulse
responses with lags of dependent variables and regressors as controls are very similar
to the baseline estimates. The Bartik instrument is constructed by scaling national
spending for each state by the average level of spending in that state in the first five
years of the sample. The estimates with Bartik instruments display similar dynamics
as the ones under the baseline instruments. In the case of placebo tests, the lags of
the changes in regional output do not significantly respond to the identified shocks
on impact, indicating the validity of the baseline instruments. More details about
robustness checks can be found in the Appendix.
This section highlights a battery of robustness checks for estimating regional im-
pulse responses, including (i) alternative specifications by adding controls, (ii) alterna-
13
tive instruments following a Bartik approach, (iii) placebo tests to falsify whether
the baseline instruments are valid, and (iv) alternative specifications by using annual
differences.
1.4.1 Lag Controls
Figure 1.3 shows the estimates with the lags of regressors and dependent variables
as controls. Denote ∇yjt ≡ yjt−yj,t−2yj,t−2 and ∇gjt ≡
gjt−gj,t−2
yj,t−2
as the biannual changes of
regional output and military spending relative to regional output. Because the shocks
are constructed at a biannual frequency, the inclusion of ∇gj,t−1 = gj,t−1−gj,t−3yj,t−3 arises
colinearity with ∇gjt to some extent (same as ∇yj,t−1 and ∇yjt). Therefore, the lag
controls are specified to be two-year lags instead, ∇gj,t−2 and ∇yj,t−2. The estimated
regional impulse responses are very similar to the baseline estimates, indicating that
the results are robust.
1.4.2 Bartik-type Instruments
This subsection employs a Bartik approach to construct instruments. The Bartik
instruments are constructed by scaling national spending for each state by the average
level of military spending in that state in the first five years of the sample. Given
the Bartik shares, sj, the Bartik instruments are represented by Bjt = sj∇gt, where
∇gt = gt−gt−2yt−2 is the biannual change of national military spending relative to national
output. Row (a) in Figure 1.4 displays the estimated regional impulse responses of
regional economic activity to a military spending shock using the Bartik instruments.
The estimators with Bartik instruments display similar dynamics as the ones under
the baseline instruments. However, the magnitude of the estimated regional impulse
responses under the Bartik instruments is larger than the baseline estimates. This is
probably because the Bartik instruments pick up serially correlated variation.
14
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Ouput: y
jt
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Population: 
jt
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Employment: n
jt
Con.Int.
Baseline:Restricted
Lag Control
(a) Restricted Sample
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Ouput: y
jt
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Population: 
jt
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Period: Year
Im
p
u
ls
e
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
h
Local Employment: n
jt
Con.Int.
Baseline: Full
Lag Control
(b) Full Sample
Figure 1.3: Lags of Dependent Variables and Regressors as Controls
Notes: The circle and dot are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} and the
gray area is a 95 percent confidence interval. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
state. A shorthand for the dependent variable is stated at the top of each panel. The
dependent variables are yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 ,
njt+h−njt−2
njt−2 , and
µjt+h−µjt−2
µjt−2 , where h is the horizon.
The sample period is 1966-2006. Output is per resident GDP by state deflated by state-
level CPI measures, employment is the number of employed divided by population. In row
(a), the restricted sample excludes CT, MS, MT, ND, UT, and VA; row (b) covers all states.
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(a) Bartik Instruments
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Figure 1.4: Estimated Regional Impulse Responses using Bartik Instruments
Notes: The circle and dot are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} with
Bartik-type instruments and the gray area is a 95 percent confidence interval. Standard
errors are robust and clustered by state. A shorthand for the dependent variable is stated at
the top of each panel. The dependent variables are yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 ,
njt+h−njt−2
njt−2 , and
µjt+h−µjt−2
µjt−2 ,
where h is the horizon. The sample period is 1966-2006 for all states. Output is per resident
GDP by state deflated by state-level CPI measures, employment is the number of employed
divided by population.
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In order to get rid of the possible serially correlated variation in the Bartik instru-
ments, I construct revised Bartik instruments Bresjt as the residuals from the following
regression, Bjt = δ + λ1Bjt−2 + λ2Bjt+2 + jt. Therefore, the revised Bartik instru-
ments Bresjt are uncorrelated with the lead and lag with two periods. Row (b) in
Figure 1.4 displays the estimated regional impulse responses under revised Bartik
instruments. The estimated regional impulse responses under the revised Bartik in-
struments are closer to the baseline estimates, relative to the estimates under original
Bartik instruments.
1.4.3 Placebo Tests
Placebo (or falsification) tests are usually applied to assess whether the instruments
are valid or note. Hypothetically, if the baseline instruments are valid, the identified
shocks ∇̂gjt (which are purified by the baseline instruments) should be uncorrelated
with the changes of regional output before time t. Therefore, one can run the baseline
regression but with the changes of regional output before time t as dependent variables
instead, i.e., ∇y˜j,t−s = αj +γt+ηs · ∇̂gjt+υsjt, where ∇y˜j,t−s = yj,t−1−s−yj,t−3−syj,t−3−s denotes
the biannual changes of regional output at horizon s in the past. Due to the biannual
difference specification, the placebo tests start with
yj,t−2−yj,t−4
yj,t−4
i.e., s = −1 to −3.
The black squares in Figure 1.5 denote the point estimates of {ηs} and the associated
vertical lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. The blue circles denote
the point estimates of baseline estimates. This result indicates that the lags of the
changes in regional output do not significantly respond to the identified shocks on
impact, which is supportive evidence for the validity of the baseline instruments.
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Figure 1.5: Placebo Tests
Notes: The black squares denote the point estimates of {ηs} and the associated vertical
lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. Blue circles denote the point estimates of baseline
results, {βh}. The dependent variables are yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 , where h is the horizon. The sample
period is 1966-2006. Output is per resident GDP by state deflated by state-level CPI mea-
sures. In panel (a), the restricted sample excludes CT, MS, MT, ND, UT, and VA; Panel
(b) covers all states.
1.4.4 Annual Difference Specifications
The baseline specification follows NS's biannual specification to mitigate potential
measurement errors in the timing of procurement variables. This subsection dis-
cusses the robustness of annual difference specification. Using annual differences, the
regression is specified as
yjt+h−yjt−1
yjt−1
= αj+γt+βh · gjt−gjt−1yjt−1 +ujt+h and the instruments
are total national procurement gt−gt−1
yt−1
interacted with a state dummy.
The statistical performance of the first-stage regression and auxiliary regressions
can be used to gauge whether the validity conditionsrelevance and lead/lag exogene-
ity conditionshold for annual difference specification. The first-stage performance
is fair, but not as good as the one for the biannual difference specification. The R2
is 0.17 and the partial R2 is 0.088. The Cragg-Donald F statistic is 3.67. Table 1.1
reports the fraction of significant slope coefficients in the auxiliary regressions for the
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Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag5 Lag6
Fraction 4% 6% 8% 8% 8% 10%
Lead1 Lead2 Lead3 Lead4 Lead5 Lead6
Fraction 8% 8% 8% 10% 6% 8%
Table 1.1: Fraction of significant slope coefficients: Annual Difference
Notes: The auxiliary regressions are specified by gjt−gjt−1yjt−1 = α
g
j + γ
g
t + η
s
j · gt+s−gt+s−1yt+s−1 + usjt,
where s = ±1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The table reports the fraction of significant (at the 95% level)
slope coefficient ηsj in the auxiliary regressions. The total number of auxiliary regressions is
51, i.e., one for each state.
annual changes of national military spending. It shows that the lead/lag exogeneity
conditions are likely to hold, while the strength of instrument relevance might not be
as strong as the baseline ones.
Figure 1.6 shows the estimated regional impulse responses in the annual differ-
ence specification. The estimates display similar patterns to the baseline results over
various horizons. The major difference is the point estimation on impact: output and
employment multiplier on impact are 1.34 and 1.28 in biannual difference specifica-
tion while they are 0.64 and 0.39 in annual difference specification. These differences
arise because the strength of instrument relevance in annual difference specification
is not as strong as the baseline instruments. As NS point out, annual difference
specification might be subject to measurement error in the timing of being recorded
and being carried out actually. In particular, the military procurement data is mea-
sured in federal government fiscal year while output and employment are measured
in calendar year. It may cause measurement errors in the timing. But overall, the es-
timated regional impulse responses display similar patterns to the baseline estimates
over various horizons.
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Figure 1.6: Estimated Local Multipliers in Annual Difference Specification
Notes: The circle and dot are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} for the an-
nual and biannual difference specifications. The gray area is a 95 percent confidence interval
for the estimates under annual difference specification. A shorthand for the dependent vari-
able is stated at the top of each panel. The dependent variables are yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 ,
njt+h−njt−2
njt−2 ,
and µjt+h−µjt−2µjt−2 , where h is the horizon. The sample period is 1966-2006 for all states. Out-
put is per resident GDP by state deflated by state-level CPI measures, employment is the
number of employed divided by population.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I exploit state-level variation of military procurement to estimate the
dynamic causal effects of a military spending shock. The estimated regional impulse
responses indicate that the regional economic consequences of government spending
are large and lengthy and dynamics are very important for regional impulse responses
to fiscal shocks. My empirical findings provide a new set of facts that can potentially
discipline structural models to map regional impulse responses to the aggregate level.
In Chapter 2, I develop a quantitative multi-region model to assess the importance
of regional reallocation on the aggregate effect of fiscal policy.
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Appendix
A. Data
Military Procurement. The main source for military spending data is the elec-
tronic database of DD-350 military procurement forms from the U.S. Department of
Defense. They cover all prime contracts greater than $10,000 from 1966 to 1983 and
greater than $25,000 to 2006. This data is for the federal government's fiscal year.14
This data is available from the data package of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). All
the military procurement contracts are measured in units of million of current dol-
lars. All prime contracts of military purchases are compiled by state for the federal
government's fiscal year.
Gross Domestic Output (GDP). The state-level output is measured by GDP
by state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). It is annual data from 1963
and in millions of current dollars. GDP by state is measured as the factor incomes
incurred in production, as is Gross Domestic Income (GDI). Although GDP by state
is measured like GDI, the factor income are reconciled with GDP as the final step in
the estimation process. The estimation of GDP by state is the sum of the ones over all
industries. Estimates for 1963-1997 is based on the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC); while after 1997, it is based on the 2007 North American Industry Classifica-
tion System (NAICS). The sectoral GDP by state is measured by major SIC/NAICS
groupings, including agriculture, construction, FIRE (finance, insurance, rental, es-
tate), government, manufacturing, mining, retail trade, services, transportation and
utilities, and wholesale trade.
14Since 1976, fiscal year has been from October 1 to September 30. Prior to 1976, it was from
July 1 to June 30.
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Employment. There are two available time series of employment by state: total
non-farm employees by state from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and em-
ployment (measured as the number of jobs) by state from BEA. The total non-farm
employees by state from BLS is available from 1939 (for most of states, the rest begins
from 1960) to present. The BEA measure of state employment is available from 1969.
It provides total employment measured by the number of jobs, non-farm employment
(by industry), and wage and salary employment (by type).
Population. The population by state is available from the Census Bureau from
1900 to present. Between census years, population is estimated using a variety of
administrative data sources including birth and death records, IRS data, Medicare
data, and data from the Department of Defense. Since 1970, it is also available
to obtain population by age group, which allows us to construct estimates of the
working age population. Notably, the migration data from IRS starts from 1980s,
which provides a short time series relative to the Census population data by state.15
GDP Deflator. The implicit price deflator is constructed by BEA with account
code, A191RD3, which is an annual index and normalized by 2009 dollar. The state-
level inflation measures are the ones adopted by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) as a
local price deflator. Before 1995, they rely on state-level inflation series constructed
by Del Negro (1998) for the period 1969-1995 using a combination of BLS regional
inflation data and cost of living estimates from the American Chamber of Commerce
Realtors Association (ACCRA). After 1995, they construct state-level price indexes by
multiplying a population-weighted average of cost of living indexed from the ACCRA
15The IRS migration data is available for the following periods: 1978-1980 (in-
migration only), 1980-1981, 1983-1984, and 1984 to present for each tax year.
https://www.archives.gov/research/electronic-records/reference-report/irs-data.html
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for each state with the U.S. aggregate Consumer Price Index.
B Econometrics Foundations
B.1 The Method of Instrumental Variable Local Projection
This subsection first shows the derivation of the validity conditions for an instru-
mental variable local projection (LP-IV) method for panel data: the relevance, con-
temporaneous exogeneity, lead/lag exogeneity conditions. The second part shows
the equivalent relationship between cumulative impulse responses for differences and
impulse responses for levels.
B.1.1 Validity Conditions
Denote {Yjt} as a stationary macroeconomic variable in region j at time t, {xjt} as
the region-specific structural shocks of interest. By definition, structural shocks {xjt}
are unforecastable and uncorrelated with other shocks {vjt}. An observed stationary
variable Yjt can be described by a structural moving average representation in terms
of structural shocks,
Yj,t+h = Yj +
S∑
s=0
(βsxj,t+h−s + ϑsυj,t+h−s + φsξt+h−s) (1.5)
where Yj denotes a region-specific constant term, S is the number of lags, which can
be finite or infinite, and h represents the horizon. The coefficients {βh} capture the
causal effects of those structural shocks of interest over time, which is referred as to
regional impulse responses.
Let Xjt be an observed regressor related to the structural shock of interest xjt. As
pointed out by Stock and Watson (2018), the scale of xjt over Xjt is indeterminate.
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Without loss of generality, this scale ambiguity is resolved by adopting a unit increase
in xjt increases Xjt by one unit. Assume Xjt can be represented by Xjt = xjt + ωjt,
where ωjt is the component independent to xjt and could be correlated with {xj,t−s}s≥1
and {υj,t−s}s≥1 and includes measurement errors that are independent to all structural
shocks.
Therefore, the above structural moving average representation can be rewritten
as
Yj,t+h = Yj + βhXjt +
∑
s
φsξt+h−s +
(∑
s 6=h
βsxj,t+h−s +
∑
s
ϑsυj,t+h−s − βhωjt
)
(1.6)
This implies the local projection regression
Yj,t+h = α
h
j + βhXjt + γ
h
t + u
h
j,t+h (1.7)
where αhj and γ
h
j are region and time fixed effects that absorb region-specific terms (Yj)
and economy-wide common shocks (
∑
s φsξt+h−s), and the error term u
h
j,t+h is a linear
combination of region-specific {xj,t+h−s}s 6=h and {υj,t+h−s}s≥0 as well as measurement
error terms.
In general, Xjt is likely to be endogenous and thus ωjt could be correlated with
{xj,t−s}s≥1 and {υj,t−s}s≥1. But with a suitable instrument, βh can be consistently
estimated by IV regression. Let Zjt be a vector of instrument variables. The in-
struments are valid if they satisfy the conditions (i) relevance E(XjtZ
′
jt) 6= 0 and (ii)
exogeneity E(uhj,t+hZ
′
jt) = 0. In particular, since the error term u
h
j,t+h is a linear com-
bination of region-specific {xj,t+h−s}s 6=h and {υj,t+h−s}s≥0, the exogeneity condition
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implies three types of exogeneity conditions:
E(vjtZ
′
jt) = 0 (contemporaneous exogeneity)
E(xj,t−hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 (lag exogeneity)
E(vj,t−hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0
E(xj,t+hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 (lead exogeneity)
E(vj,t+hZ
′
jt) = 0,∀h > 0 .
Thus, the relevance condition also implies that
E(xjtZ
′
jt) 6= 0. (relevance)
B.1.2 Cumulative Impulse Responses for Differences
In many applications, the dependent variable is specified in first differences, e.g.,
∆Yj,t+τ ≡ Yj,t+τ − Yj,t+τ−1, but our interest is impulse responses for levels. Exist-
ing literature has pointed out the equivalence that cumulated impulse responses for
differences are the same as impulse responses for levels. I now show this equivalent
relationship for the instrumental variable local projection method for panel data.
The local projection regression for the dependent variable in first differences is
given by
∆Yj,t+τ = α˜
τ
j + γ˜
τ
t + δτ · xjt + u˜τj,t+τ ,
and thus the regression for the dependent variable in cumulated differences is given
by
h∑
τ=0
∆Yj,t+τ =
h∑
τ=0
α˜τj +
h∑
τ=0
γ˜τt +
h∑
τ=0
δτ · xjt +
h∑
τ=0
u˜τj,t+τ . (1.8)
Claim: The cumulated impulse responses for differences
∑h
τ=0 δτ are the same as the
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impulse responses for levels βh.
Proof: According to the local projection regression for the dependent variable for
levels,
Yj,t+τ = α
τ
j + γ
τ
t + βhxjt + u
τ
j,t+τ ,
the regression for the dependent variable in first differences can be represented by
∆Yj,t+τ = (α
τ
j − ατ−1j ) + (γτt − γτ−1t ) + (βτ − βτ−1) · xjt + (uτj,t+τ − uτ−1j,t+τ−1).
In particular, if τ = 0, this yields
∆Yjt = (α
0
j − α−1j ) + (γ0t − γ−1t ) + (β0 − 0) · xjt + (ujt − u−1j,t−1),
for the reason that xjt has no impact on Yjt−1.
Therefore, the cumulated impulse responses for differences
h∑
τ=0
δτ =
h∑
τ=0
(βτ − βτ−1) = βh,
which are equivalent to the impulse responses for level, βh. Q.E.D.
B.2 Discussions on Regression Specifications
B.2.1 Variable Construction: Multipliers vs. Elasticities
Ramey (2016) suggests two alternative ways to construct regression variables for
estimating government spending multipliers. One is based on Hall (2009) and Barro
and Redlick (2011), while the other one accords to Gordon & Krenn (2010). The
Hall-Barro-Redlick (HBR) transformation constructs variables as wˆt+h ≡ (wt+h −
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wt−1)/yt−1, where wt is the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) per-capita
variable deflated by the GDP deflator and yt−1 is real GDP per capita in the last
period t − 1. The Gordon-Krenn (GK) transformation divides all NIPA per-capita
variables by potential GDP, estimated as an exponential trend. Thus, the NIPA
variables are transformed to be wˆt = wt/y
?
t , where y
?
t is the estimated trend in real
GDP per capita. In most of cases, both methods give similar results. Following the
HBR approach, the government spending multiplier can be estimated by
(
yt − yt−1
yt−1
)
= γ + βy ·
(
gt − gt−1
yt−1
)
+ εt (1.9)
where βy is the coefficient of interest, implying how much dollar of output increases
as government spending rises by one dollar on average, i.e., βy = ∆y
∆g
, which is the
multiplier.
Notably, a standard way in previous literature to define left-hand-side variable
is as the log-difference of government spending, log(gt/gt−1) ≈ gt−gt−1gt−1 . However,
the estimated coefficient does not directly reveal the government spending multiplier
because the percent changes must be converted to dollar equivalents. Most of the
analyses using log-difference method obtain the spending multiplier by using an ad
hoc conversion factor based on the sample average of y/g. More precisely, they follows
a regression model,
log
(
yt
yt−1
)
= γ + δy · log
(
gt
gt−1
)
+ εt (1.10)
where log(yt/yt−1) ≈ yt−yt−1yt−1 and δy implies the elasticity,
∆y/y
∆g/g
, therefore βy =
δy · (y/g). According to Owyang, Ramey and Zubairy (2013), their investigations
reveal that this widely-used method can lead to biases in multiplier estimates. In
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particular, they find that this method often generates multipliers greater than unity
even when auxiliary specifications show that private spending falls when government
spending increases. This bias occurs because the ratio of y/g varies greatly over the
sample period they consider. In addition, this bias may be severer in the context of
panel data because of regional heteroscedasticity.
The HBR transformation has several advantages relative to the log-difference
transformation: (i) it is a direct way to obtain the government spending multiplier in
dollar equivalents; (ii) it avoids potential upward bias due to ignoring the variation
of yt/gt over the sample period when using ad hoc conversion factor; (iii) it also helps
to control heteroscedasticity, in particular, across states in case of panel data.
For non-NIPA variables, e.g., employment, the standard way is to convert them
as log-difference, nt−nt−1
nt−1
, where nt denotes working hours or employment per capita.
Thus, the regression to estimate the government spending multiplier on employment
follows (
nt − nt−1
nt−1
)
= γ + βn ·
(
gt − gt−1
yt−1
)
+ εt
Therefore, βn implies the change of employment growth rate given one percentage
increase of government spending relative to output. Alternatively, one could also
employ growth rate of government spending (gt−gt−1)/gt−1 as left-hand-side variable
such that the multiplier can be estimated by (nt−nt−1)/nt−1 = γ+δn·(gt−gt−1)/gt−1+
εt. However, β
y and δn are not comparable for the reason that βy measures percentage
change of output as government spending rises by one percent relative to output while
δn measures the one of output as government spending rises by one percent. Therefore,
if βy is estimated by using HBR transformation, then it is better to keep using HBR
transformed variables to obtain the multipliers of other variables. This procedure
enables to avoid similar biases due to ignoring the variation of yt/gt over the sample
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period when using ad hoc conversion factor.
B.2.2 Coefficient Interpretations
Given the baseline specification with the HBR transformation,
yj,t+h − yj,t−2
yj,t−2
= αhj + γ
h
t + βh ·
gjt − gj,t−2
yj,t−2
+ uhj,t+h,
the coefficients of interest {βh} can be interpreted as the impulse responses in the
multiplier sense. In response to a dollar shock of regional government spending per
resident, regional output per resident rises by βh dollar at horizon h after the shock.
Notably, the one dollar shock will also lead to a persistent increase in regional gov-
ernment spending per resident. Alternatively, {βh} can be also interpreted as follows.
In response to a 1 percent shock of regional government spending relative to regional
output, regional output per resident rises by βh percent at horizon h relative to the
pre-shock level. In the calibration, the parameters are calibrated by matching the
model-based impulse responses to 1 percent regional government spending shock and
the estimated impulse responses {βˆh}.
For alternative variables, e.g., regional employment rates, the coefficients of in-
terest {βnh} can be interpreted as follows. In response to 1 percent shock of regional
government spending relative to output, regional employment per resident rises by
βnh percent at horizon h relative to the pre-shock level. The interpretation is similar
in the case of population, sectoral output, and sectoral employment as alternative
dependent variables.
29
C More Discussions on Empirical Results
C.1 Visual Representations
This subsection provides a visual representation of the baseline specification. Figure
1.7 represents binned scatter plots for the first stage regression and reduced form
regressions of the IV elasticities of per-resident state output and population over
different horizons, respectively. The x variable is the residualized instrument, and y
variables are the residualized regional military spending, regional output, and regional
population in the biannual difference specification over various horizons. Both the x
and y variables are demeaned by year and state fixed effects. These plots show that
neither the first-stage nor the reduced-formed relationships are driven by outliers.
C.2 Validity of Baseline Instruments
First, the first-stage performance can be used to gauge the strength of instrument
relevance. R2 is 0.26; adjusted R2 is 0.21; and the partial R2 of the excluded instru-
ments is 0.12 for the baseline specification. Given that a large number of instruments
is used in the baseline specificationone for each state, the Cragg-Donald (1993)
first-stage F statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) is roughly five for the base-
line specification, where the critical value for less than 30 percent bias at 5 percent
significance for 51 instruments is roughly 4. This evidence suggests that the baseline
instruments satisfy relevance conditions.
Second, the contemporaneous exogeneity condition is not directly testable. The
analysis relies on the identifying assumptionnational military spending does not
respond because states that receive a disproportionate amount of military spending
are doing poorly relative to other states. If the identifying assumption is correct,
then E(vjt+hZ
′
jt) = 0, ∀h, i.e., contemporaneous exogeneity conditions and lead/lag
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Figure 1.7: First Stage and Reduced Form Binned Scatter Plots
Notes: The figure shows binned scatter plots of the first stage and reduced form of the IV
elasticities of per-resident state output and population over different horizons. Both the x
and y variables are demeaned by year and state fixed effects. The sample period is 1966-2006
for all states. Local military and output are per resident state military spending and GDP
by state deflated by state-level CPI measures.
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exogeneity conditions for other region-specific structural shocks {vjt} hold.
Third, I run auxiliary regressions with leads and lags of the biannual changes in
national military spending interacted with a state dummy, to test whether lead/lag
exogeneity conditions for the structural shocks of interest hold or not. Denote the
biannual changes of regional military spending and of national military spending by
∇gjt ≡ gjt−gjt−2yjt−2 and ∇gt+h ≡
gt+h−gt+h−2
yt+h−2
, respectively. The lead/lag exogeneity
conditions imply that ∇gjt and Ij∇gt+h are uncorrelated for any h 6= 0, where Ij
denotes a state dummy. That's to say, the slope coefficients should be not significant
for any horizon h 6= 0. Since a large number of instrumentsone for each stateare
employed in each auxiliary regression, the fraction of significant slope coefficients in
each auxiliary regression is a concise index to show the performance. Hypothetically,
if the lead/lag exogeneity conditions hold, the fraction of significant slopes should be
small for all auxiliary regressions.
As the difference is constructed in a biannual frequency, the auxiliary regressions
are run with leads and lags at h = ±2, 4, 6, 8. Table 1.2 reports the fraction of
significant slope coefficients in the auxiliary regressions. The result indicates that
for each auxiliary regressions, there are 4-8 states (out of 51) that fail the lead/lag
exogeneity tests. Since the fraction is not an ordinary statistic, one cannot judge
whether it is large or small in a statistical sense. However, the tests are still able to
provide useful information. I find that six states fail most of the lead/lag exogeneity
tests: Connecticut, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. That's
to say, the leads and lags of the national military spending are correlated with the
current changes of local military spending in these states. Hence, a natural way to
check robustness is to re-run the baseline regressions by excluding these states.
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Lag2 Lag4 Lag6 Lag8 Lead2 Lead4 Lead6 Lead8
Fraction 16% 12% 12% 6% 16% 12% 8% 8%
Table 1.2: Fraction of Significant Slope Coefficients in Auxiliary Regressions
Notes: The auxiliary regressions are specified by gjt−gjt−2yjt−2 = α
g
j + γ
g
t + η
s
j · gt+s−gt+s−2yt+s−2 + usjt,
where s = ±2, 4, 6, 8. The table reports the fraction of significant slope coefficient ηsj in the
auxiliary regressions. The total number of auxiliary regressions is 51, i.e., one for each state.
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Figure 1.8: Regional Impulse Responses: IV vs. OLS Estimates
Notes: The circle and dot are point estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} in using
OLS and IV respectively. A shorthand for the dependent variable is stated at the top of each
panel. The dependent variables are yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 ,
njt+h−njt−2
njt−2 , and
µjt+h−µjt−2
µjt−2 , where h is the
horizon. The sample period is 1966-2006. Output is per resident GDP by states deflated by
state-level CPI measures, employment is the number of employed divided by population.
C.3 Comparing with OLS Estimates
Figure 1.8 represents the estimated regional impulse responses based on a local projec-
tion regression with and without instruments. Blue dashed lines represent the baseline
estimates of regional impulse responses (with the baseline instruments), while red cir-
cles stand for the estimated impulse responses in using OLS. The OLS estimates have
a similar shape pattern but much smaller, reflecting the expected endogeneity bias.
C.4 The Specification Regional Total Term
In the baseline specification, state-level output and military spending are measured
in per capita terms. Hence, the dependent variable
yjt+h−yjt−2
yjt−2
and the regressor
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Figure 1.9: Regional Total Terms vs. Per-Resident Terms
Notes: The circle and dot are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses {βh} in re-
gional per resident terms and in regional total terms respectively. The dependent variable
is yjt+h−yjt−2yjt−2 , where h is the horizon. The sample period is 1966-2006 for all states. Output
is per resident GDP by state deflated by state-level CPI measures.
gjt−gjt−2
yjt−2
are interpreted as net change rates of variable per capita. The regional
impulse response βh represents how much the net change rate of per capita output is
in response to 1 percent increase of localized military spending relative to its output.
Alternatively, one can employ state-level output and military spending measured
in regional total terms and estimate the effects on net change rate of state output in
total terms. Hence, the regression specification is given by
y˜jt+h − y˜jt−2
y˜jt−2
= αj + γt + βh · g˜jt − g˜jt−2
y˜jt−2
+ ujt+h
where y˜jt and g˜jt are the regional total level of real output and military spending. I
thus instrument for the biannual change rates of state military procurement
g˜jt−g˜jt−2
y˜jt−2
in using the biannual change rates of national procurement in regional total level
g˜t−g˜t−2
y˜t−2
interacted with a state dummy. Figure 1.9 reports the estimates. Since the
change rate of state output in total levels contains the change rate of per capita output
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and of regional population. As expected, the estimated regional impulse responses in
total level terms are systematically larger than the ones in per capita terms, especially
after 5 years as regional populations grow substantially. The results are consistent
with our conjecture, indicating significant labor migration towards booming regions.
C.5 Long-Run Average Multipliers
In the baseline specification, I apply an instrumental variable local projection method
to estimate the regional impulse responses to fiscal stimuli. Usually, one can apply
long differences of regional output and military spending to estimate the long-run
average multipliers in using the following regression specification
yj,t+h − yj,t−2
yj,t−2
= αhj + γ
h
t + δh ·
gj,t+h − gj,t−2
yj,t−2
+ uhj,t+h (1.11)
where δh is usually interpreted as the long-run average multiplier. Figure 1.10 re-
ports the estimates of δh under the baseline instrument specification. For a better
comparison, I also compute the implied long-run average multipliers based on the
estimated regional impulse responses by δimpliedh =
1
h
∑h
s=0 βˆs, where βˆh are the point
estimates of regional impulse responses in the baseline specification. The estimates
for the variables in regional per resident terms are shown in the left panel and the
ones in regional total terms in the right panel.
C.6 Regional Impulse Responses of Sectoral Employment
The left panel of Figure 1.11 reports the employment multipliers across sectors. The
employment multipliers are similar to the output multipliers in the corresponding
sectors. The local employment in construction sector also sharply responds to local
military spending shocks. Other sectors including mining, agriculture, transportation
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Figure 1.10: Long-run Average Multipliers
Notes: The dots are point estimates of long-run average output multipliers {δh} in regional
per resident terms and in regional total terms respectively for the left and right panels, as in
regression (1.11). The sample period is 1966-2006 for all states. The circles are the implied
long-run average output multipliers δimpliedh =
1
h
∑h
s=0 βˆs, where βˆh are the LP-IV estimates
of regional impulse responses in the baseline specification.
and utilities, and government do no have statistically significant responses neither.
The right panel indicates that the construction sector makes an important contribu-
tion to the overall employment response.16
16The sectoral employment shares are 7 percent for construction, 19 percent for manufacturing,
9 percent for FIRE, 6 percent for wholesale trade, 21 percent for retail trade, and 31 percent for
services.
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Figure 1.11: Regional Impulse Responses of Employment by Sectors
Notes: The panel (a) shows LP-IV estiamtes of regional impulse responses {βh} of sectoral
employment, which is measured by the number of employed divided by regional population.
Panel (b) reports a breakdown of employment responses by sector. The dependent variable is
nsjt+h−nsjt−2
nsjt−2
, where h is the horizon and s denotes the sector. The sample period is 1966-2006
for all states.
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Chapter 2
Quantifying Fiscal Multipliers by a World of Regional Reallocation
2.1 Introduction
The regional exposure of a macroeconomic shock or policy intervention is often sub-
stantially asymmetric across regions (i.e., regions have idiosyncratic sensitivities.)
These asymmetric impacts may trigger regional reallocationlabor migration across
regionsthat affects both the regional and aggregate dynamics of the economy. While
a literature initiated by Blanchard and Katz (1992) has emphasized that regional re-
allocation is a primary margin of adjustment,1 there is essentially no quantitative
modeling of the role of regional reallocation in determining aggregate economic ac-
tivity.2
In this chapter, I study how labor reallocation across regions in response to fis-
cal stimuli affects regional and aggregate economic activity quantitatively. According
to the previous chapter, regional output and population display large and lengthy
responses to a regional fiscal stimulus, especially in the construction sector. To elu-
1Also see Eichengreen (1993), Borjas (2001), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), Kennan and Walker
(2011). Labor migration is a significant force by which the U.S. labor market adjusts to regional
shocks, despite a recent slowdown in regional reallocation (e.g., Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2017).
2Existing literature (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; Farhi and Werning, 2017) mainly fo-
cuses on a monetary union model assuming that regions are small open economies where goods and
capital are freely traded but population is fixed across regions. One exception is Farhi and Werning
(2014), who study the role of labor migration in a static monetary union model. Another is House,
Proebsting, and Tesar (2018) who introduce labor mobility into a multi-country DSGE model to
quantify the benefits labor mobility in a currency union.
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cidate the underlying mechanism and to quantify the aggregate impact, I develop a
multi-region New Keynesian model with labor migration and housing construction
and calibrate a U.S. economy with 51 regions. The model reveals that labor re-
allocation amplifies regional output through a boom in construction spending and
amplifies aggregate output through a positive covariance effect arising from net di-
rected migration towards booming regions where population and regional output per
resident are rising simultaneously. To circumvent high dimensionality, I propose a new
method to tractably solve spatial DSGE models. Using this method, I quantitatively
find that in response to a national military buildup that affects regions differentially
in a manner consistent with U.S. expenditure, labor reallocation amplifies the aggre-
gate output effect of government spending by 30 percent relative to a model without
it.
This chapter quantitatively analyzes the regional and aggregate implications of
my empirical findings. However, before proceeding to a complex quantitative model,
I study a simple model of regional reallocation to build intuition. This example
features asymmetric regional government purchase shocks and assumes that labor is
freely mobile across regions. The simple model reveals that labor migration and hous-
ing construction are each crucial to generate amplification effects on both regional and
aggregate responses to fiscal stimuli. In response to a regional fiscal expansion, labor
shifts to booming regions. Workers migrating to a region bring not only their labor
supply but also their demand for local housing. The increase in regional housing
demand leads to a more than proportional rise in construction spending, because
immobile factors, such as land, are in fixed supply. Therefore, the construction re-
sponse triggered by labor migration amplifies the impact of regional fiscal stimulus
on regional output per resident.
More importantly, regional reallocation amplifies the aggregate output effect of
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asymmetric localized government spending shocks. Intuitively, in response to asym-
metric regional shocks, population moves towards booming regions. These regions
experience an output and construction boom which increases output per resident.
The combination of population and output per resident growth occurring in the same
areas generates a covariance effect that amplifies the impacts on aggregate output.
To quantitatively evaluate the aggregate impacts of labor reallocation across re-
gions, I develop a New Keynesian monetary union model in the tradition of Benigno
and Benigno (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2008), NS (2014), and Beraja, Hurst, and
Ospina (2018).3 The model consists of multiple regions in which capital and inter-
mediate goods are freely traded. However, I relax the assumption that all regions
are small open economies with fixed populations and allow individual agents to opti-
mally decide where to move subject to migration frictions. The individual's problem is
closely related to the competitive/directed labor search model of Lucas and Prescott
(1974). To generate gradual labor migration as in the data, individual agents are
subject to a constant Calvo probability of being able to relocate and idiosyncratic
taste shocks for various regions. In addition, construction completion lags help to
generate hump-shaped responses of construction as in the empirical work.
In general, solving a spatial DSGE model is challenging because the entire cross-
sectional distribution of regional economic conditions evolves as a state variable,
causing a high-dimensional state space. I propose a new method that surmounts
this roadblock in order to characterize and solve the equilibrium in spatial DSGE
models. Under appropriate assumptions,4 the aggregate responses in the model un-
3The regional reallocation mechanism does not depend on nominal rigidity, which is shown by
the simple model in Section 2.2. The purpose of introducing the New Keynesian framework is to
incorporate monetary policy reaction to generate realistic aggregate fiscal multipliers.
4The key assumptions for aggregation include i) the underlying production, utility, and market
structure are symmetric across regions and ii) the Gumbel specification of location-preference shocks.
More details are discussed in Section 2.3.
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der flexible perturbation can be characterized by an aggregate dynamic system with
a new low-dimensional state variable capturing aggregate effects of reallocation. Ap-
plying this aggregation result, I show that the regional responses in the model can be
represented by a regional dynamic system conditional on the aggregates.5 Thus, the
model-based regional impulse response is conceptually consistent with the estimated
regional impulse response that includes time fixed effects soaking up all aggregate
variation.
I calibrate the model to a 51-state U.S. economy. After setting some parameters to
standard values, I fit the structural parameters associated with labor migration and
housing construction by matching the regional impulse responses of population and
construction output estimated from the data. Although I do not target the estimated
responses to regional output and consumption, the model matches those impulse re-
sponses quite well. In contrast, a comparable model without labor migration does not
generate lengthy hump-shaped responses of regional output, population, construction,
and consumption.
Equipped with the calibrated economy, I investigate the macroeconomic impli-
cations of regional reallocation in response to fiscal stimuli. Using the systematic
heterogeneity in regional sensitivity to national military spending pointed out by NS,
I quantify the impacts of 1 percent national military buildup relative to output that
affects state military spending differentially. Relative to a comparable model with
fixed populations, regional reallocation amplifies the aggregate cumulative output
multiplier by 30 percent.
The degree of amplification provided by regional reallocation depends crucially
5This approach shares similar advantages with Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2018) in that it
enables us to separately solve regional and aggregate dynamics by using perturbation methods.
Unlike their method, I allow for labor mobility across regions and thus aggregate variables depend
on the endogenously varying population distribution across regions.
41
on the asymmetry and persistence of the spending. I perform two sets of quantita-
tive experiments to demonstrate this point. First, by altering regional sensitivity to
national military spending, I quantify the macro impacts in response to a national
military buildup that affects regions more asymmetrically than in the benchmark
case. The results show that the aggregate output effect of government purchases is
greater when there are more asymmetric localized fiscal shocks across regions. This
is because more asymmetric shocks trigger a larger covariance effect of regional real-
location. This dispersion dependence is in contrast to existing models with regional
fixed populations, which instead predict irrelevance to the degree of asymmetry of re-
gional shocks. Second, I investigate the role of the persistence of fiscal shocks, given
the degree of asymmetry. More persistent fiscal shocks lead to a larger magnitude of
labor reallocation and therefore a larger amplification effect on aggregate output.
These results indicate that analyses of fiscal policy need to consider the asym-
metry and persistence of the policy in order to assess the importance of the regional
reallocation channel.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 studies a simple
model of regional reallocation to build intuition. Section 2.3 develops a quantitative
multi-regional New Keynesian model with labor migration and housing construction.
Section 2.4 describes a new method to characterize and solve for equilibrium in the
model. Section 2.5 calibrates parameters. Section 2.6 inspects the main mechanisms
and quantifies the impact of regional reallocation on aggregate fiscal multipliers. Sec-
tion 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 A Simple Static Model of Regional Reallocation
Having shown the regional impulse responses to fiscal stimuli, I investigate the regional
and aggregate implications of the above empirical findings. But before proceeding
to a complex quantitative model, I study a simple model of regional reallocation
to build intuition and illustrate the covariance effect. To that end I provide an
analytical solution to equilibrium output in response to regional government spending
by specifying particular functional form assumptions, as well as a general solution by
using a second-order approximation for the case without functional form assumptions.
2.2.1 Basic Setup
The economy is static and consists of J regions indexed by j ∈ J = {1, 2, ..., J}, with
regional populations denoted by µj and total population is normalized to one,
∑
j µj =
1. Individual households are freely mobile across regions. Lower-case variables are in
per-resident terms, and upper-case variables stand for regional totals.6 In each region,
individual households have utility over consumption cj and hours worked nj, denoted
by u(cj, nj), where utility is concavely increasing in cj and convexly decreasing in nj.
Each region has a competitive firm that produces regional goods by using regional
labor following a production function yj = ajf(nj), where aj is productivity level
and f is increasing in nj. Assume that each household demands one unit of housing
inelastically. Houses are produced by using regional goods xj and land per resident
lj = L/µj, where L is the regional total amount of land, which is common across
regions. The housing production function is denoted by hj = h(xj, lj), where h is
increasing in xj and lj. Regional goods are not traded across regions and are used for
regional consumption Cj = cjµj, construction spending Xj = xjµj, and government
6Since total population is normalized to 1, aggregate total variables equal to aggregate per capita
variables.
43
purchases Gj, where Gj = G + εj and εj are exogenous shocks. The regional goods
market clears such that yjµj = cjµj+xjµj+Gj. The aggregate amount of government
purchases is denoted by G =
∑
j Gj. Assume a symmetric steady state across regions
such that y?j = y
?, c?j = c
?, n?j = n
?, x?j = x
?, G?j = G
?, a?j = a
?, and µ?j = µ
? = 1/J .
2.2.2 Analytical Solution
To show the regional reallocation mechanism analytically, I assume a quadratic utility
function u(c, n) = 1
2
(c − c)2 − λn
2
n2, a linear production of regional goods yj = anj,
and a Cobb-Douglas housing production, hj = (
L
µj
)
1
2 (xj)
1
2 . Under spatial equilibrium,
individual households' utilities are equalized across regions such that u(cj, nj) = u.
Given a realization of exogenous government purchase across regions {Gl}l∈J , the
spatial equilibrium condition pins down the equilibrium distribution of population
across regions, denoted by µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ). Thus, regional construction spending
depends on the size of the regional population, denoted by xj = x(µj) = µj/L,
where xµ > 0 is the derivative of construction spending with respect to the size
of regional population. The equilibrium regional labor supply function is given by
nj = n(gj, xj) =
c+gj+xj
a+λn/a
, where ng > 0 and nx > 0 are the first-order derivative
of labor supply with respect to government purchases and construction spending.
Under spatial equilibrium, the regions receiving relatively high government purchases
Gj > G attract labor immigration such that µj > µ
?, and vice versa.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium regional and aggregate
output:
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Proposition 1. Under spatial equilibrium, the exact solution for regional output per
resident in response to government purchase shocks is given by
yj = y
? + ang · (gj − g?) + anx · (xj − x?) (2.1)
and the exact solution for aggregate output is
Y =
∑
j
yjµj = Y
? + ang · (
∑
j
Gj −G?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mean effect
+ anx ·
∑
j
(xj − x?)(µj − µ?)︸ ︷︷ ︸,
covariance effect
(2.2)
where regional per resident government purchases are gj = Gj/µj, construction spend-
ing is xj = µj/L, and equilibrium regional population is µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ).
As Proposition 1 states, equation (2.1) indicates how regional government-purchase
shocks affect regional output per resident. First, regional government purchases have
a direct stimulating effect on regional output, represented by ang(gj−g?). Second, as
labor immigration increases regional housing demand, regional construction spending
booms and pushes regional output up additionally, reflected by anx(xj−x?). This am-
plification mechanism triggered by asymmetric regional government-purchase shocks
is different from the existing literature based on monetary union models with fixed
populations across regions.
Aggregating equation (2.1) weighted by populations, the aggregate output can
be represented by Y = Y ? + ang(G − G?) + anx(X − X?). Using a covariance
decomposition, this yields X − X? = ∑j x?(µj − µ?) + ∑j(xj − x?)µ? + ∑j(xj −
x?)(µj − µ?). Due to the equilibrium construction policy xj = µj/L and adding-up
condition of population, the first two terms wash out. Therefore, equation (2.2) shows
how aggregate output changes in response to asymmetric government purchase shocks
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across regions.
The mean effect term ang(
∑
j Gj − G?) represents the standard expansionary
effect of government spending; it shows the effect of aggregate government spending∑
j Gj independent of its distribution across regions. This result is consistent with the
existing literature. In the case without regional reallocation, the solution for aggregate
output is given by Y o = Y ? + ang(
∑
j Gj −G?). It implies that the national effect of
government spending only depends on the aggregate amount, because the effects of
regional output in response to asymmetric regional government spending net out.
The novel mechanism is the covariance effect term anx
∑
j(xj − x?)(µj − µ?),
which represents the second-order effect arising from the comovement of regional con-
struction and population. High-spending regions (Gj > G
?) attract labor immigration
(µj > µ
?) and also have more construction demand (xj > x
?). Plugging in equilibrium
construction spending, the covariance effect term becomes anx/L ·
∑
j(µj − µ?)2 >
0. Therefore, regional reallocation in response to asymmetric government spending
shocks leads to a positive comovement between regional construction and population.
This covariance effect amplifies aggregate output relative to a model without labor
reallocation.
2.2.3 General Solution
Proposition 1 shows the regional reallocation mechanisms analytically for specific
functional forms. In general, the regional reallocation mechanisms in equation (2.2)
also appear in cases where the above functional form assumptions are relaxed. In this
subsection, I show that although the macro impacts of regional reallocation wash out
in the first-order approximation, they can be important in a second-order approxi-
mation.
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Proposition 2. Under spatial equilibrium, the first-order approximation of the re-
sponse of regional output to government purchase shocks is given by
yj = y
? + ang · (gj − g?) + anx(xj − x?) + h.o.t (2.3)
and the second-order approximation to aggregate output is given by
Y = Y ?+ang(
∑
j
Gj−G?)+anx
∑
j
x˜µ(µj − µ?)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariance effect
+
1
2
angg(
∑
j
Gj−G?)2+h.o.t., (2.4)
where x˜µ ≡ (xµ + 12xµµµ?) > 0, xµ and xµµ are first- and second-order derivatives of
construction spending with respect to regional population.
As Proposition 2 illustrates, the regional reallocation effects on regional output
show up in the first-order approximation while the regional reallocation effects on
aggregate output appear in the second-order approximation.
Consistent with equation (2.1), the construction effect anx(xj − x?) in equation
(2.3) amplifies regional output relative to the one with fixed populations across re-
gions. This effect is first-order to regional output. As more labor immigrates to
a region due to favorable regional shocks, regional construction spending booms in
response and increases regional output.
The aggregate impacts of regional reallocation are shown by the covariance effect
term
∑
j x˜µ(µj − µ?)2 in equation (2.4). Net directed migration shifts population to
booming regions which are where populations and regional output per resident go up
jointly. This comovement force generates a nonlinear aggregate effect that amplifies
the impacts of government spending relative to the situation without labor migration.
Such nonlinear aggregate effects are similar to the generalized Hulten Theorem in
47
Baqaee and Farhi (2018) in the following sense. Given a fixed amount of aggregate
government spending, the regional output effects of asymmetric government-spending
shocks net out in the aggregate to the first-order approximation. However, the second-
order aggregate effect of a regional shock is associated with the change in the popu-
lation share of that region. In response to a positive regional government-spending
shock, not only the regional output per resident rises but also the population share in
that region. Regional reallocation amplifies the aggregate impact of positive regional
shocks and mitigates that of negative regional shocks, leading to an amplification of
aggregate output impact to a second-order approximation.
Under a first-order approximation, the aggregate impacts of regional reallocation
wash out. The standard log-linearization approach cannot deliver the macro im-
plications of regional reallocation in response to asymmetric shocks across regions.
Therefore, in Section 2.4, I propose a flexible perturbation method to characterize
the macro impacts of regional reallocation in a tractable manner.
2.3 A Quantitative Multi-Region New Keynesian Model
In this section, I develop a multi-region New Keynesian model with imperfect labor
mobility and housing construction to quantify the role of regional reallocation in
affecting regional and aggregate fiscal multipliers. This model is built on a large
literature on monetary union models.7 The economy consists of multiple regions
indexed by j ∈ J = {1, ..., J}, where capital and intermediate goods are freely
traded. The economy has a federal government that conducts fiscal and monetary
policy.8 However, I relax the assumption that all regions are small open economies
7For example, Benigno and Benigno (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2008), NS (2014), and Beraja,
Hurst and Ospina (2018).
8The regional reallocation mechanism does not depend on nominal rigidity, as shown by the simple
model in Section 2.2. The purpose of introducing the New Keynesian framework is to incorporate
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with fixed populations and allow individuals to relocate from one region to another
subject to migration frictions. Individuals decide optimal migration policies subject
to a constant Calvo probability of being able to relocate and idiosyncratic taste shocks
for various regions. In addition, variable construction completion lags help to generate
hump-shaped responses of construction as in the data. In this model, subscripts j
and t denote region and period and lower-case letters for regional per resident terms
and upper-case letters for total quantities or prices.
2.3.1 Firms and Production
2.3.1.1 Local Production
Regional Final Goods. Each region has a continuum of competitive firms that
purchase traded intermediate goods and regional labor to produce regional final goods.
Each firm operates a Cobb-Douglas production function, yjt = Am
α
jtn
1−α
jt , where yjt,
mjt, and njt denote the amount of regional output, intermediate input, and hours
worked in per resident terms, and A the productivity level.9 A regional final goods
firm chooses an input bundle to maximize its profit,
max
{mjt,njt}
: Pjtyjt −Wjtnjt −Qtmjt,
where Pjt and Wjt are the price of regional final goods and the nominal wage in
region j at time t, and Qt is the price of traded intermediate inputs. The optimal
input decisions for regional final goods firms satisfy Wjt = (1 − α)PjtAmαjtn−αjt and
Qt = αPjtAm
α−1
jt n
1−α
jt .
monetary policy reaction to generate realistic aggregate fiscal multipliers.
9The size is normalized as being the same as regional population. The regional total output of
final goods is denoted by Yjt = yjtµjt
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Regional Housing Construction. In each period a fraction δh of housing stock
depreciates such that the regional housing stock evolves as Hjt+1 = (1− δh)Hjt +Y hjt ,
where Y hjt denotes the number of new houses built at time t.
10 Assume that there is
a continuum of competitive builders whose size is normalized by regional population.
Each builder operates a decreasing return-to-scale housing production technology,
yhjt = bx
ζ
jt, where ζ ∈ (0, 1) and xjt and b are the amount of regional goods used as
construction inputs and the productivity of the housing sector.11 The total amount
of newly-built houses is Y hjt = y
h
jtµjt.
In order to generate hump-shaped responses of regional construction, the model
needs to introduce some frictions on regional housing supply. Permit restrictions are
a natural friction. In practice, the government issues a limited number of permits
to restrict the regional supply of housing due to political, environmental, and other
reasons. In this model, I assume that the government issues one unit of housing
permit for each new immigrant.12 I also assume that a fraction φh of the authorized
permit stock Sjt is completed in each period, where φh ∈ (0, 1) denotes the completion
rate. Thus, the number of new houses built at time t is not greater than the number
of completed permits, Y hjt ≤ φhSjt . The stock of authorized permits Sjt is the sum of
the unfinished permits for the last period (1 − φh)Sjt−1 and new issued permits Snjt,
given by Sjt = (1− φh)Sjt−1 + Snjt.13 Under the specific completion rate, the average
10In this quantitative model, I allow for varying housing consumption, instead of inelastic demand.
More details about utility specification and regional housing market structure are in subsection 2.3.2.
11I also study the case of a competitive regional builder who operates a housing production function
of Y hjt = bX
ζ
jt. Most of the results are preserved. But the regional steady state interacts with the size
of regional population, and it makes aggregation relatively more difficult than the above specification
of the per resident production function.
12Howard and Liebersohn (2018) establish an empirical fact that the change of population is nearly
one-for-one with the change of housing units, implying that labor reallocation is the main force for
cross-sectional housing demand. The one permit per person assumption is consistent with this
empirical fact.
13Although regional population is a constant in steady state, there is still an influx of new immi-
grants, which exactly offsets the amount of labor out-migration, due to idiosyncratic location-taste
shocks. Therefore, at steady state, new permits are issued to cover the depreciated amount of
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duration of a construction project is 1−φh
φh
periods. This parameter can be disciplined
by the average construction duration from the data.14
Therefore, builders optimally choose the number of houses to build subject to
permit restrictions. The equilibrium rental rates and housing prices are pinned down
by the individual household's marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
housing and the user cost equation.15
2.3.1.2 Production of Tradeable Factors
Monopolistic Intermediate Firms. For each variety i (denoted by parenthe-
ses), a monopolistic firm uses capital to produce intermediate goods by Mt(i) =
Kt(i).
16 Since the intermediate goods and capital goods are freely traded, the lo-
cation of intermediate goods production does not matter. Each monopolistic firm
is subject to Calvo-type nominal rigidity such that it resets its price each period
with a constant probability 1 − θ. Therefore, the profit-maximization problem is
max{Q?t } : Et
{∑∞
s=0 θ
sΛnt,t+s[Q
?
tMt+s|t(i)− Φnt+sMt+s|t(i)]
}
, subject to its demand,
Mt+s|t(i) = [Q?t/Qt+s]
−εMt+s for all s ≥ 0, where Q?t is the optimal reset price for the
firm that is able to reset its price at time t, Λnt,t+s and Φ
n
t denote nominal stochastic
discount factor and nominal marginal cost at time t. Thus, the optimal reset price sat-
isfies the optimal pricing condition, Et
{∑∞
s=0 θ
sΛnt,t+sMt+s|t(i)
(
Q?t − εε−1Φnt+s
)}
= 0,
implying that a firm resets its price equal to a constant markup over a weighted av-
erage of current and expected future nominal marginal costs. The nominal marginal
housing stock.
14If φh goes to one, all housing permits are completed immediately and the model degenerates to
a standard housing model without completion duration.
15The builder's optimality conditions as well as equilibrium conditions for rental rate and housing
prices are shown in the Appendix.
16For simplification, I specify a constant return-to-scale production function of intermediate goods.
In fact, the production function can be also decreasing return-to-scale, e.g., Mt(i) = [Kt(i)]
κ, where
κ ∈ (0, 1).
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cost of intermediate producers equals to the rental rate of capital, Φnt = R
k
t . Given
the Calvo-probability specification, the price of traded intermediate goods follows
Qt =
[
θQ1−εt−1 + (1− θ)Q?1−εt
] 1
1−ε .
Traded intermediate goodsMt are produced by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function over a continuum of varieties indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], Mt =
[
∫ 1
0
Mt(i)
ε−1
ε di]
ε
ε−1 , where ε governs the substitutability of varieties with ε ≥ 1. Hence,
the price of traded intermediate goods is and the demand for intermediate goods of
variety i is Mt(i) = [Qt(i)/Qt]
−εMt.
Investment Goods Producer. A competitive investment goods producer com-
bines regional final goods to produce investment goods using a CES production func-
tion, It = (
∑
j i
η−1
η
jt µjt)
η
η−1 , where η governs the substitutability of regional goods with
η ≥ 0 and µjt denotes the population in region j at time t. Hence, the demand for
local goods in region j to produce investment goods is ijt = (Pjt/Pt)
−ηIt and mar-
ket price of investment goods (and capital) is Pt = (
∑
j P
1−η
jt µjt)
1
1−η . Therefore, the
aggregate capital stock evolves according to Kt+1 = (1 − δk)Kt + It, where δk is the
capital depreciation rate.
2.3.2 Households
There is a continuum of individual households in the economy. The size of a pop-
ulation is normalized to one. Each household lives infinitely, and time is discrete
t = 1, 2, .... Households are allowed to migrate across regions but are subject to fric-
tions. Within each period individuals have to live in the same region where they work.
Individuals hold equal shares of capital stock and receive dividend payoffs. They de-
cide consumption cjt, hours worked njt, housing service hjt, and migration choices to
maximize their expected lifetime utility given by E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(cjt, njt, hjt), where β is
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a time discount factor. I also assume a big family who decides the aggregate stock
of capital. This assumption enables me to avoid keeping track of capital distribution
across individuals as a state variable.
2.3.2.1 Imperfect Labor Mobility across Regions
I now introduce two features to generate imperfect labor mobility across regionsCalvo
migration probability and Gumbel location-preference shocks. At the end of each pe-
riod, each individual agent can relocate with a constant probability ψ ∈ (0, 1), which
is referred to as the Calvo migration probability. In addition, following the standard
specification in the spatial economics literature (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Moretti,
2011), individuals who relocate face idiosyncratic location-specific preference shocks,
jt, which follow an i.i.d. Gumbel distribution across individuals and over time.
17
The evolution of population distribution across regions is given by
µjt+1 = (1− ψ)µjt + ψϕjt, (2.5)
where µjt denotes the population in region j at time t and ϕjt stands for the optimal
migration policy to region j in the next period for those who are allowed to relocate.18
2.3.2.2 The Individual Household's Problem
Each individual household holds equal shares of capital and therefore receives divi-
dends from a parent. In addition, each individual pays housing rent to the parent to
obtain housing service. Given that households receive local real wage income, profit
17The Gumbel distribution assumption is standard in dynamic discrete choice models and allows
for simple aggregation of idiosyncratic decisions made by individual households. (Artuc, Chaudhuri,
and McLaren, 2010; Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro, 2018)
18The newly issued permits at time t is Snjt = ψϕjt, under the one permit per immigrant assump-
tion.
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from monopolistic firms Rmt , and dividend Dt, they decide consumption cjt, hours
worked njt, housing service hjt, and migration choices, to maximize expected lifetime
utility
Vj(s) = max{cjt,njt,hjt}
{
u(cjt, njt, hjt) + κj + β[(1− ψ)EtVj(s′) + ψ(max
l∈J
: EtVl(s′) + νlt)]
}
,
subject to budget constraint, cjt+%
h
jthjt = (1− τt)(Wjt/Pjt)njt+Dt+Rmt −Tt, where
s denotes a set of state variables at time t, κj denotes local amenity in region j,
19 ψ is
the Calvo migration probability, %hjt is the market rental rate of housing, τt and Tt are
labor income tax rates and real lump-sum taxes levied by a federal government, and
jt denotes idiosyncratic location-preference shocks, and ν is the standard deviation
of location-preference shocks.
Under the Gumbel distribution assumption, the optimal relocation policy is shown
by20
ϕjt =
exp[EtVj(st+1)]
1
ν∑
l exp[EtVl(st+1)]
1
ν
. (2.6)
This optimal relocation policy is consistent with the existing literature of labor real-
location (e.g., Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren, 2010; Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro,
2018). First, the optimal migration policy is a probabilistic rule due to idiosyncratic
location-preference shocks. Second, the regions with higher virtual expected value
EtVj(st+1) attract a larger fraction of labor migration. Third, a higher standard
deviation of location-preference shocks ν implies a flatter distribution of optimal relo-
cation ϕt. Intuitively, the optimal migration policy is determined by two forcesthe
gain of expected value from relocation and the cost from location-preference shocks.
19The region-specific time-invariant local amenity is commonly assumed in the literature on spatial
economics (see Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) for a survey. The local amenity term represents
climate, landscape, culture, language, etc.)
20The proof is in the Appendix.
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A higher variance of location preference shocks causes higher expected loss to a par-
ticular location.
2.3.2.3 The Parent's Problem and Capital Accumulation
A representative parent decides aggregate capital stock Kt+1, nominal bond holding
Bt, and dividend Dt to maximize the average of all individual households' utilities,
max{Kt+1,Bt+1} : E0
∑
t β
t
(∑
j u(cjt, njt, hjt)µjt
)
subject to the budget constraint
PtKt+1 +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + (1− δk)PtKt +RktKt −
∑
j
PjtDtµjt
+
∑
j
Pjt%
h
jthjtµjt −
∑
j
Pjtxjtµjt,
whereRt is nominal interest rate, R
k
t is nominal return rate of capital, and
∑
j Pjtχjtµjt
is the total spending on housing construction. Bonds are in zero net supply in equilib-
rium such that Bt = 0 for all t. The parent receives all profit from housing builders,
owns all the houses, and rents them to individual households. This representative
parent assumption enables me to avoid keeping track of the distribution of capital
holding across individuals as a state variable.21 The intertemporal Euler equation
to the parent's optimization problem is given by MUt = βEt
[
Rt
Pt
Pt+1
MUt+1
]
, where
MUt =
∑
j uc(jt)µjt represents economy-wide marginal utilities and the nominal
stochastic discount factor is Λnt,t+s =
PtMUt+s
Pt+sMUt
.
21The big family specification is not the same as complete market assumption. Although house-
holds have perfect risk sharing within a region, their consumption could be different across regions
in the model.
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2.3.3 Government
2.3.3.1 Region-based Government Purchases
The economy has a federal government that conducts fiscal and monetary policy.
The per-resident federal government spending in each region {gjt} has the common
component ξt and a regional idiosyncratic component zjt over regional final goods
such that gjt = exp(ξt + zjt). The common component is assumed to be a constant
ξt = ξ and idiosyncratic components follow exogenous AR(1) processes given by
zjt = ρzzjt−1 + zjt, where ρz denotes the persistence of idiosyncratic government
spending and zjt is an i.i.d. white noise with zero mean. The government spending
at steady state is g = exp(ξ).
2.3.3.2 National Tax and Monetary Policy
The government levies both labor income and lump-sum taxes to finance its purchases
of goods. Therefore, the government budget constraint satisfies
∑
j
Pjtgjtµjt = (1− τt)
∑
j
Wjtnjtµjt +
∑
j
PjtTtµjt.
The federal government also operates a common monetary policy for the whole
economy. In particular, I consider a Taylor rule for nominal interest rates,
Rˆt = ρrRˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(φpipˆit + φyYˆ gapt ),
where Rˆt, pˆit, and Yˆ
gap
t denote the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate, inflation
rate, and aggregate output gap, respectively. ρr, ρpi, and ρy stand for the policy
responsiveness to interest rate in the last period, inflation rate, and aggregate output
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gap. Aggregate output Yt is defined by summing up the value of all final goods across
regions, Yt ≡
∑
j Pjtyjtµjt/Pt.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
Definition. A dynamic spatial equilibrium is a collection of prices and quantities,
{Pjt,Wjt, Qhjt, %hjt, Qt, Pt, Q?t , Rt, Rkt , Qt(i)} and {cjt,mjt, njt, yjt, µjt, gjt, xjt, hjt, ijt, ϕjt,
Kt, Dt, It, Tt,Mt,Mt(i), Kt(i)} for each region and period, and exogenous shocks of
government spending across regions {zjt}, such that (i) regional final goods firms,
monopolistic intermediate firms, investment goods producers, and housing builders
maximize profits; (ii) individual households maximize lifetime expected utility; (iii)
the parent maximizes weighted average utility; (iv) regional final goods, labor, and
housing markets and national intermediate good and capital markets clear such that
yjt = cjt + gjt + ijt + xjt for all regions, Mt =
∑
jmjtµjt and Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di for all
time.
2.4 Aggregation
In this section, I develop a new method to characterize and solve the regional and
aggregate dynamics in the model. I show that the equilibrium behavior of regional and
aggregate variables in a locally-perturbed economy can be represented by a regional
dynamic system and an aggregate dynamic system, respectively. Applying this useful
aggregation result, I provide a procedure to solve the model.
2.4.1 Aggregation
The model is log-linearized around the steady state. A regional variable's log-deviation
from steady state is denoted by a lowercase letter with hats. Uppercase letters with
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hats in calligraphic form represent aggregate variables in log-deviation from steady
state. For example, cˆjt ≡ log(cjt/c?) and Cˆt ≡ log(Ct/c?) stand for regional per res-
ident and aggregate consumption deviations from the steady state, where c? is the
steady state for per-resident consumption. In addition, the difference of log-deviation
of a regional variable from another regional counterpart is denoted by a lowercase
letter with tildes, e.g., c˜jt ≡ cˆjt − cˆj′t.
As shown in Section 2.2, the aggregate effects of regional reallocation totally wash
out when using a first-order approximation. To capture the covariance term arising
from regional reallocation, I apply a flexible perturbation method. For any aggregate
variable that is defined by the sum of per-resident regional counterparts weighted by
regional populations, e.g., aggregate consumption Ct =
∑
j cjtµjt, and due to the fact
that population shares across regions add up to one
∑
j µjt = 1, we have the following
identity, Ct−c
?
c?
=
∑
j cjtµjt−
∑
j c
?µjt
c?
= Σj(
cjt−c?
c?
)µjt. Therefore, Cˆt =
∑
j cˆjtµjt, implying
that the cross-sectional inner-products between local variable exposures and popula-
tion shares are equivalent to the aggregate counterparts in log-deviation from steady
state. In addition, expanding µjt around steady state, i.e., µjt = (1 + µˆjt)µ
?
j , the
log-deviation of aggregate consumption can be shown by Cˆt =
∑
j cˆjtµ
?
j +
∑
j cˆjtµˆjtµ
?
j .
This equation indicates that the second-order term
∑
j cˆjtµˆjtµ
?
j captures the covari-
ance effect arising from regional reallocation. The major advantage of such a flexible
perturbation method is that it enables us to characterize the nonlinear covariance
effect in a linear manner, which significantly reduces computational intensity but
preserves the covariance effect.
Applying this flexible perturbation method, I aggregate up all log-linearized equi-
librium conditions by population shares. Under two key assumptions, the model can
aggregate up to an augmented representative economy that is able to capture the
impacts of cross-sectional distribution on aggregate dynamics. Therefore, the ag-
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gregate dynamics in the modelthe equilibrium behavior of aggregate variables in
log-deviation from steady statecan be characterized by such a log-linearized aug-
mented representative economy.
The first key assumption for aggregation is that the underlying production, util-
ity, and market structure are symmetric across regions. For instance, individual
households have the same utility form over consumption and leisure and are linear
to the exogenous local amenity. The second assumption is the Gumbel specification
of location-preference shocks. This assumption implies an optimal migration policy
that only depends on the differentials of residential value across regions.
Under these assumptions, in steady state each region is identical in per resident
terms. Given the Gumbel specification, heterogeneous local amenities only affect the
size of population shares across regions at steady state. Therefore, the log-linearized
aggregate variables are equivalently represented by the inner-product of log-linearized
regional variables and varying regional population shares, e.g., Cˆt =
∑
j cˆjtµjt for ag-
gregate consumption. Similarly, I define the inner-product of a log-linearized regional
variable and the difference between optimal migration policy and population distri-
bution ϕ˜jt ≡ ϕjt−µjt as a reallocation summary statistic, denoted by an uppercase
letter with tildes, e.g., G˜t ≡
∑
j gˆjtϕ˜jt for localized government spending. The real-
location summary statistic characterizes how regional reallocation affects aggregate
dynamics in response to regional economic conditions. Thus, Proposition 3 shows
that the aggregate dynamics in the model can be characterized by a log-linearized
augmented representative aggregate economy.
Proposition 3 (Aggregate Dynamics) The behavior of aggregate variables in the
locally-perturbed economy is identical to that of an augmented representative economy
in the form of a linear dynamic system Γ0EtYˆt+1 = Γ1Yˆt + Γ2X˜t, where Γ0, Γ1, and
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Γ2 are matrices of coefficients, Yˆt =
∑
j yˆjtµjt stands for aggregate variables and
X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt stands for reallocation summary statistics.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 clearly shows the aggregate influence from regional reallocation.
Under the Gumbel specification, the optimal migration policy {ϕjt} depends on the
distribution of regional economic conditions {xˆjt}. Therefore, the reallocation sum-
mary statistics X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt are able to characterize the aggregate influence of
asymmetric regional shocks through regional reallocation. For instance, denote a re-
gional demand by xˆjt. Holding other regions fixed, a positive unit of local demand
shock xˆjt > 0 attracts more labor immigration ϕ˜jt > 0. Therefore, the augmented
aggregate demand rises, X˜t > 0, due to the covariance effect. In contrast, without
net directed labor reallocation, ϕ˜jt term vanishes and therefore aggregate dynamics
has nothing to do with regional reallocation and is irrelevant to the cross-sectional
distribution of regional shocks.
Subtracting the aggregate system from the original log-linearized system, this
yields a regional dynamic system that contains log-deviation of regional variables
from the aggregate counterparts. Proposition 4 shows that the regional dynamics in
the model can be characterized by a regional dynamic system.
Proposition 4 (Regional Dynamics) The behavior of regional variables in the log-
linearized economy is identical to that of a regional dynamic economy in the form of
Φ0Ety˜t+1 = Φ1y˜t + Φ2z˜t, where Φ0, Φ1, and Φ2 are matrices of coefficients, y˜t stands
for differential regional variables, z˜t represents regional idiosyncratic shocks.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Proposition 4 provides two useful results. First, the solution for regional dynam-
ics is directly comparable with the estimated regional impulse responses by a local
projection method for panel data with time fixed effects. The time-fixed effects in
regression soak up aggregate variation such as national monetary shocks or aggregate
productivity. The differential regional variables in log-deviation from steady state
also net out all aggregate variation. Therefore, relevant parameters can be calibrated
by matching the regional impulse responses in the model with the estimated regional
impulse responses from the data. Second, given the realization of localized govern-
ment spending shocks across regions, the optimal migration policy can be solved, as
well as the evolution of population distribution across regions. Under the Gumbel
specification of location-preference shocks, the optimal migration policy only depends
on the differentials of regional economic conditions. All common changes of aggregate
conditions play no role in affecting labor reallocation across regions.
2.4.2 Solution Method
Numerically solving the equilibrium of a spatial DSGE model is challenging. Migra-
tion decisions depend on regional economic conditions (e.g., regional population den-
sity and regional fiscal shocks) not only in an individual's residential region but also
in all other regions (i.e., all 51 regions). Thus the entire cross-sectional distribution
of regional economic conditions evolves as a state variable, causing a computational
complexity.
Applying the aggregation results, I solve the aggregate dynamics using locally
accurate perturbation methods, thus avoiding computational complexity of high di-
mensionality. I first solve the regional dynamics and obtain optimal labor migration
policies and the evolution of labor distribution across regions. Then, given the dis-
tribution of regional demand shocks, I employ the solution for labor migration and
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solve for the evolution of reallocation summary statistics. Finally, I plug their evo-
lution processes into the aggregate dynamic system and solve for aggregate impulse
responses.
This approach is similar to the method of Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2018) in
that it enables us to separately solve regional and aggregate dynamics by using per-
turbation methods. Unlike their method, my approach allows for labor migration
across regions, and aggregate variables can depend on the endogenously varying pop-
ulation shares. Therefore, the evolution of aggregate shocks depends not only on the
exogenous shock process but also on the cross-sectional labor distribution in response
to the shocks.
2.5 Model Parameterization
The model is calibrated in two steps. First, a set of parameters is fixed to be consistent
with the standard macroeconomic literature. Given those parameters, the remaining
parameters are calibrated to match the estimated local impulse responses to fiscal
stimuli from Chapter 1 and related moments from the data.
Fixed Parameters. Table (2.1) lists the parameters to be fixed exogenously. House-
hold's utility is separable over consumption, hours worked, and housing service,
u(c, n, h) = log(c) − λn n1+φ
−1
n
1+φ−1n
+ λh log(h), where φn denotes the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply.22 As in NS (2014), φn is set to 1, which is relatively standard in macroe-
conomics, although φn is somewhat higher than values estimated in microeconomic
studies (Hall, 2009; Chetty et al., 2012). The calibrated value of λn is pinned down by
setting the average hours worked N? = 0.2 in steady state.23 I calibrate λh = 0.22 to
22The major results are robust to a CRRA utility function, as shown in the Appendix.
23The optimal consumption-labor condition at steady state, W
?
P?c? = λn(N
?)φn , can pin down the
value of λn = 1.035 by setting average hours worked ratio N
? = 0.2.
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match the average ratio of housing consumption over total consumption, 18 percent.
(Piazzesi and Schneider, 2016)
A model period is one year. The time discount factor is set to β = 0.97, implying
that the annual real interest rate at steady state is 3 percent. The annual capital
depreciation rate is set to δk = 0.08, which is roughly in line with the average in
the postwar data, and annual housing depreciation rate to δh = 0.03 consistent with
Piazzesi and Schneider (2016). According to NS's estimates of the persistence of
government spending, the AR(1) coefficient is calibrated to be ρz = 0.75 at an annual
frequency. The firm's annualized probability of resetting prices equals to 1− θ = 0.7,
which is in line with the fact that firms adjust their prices with probability 0.25 in
each quarter on average (Bils and Klenow, 2004).
The regional final good production is of Cobb-Douglas form with a labor share
1 − α = 2
3
. The elasticity of substitution across intermediate varieties is specified to
ε = 7 as in NS. The elasticity of substitution across regions is set to be η = 1. This
parameter is associated with the elasticity of substitution between home goods and
foreign goods in the open economy macroeconomics literature, which ranges between
1 and 2 (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002). A larger η leads to more reduction in
local demand from investment-goods production in response to local fiscal shocks.
In the benchmark case, the monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule such that
rˆt = φpipˆit with φpi = 1.5. This specification implies that the central bank aggressively
raises the real interest rate to curtail the inflationary effects of a government spending
shock. The benchmark case is the one in which government spending is completely
financed by lump-sum taxes Tt. The ratio of federal government purchases over output
is set to 10 percent, i.e., g = g?/y? = 0.1, in steady state.
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Parameter Description Value Source
β Annual discount factor 0.97 Standard
φn Frisch elasticity 1 NS (2014)
λh Housing utility coefficient 0.22 PS (2016)
1− α Labor share 0.67 NS (2014)
δk Capital depreciation 0.08 Standard
δh Housing depreciation 0.03 PS (2016)
θ Annualized reset price probability 0.7 BK (2004)
ε Elasticity of substitution across varieties 7 NS (2014)
η Elasticity of substitution across regions 1 CKM (2002)
φpi Monetary policy responsiveness 1.5 Standard
ρz Persistence of military spending 0.75 NS (2014)
g Steady state government purchase ratio 0.1 Standard
Table 2.1: Fixed Parameter Values
Notes: Parameters exogenously fixed in the calibration.
Fitted Parameters. I choose the remaining parameters to match impulse re-
sponses. Setting equal weights over horizons, I calibrate the parameters by matching
model-based impulse responses and the estimated regional impulse responses of popu-
lation and construction output from Chapter 1. The fitted parameters are summarized
in Table 2.2.
The Calvo migration probability ψ is associated with the gross migration rate. The
model with larger ψ gives rise to a higher gross migration rate. Thus, ψ is calibrated
to match an annualized gross migration rate across states in the postwar United
States of 3 percent from Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2011). The Gumbel elasticity
ν governs the magnitude of net directed migration responses. The estimated regional
impulse response of population can be used to discipline the Gumbel elasticity. The
estimated regional impulse response of construction output is able to calibrate the
permit completion rate φh and the housing production elasticity ζ. Since housing
productivity b determines the construction spending in steady state, the average
weight of regional output in the construction sector over the sample period, 5 percent,
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Parameter Description Value
ψ Calvo migration probability 0.031
ν Gumbel elasticity 1.65
φh Permit completion rate 0.47
ζ Elasticity of housing production 0.74
b Housing productivity 0.66
Table 2.2: Fitted Parameter Values
Notes: The targeted moments are, respectively, the annual gross migration rate across states
for ψ, the estimated regional impulse responses to population for ν, the estimated regional
impulse responses to construction output for φh and ζ, and the average weight of regional
output in the construction sector for b.
is a moment to pin down b. The model implies that the population distribution at
steady state is determined by the local amenity parameters {κj}, and the average
population shares by state over the sample period can discipline these parameters.
The distributions of calibrated local amenity and population shares across states are
reported by Figure 2.1.
The calibrated model fits the targeted moments well. Under these parameter
values, the calibrated model generates a 3 percent simulated gross migration rate and
5 percent regional construction output ratio at steady state. The calibrated Gumbel
elasticity ν = 1.65 is broadly comparable to previous findings in the literature, e.g.,
Artuc, Cahaudhuri and McLaren's (2010) estimate ν = 1.88 at an annual frequency.
The calibrated housing production elasticity of non-land factors ζ = 0.74 is close
to the estimate in Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010), 0.85. The calibrated permit
completion rate φh = 0.47 implies the average duration of housing construction to be
1.1 years, which is consistent with the data provided by the Value of Construction
Put in Place Survey from the Census.24 Without labor reallocation across regions,
24According to the Value of Construction Put in Place Survey, a construction project, on average,
takes one month for permit authorization, one month from authorization to start, and nine months
from start to completion.
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Figure 2.1: Distributions of Calibrated Amenity and Population across States
Notes: Panel (a) shows the calibrated value of local amenities across states, and Panel (b)
displays the average population distribution across U.S. states from 1966 to 2006.
the model generates no responses of construction output and population, as shown in
the Panel (a) in Figure 2.2.
Under the calibrated parameters, is the model able to replicate the identified
impulse responses of regional economic activity to a military spending shock? Besides
regional output per resident as a major measure of regional production, regional retail
employment per capita can be used to proxy for regional consumption. As Guren et al.
(2018) point out, retail employment has long been viewed by measurement agencies
as one of the best available proxies for consumption expenditures (although not one-
for-one). Panel (b) in Figure 2.2 shows that the calibrated model broadly matches
the estimated regional impulse responses of a fiscal shock to output and consumption.
In addition, without labor reallocation across regions, the model cannot generate the
responses of output and consumption estimated from the data.
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Figure 2.2: Matching Regional Impulse Responses in the Calibration
Notes: Red dotted lines are the estimated regional impulse responses from the data. Blue
circles are the model-based regional impulse responses in the benchmark model, while black
stars are the one in a model without labor migration. Weighted impulse response is the
response of a variable weighted by its share in output. The construction share in output is
5 percent.
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2.6 Quantitative Analysis of Regional Reallocation
Having shown that the calibrated model can generate regional dynamics that match
the data, I now inspect the underlying mechanisms which drive these results. To
this end, I study the quantitative impacts of a localized government spending shock
by comparing the regional and aggregate impulse responses in my calibrated model
to a comparable version without labor migration.25 The results imply that two key
mechanismsmigration accelerator and regional reallocationplay central roles in
driving internal propagation effects on regional and aggregate dynamics.
2.6.1 Regional Dynamics and Migration Accelerator Mechanism
2.6.1.1 Regional Impulse Responses
I first show how regional reallocation affects regional dynamics by comparing the im-
pulse responses of regional economic variables in my calibrated model to a comparable
model without labor migration. Figure 2.3 plots the regional impulse responses to a
1 percent shock of localized government spending relative to steady state output in
a given region. The comparable model generates no response in regional population
and regional construction. Since the government spending shock decays exponentially,
regional economic activity, such as output, consumption, and wages, declines in a sim-
ilar exponentially decaying pattern. Most existing models share the same features of
the comparable model and cannot generate hump-shaped and lengthy responses as
in the data.
In contrast, as labor migration is introduced, the calibrated model can generate
sizable amplification effects on the response of regional economic variables. A positive
25The benchmark can be seen as a special case of the full model in which net directed labor
migration is shut down by setting ψ = 0. Hence, there is no labor reallocation across regions and
thus population shares and regional housing construction are constant in the model.
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localized government spending shock leads to an increase of the regional real wage.
According to the optimal migration policy (i.e., equation 2.6), higher regional real
wages attract more labor migration towards such booming regions. As more labor
gradually migrates into such regions, the regional demand for housing goes up. Be-
cause of decreasing returns to scale housing production, regional construction spend-
ing increases proportionally more than the increase of population. Thus, regional
demand is amplified due to labor migration and regional construction booms. The
increasing demand for regional housing construction further drives up regional wages
and attracts more labor influx. This leads to a lengthy and hump-shaped response
of regional output. I refer this channel as to the migration accelerator mechanism
through which regional demand shocks can derive amplification on regional economic
activity. This mechanism is consistent with recent empirical findings about labor
migration and local housing construction (e.g., Howard, 2018).
2.6.1.2 Role of Labor Migration: Calvo and Gumbel Specification
I now explore the quantitative role of Calvo and Gumbel specification in determin-
ing the responses of labor migration and regional population. Figure 2.4 shows the
regional impulse responses to a 1 percent shock of localized government spending
relative to steady state output in a region with 10 percent population at steady state
(e.g., California).
As regional demand booms, the optimal migration policy implies that, for an
individual agent who is able to relocate, the probability of migrating towards such a
region goes up by 12 percent from 0.1 to 0.112 (Panel b). Given the Calvo migration
probability at an annual frequency, ψ = 0.031, the regional population share evolves
according to µjt+1 = (1 − ψ)µjt + ψϕjt. Regional population gradually responds to
a government spending shock, leading to a 2 percent increase in population after 10
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Figure 2.3: Model-based Regional Impulse Responses
Notes: The blue circles and red stars represent the model-based regional impulse responses
to 1 percent localized government spending shock relative to output. Weighted deviation
is the regional impulse responses of a variable weighted by its share in steady state output.
The shares of government spending and construction in steady state output are 10 and 5
percent respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Role of Calvo and Gumbel Specification
Notes: Blue lines represent the model-based regional impulse responses to 1 percent localized
government spending shock relative to output. Weighted deviation is the regional impulse
responses of a variable weighted by its share in steady state output. The shares of government
spending and construction in steady state output are 10 and 5 percent, respectively.
years relative to the pre-shock level.
This result implies that the Calvo migration probability and Gumbel location-
preference shocks play important roles in shaping the gradual response of regional
population to a regional demand shock. Intuitively, the Calvo migration probability
ψ controls the persistence of the response in regional population, while the Gumbel
elasticity ν governs the intensity of the response. In order to generate the dynamic
responses of regional populations as in the data, one needs to incorporate proper mi-
gration frictions, for instance, the Calvo migration probability, to generate reasonable
persistence.26
26Most of models in the spatial economics literature are embedded with Gumbel location-
preference shocks but abstract from Calvo migration probability. Under those models, population
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Figure 2.5: Role of Regional Housing Construction
Notes: Blue circles stand for the model-based regional impulse responses to 1 percent local-
ized government spending shock relative to output in the benchmark case, while red dotted
lines represent the no-construction-response case. Weighted deviation is the regional
impulse responses of a variable weighted by its share in steady state output.
2.6.1.3 Role of Regional Housing Construction
To highlight the role of regional housing construction, I compare my results to a no-
construction-response case. In the no-construction-response case, regional housing
construction is a constant and has no response to any changes of labor immigration.
Figure 2.5 reports the comparison. The result shows that, without the response
of regional construction to immigration, the regional amplification is substantially
weakened. Under the no-response scenario, only a small fraction of labor migration
is triggered by localized government spending shocks. Since there is no additional
responds immediately and then converges to the pre-shock level, instead of generating a gradual and
persistent pattern.
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increase in regional housing construction as a response (dotted line in Panel b), in-
dividual agents expect no further prosperity from regional construction demand and
thus reduce their propensity to migrate relative to the benchmark case (Panel d). Re-
gional population thus grows at a low speed relative to the case with regional housing
construction (Panel c). Therefore, regional output expands substantially less than
the case with regional housing construction (Panel a).27
2.6.2 Aggregate Dynamics and Regional Reallocation
Having elucidated the mechanisms and discussed what drives the amplification of re-
gional output, I now quantify the aggregate impacts of asymmetric localized govern-
ment spending shocks and elaborate the macro consequences of regional reallocation.
In addition, I conduct various quantitative experiments and investigate the role of
asymmetry and persistence of fiscal policy across regions. .
2.6.2.1 Amplification Effects of Regional Reallocation
Based on the discussion in Chapter 1, state-level military procurement displays sys-
tematic heterogeneity in sensitivity to national military spending. For instance, in
response to one unit of change in national military spending, the change of military
procurement in California is more sensitive to the national one than the change in
Illinois is. In fact, the estimated slope coefficients in the first stage regression can be
interpreted as the loading factors of these sensitivities. Figure 2.6 displays the distri-
bution of loading factors across states. This result suggests that there is substantial
27In case that regional construction is responsive to immigration, the amplification effects on re-
gional economic activity are associated with the permit completion rate, φh. The smaller completion
rate of housing permits leads to a more persistent impact on future construction spending. There-
fore, regional construction demand displays a persistent response to labor immigration. Thus, the
permit completion rate gives rise to a persistent and hump-shaped response of regional construction
to a regional demand shock.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Loading Factors (Local Sensitivities)
Notes: The loading factors are the estimated slope coefficients in the first-stage regression.
The left panel shows the loading factors across U.S. states in a map. The right panel reports
the density of loading factors weighted by average population shares across states (where
Mississippi has a negative sensitivity).
heterogeneity of state military spending in sensitivity to national military spending.
Using the loading factors across regions as heterogeneous regional sensitivities,
I quantify the aggregate impacts of 1 percent national military buildup relative to
output that affects state military spending differentially in the calibrated model.
Figure 2.7 displays the aggregate impulse responses. In response to an increase in
government spending, aggregate consumption drops due to crowding-out effect (Panel
c). Therefore, aggregate labor supply increases (Panel f) as well as more capital
investment is undertaken (Panel e). Hence, aggregate output increases. This is
consistent with common wisdom.
In contrast, the asymmetric localized government spending shocks give rise to la-
bor reallocation across regions. As shown in the above discussion, the regional shocks
trigger labor migration towards booming regions. As more labor migrates into those
regions, regional housing demand goes up, driving an increase of construction spend-
ing in a greater proportion than the increase of the regional population. The increas-
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Figure 2.7: Aggregate Impulse Responses
Notes: Blue lines represent the model-based aggregate impulse responses to 1 percent na-
tional military spending shock relative to steady state output that affects states differently
according to the estimated loading factors as local sensitivities shown in Figure 2.6. Con-
sumption/output ratio is 65 percent, investment/output ratio is 20 percent, government-
purchase/output ratio is 10 percent, and construction-spending/output ratio is 5%.
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ing construction demand triggers further increase of regional wages, attracting even
more labor over time. The labor migration accelerator amplifies the magnitude of re-
gional demand changes. In addition, given increasing regional construction spending
per resident in booming regions, a net increase of aggregate construction spending re-
sults, simply because net directed migration reallocates more population to booming
regions, which get more weights in aggregate. Therefore, aggregate construction rises
in response to labor reallocation across regions and serves as an aggregate demand
shifter, which creates a positive covariance effect: the regional reallocation mecha-
nism. This force amplifies the response of aggregate output, eventually leading to a
larger aggregate fiscal multiplier.
To evaluate the overall impacts of fiscal stimulus over various horizons, I calculate
the cumulative aggregate fiscal multipliers to output as defined in Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Vegh (2013).28 To show the impact of the regional reallocation channel, I compute
the cumulative aggregate fiscal multiplier in the case of shutting down the possibility
of labor migration (i.e., ψ = 0). Figure 2.8 reports the results with and without labor
migration. Quantitatively, labor reallocation leads to a 30 percent amplification of
the cumulative aggregate output multiplier relative to a benchmark model without
labor migration (0.56 vs. 0.43), given the spatial heterogeneity of regional military
spending shocks.
28They define the cumulative multiplier at time T by
Cumulative Multiplier(T ) =
∑T
t=0(1 + i)
−t∆yt∑T
t=0(1 + i)
−t∆gt
,
where i is the steady state interest rate and ∆yt and ∆gt represent the changes of aggregate output
and government spending between period t and t− 1.
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Figure 2.8: Cumulative Aggregate Fiscal Multiplier
Notes: The cumulative aggregate fiscal multipliers are based on the impulse responses of
aggregate output to a 1 percent national military spending shock relative to steady state
output that affects states differently as in Figure 2.6. Red circles represent the multipliers in
the benchmark calibrated model, and blue stars stand for the model without labor migration
by setting ψ = 0.
2.6.2.2 The Impacts of Asymmetry
I analyze how the aggregate effects of national fiscal policies depend on the cross-
sectional distribution of fiscal stimulus. I apply the distribution of loading factors in
Figure 2.6 as a benchmark and quantify the role of regional heterogeneity by altering
the distribution of loading factors. Applying a mean-preserving spread, I stress the
magnitudes of loading factors and generate two alternative distributions of localized
government spending shocks as being 50 percent more dispersed (Case 1) and 50
percent less dispersed (Case 2) relative to the benchmark case. Figure 2.9 displays
the alternative distribution of loading factors. In response to 1 percent national
government spending shock relative to steady state output, the localized government
spending shocks are more asymmetric in Case 1 than in the benchmark case, while
the shocks are less asymmetric in Case 2 than in the benchmark case.29
29In terms of cross-sectional standard deviation of the distribution across states, the benchmark
case has a standard deviation of 0.63, Case 1 of 0.95, and Case 2 of 0.32.
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Figure 2.9: Alternative Distribution of Loading Factors
Notes: The figure reports the density of loading factors weighted by average population
shares across states. The loading factors are the estimated slope coefficients in the first-
stage regression.
Figure 2.10 shows the cumulative aggregate output multipliers for the benchmark
and alternative cases. These results suggest that the aggregate impact of regional
demand shocks crucially depends on their cross-sectional dispersion. If regional de-
mand shocks are more asymmetric, labor reallocation triggers a larger magnitude
of net directed migration. It gives rise to a larger amount of regional construction
spending as regional housing demand increases in booming regions. Aggregating the
changes of regional demand, a larger increase of aggregate demand follows due to a
larger covariance effect. Thus, aggregate output increases even more, leading to a
larger cumulative fiscal multiplier. In Case 1 with more asymmetric distribution of
regional sensitivities, the aggregate fiscal multiplier is amplified by 46 percent rela-
tive to a comparable model without labor migration (0.63 vs. 0.43); while in Case 2
with a 50 percent less asymmetric distribution, the amplification drops to 12 percent
(0.48 vs 0.43). If all states suffer from the same regional demand shocks, no labor
reallocation is triggered. Thus, the regional reallocation channel is shut down and
the aggregate impacts are the same as the model without labor reallocation predicts.
The degree of asymmetry of fiscal policy across regions is quantitatively important
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Figure 2.10: Aggregate Cumulative Multipliers: Distributional Dependence
Notes: The figure reports the cumulative aggregate output multipliers in response to a 1
percent increase in government spending relative to output that affects states differently
according to alternative distributions of loading factors: 50% more dispersed, benchmark,
and 50% less dispersed.
for the evaluation of aggregate fiscal multipliers.
2.6.2.3 The Impacts of Persistence
I now investigate how the amplification effect of regional reallocation on aggregate
output also depends on the persistence of fiscal policy. Intuitively, even if a fiscal
shock affects regions differentially, individuals have a smaller migration propensity in
response to a transitory fiscal shock relative to a persistent shock. This also affects
the magnitude of the amplification effect of regional reallocation.
To explore the sensitivity to persistence, I consider a case with relatively low
persistence of government spending shocks. I specify the persistence at an annual
frequency to be ρz = 0.56, where the half-life of the shock is roughly one year and
the impact of the shock essentially returns to a normal level after three years; in the
benchmark case, the persistence is 0.75 and the impact of the shock mean-reverts to
a normal level after six years.
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Figure 2.11: Regional Impulse Responses: Low Persistence
Notes: Blue circles and black stars represent the model-based regional impulse responses to
a 1 percent government spending shock relative to output with low persistence, ρz = 0.56.
Weighted deviation is the regional impulse responses of a variable weighted by its share in
output. The shares of government spending and construction in output are 10 and 5 percent
respectively.
Figure 2.11 plots the regional impulse responses to a 1 percent localized govern-
ment spending shock relative to steady state output with relatively low persistence
ρz = 0.56. The magnitude of labor immigration is substantially weakened, compared
to the benchmark model, and leads to a moderate increase in regional housing demand
and regional construction. As Panel (b) shows, the amplification effect on regional
output per resident is significantly smaller than in the benchmark case.
Figure 2.12 shows the cumulative aggregate fiscal multipliers in response to a
relatively low persistent shock for the models with and without labor migration. The
amplification effect of regional reallocation on aggregate output is only 5 percent,
where the ten-year cumulative aggregate fiscal multiplier is 0.32 for the case with
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Figure 2.12: Cumulative Aggregate Fiscal Multiplier: Low Persistence
Notes: The cumulative multipliers are based on the impulse responses of aggregate output to
a 1 percent national military spending shock relative to output with low persistence of ρz =
0.56 that affects states differently as in Figure 2.6. Red circles represent the multipliers in
the model with labor migration, and blue stars stand for the model without labor migration
by setting ψ = 0.
labor migration and is 0.305 for the case with fixed population. This is because
individuals have a smaller migration propensity in response to a transitory shock and
therefore there is less of a stimulating effect on regional output per resident through
a regional construction boom. This leads to a relatively smaller covariance effect and
thus mitigates the amplification effect of regional reallocation on aggregate output.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the macroeconomic implications of regional reallocation in
affecting both regional and aggregate fiscal multipliers. Exploiting state-level varia-
tion of military spending, I provide evidence that the regional consequences are large
and lengthy because the asymmetric shocks trigger regional reallocation of popula-
tion. Labor reallocation amplifies regional output through a boom in construction
spending and aggregate output through a covariance effect arising from net directed
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migration towards booming regions. Using a new method that is both tractable
and sufficiently rich to capture heterogeneity across regions, my analysis shows that
regional reallocation and systematic regional heterogeneity are quantitatively very
important for aggregate output effects of fiscal policy. Virtually every macroeco-
nomic shock affects regions differently, so that many shocks may lead to the regional
reallocation effect similar to this paper. Given the pervasive nature of heterogeneity
in regions and macroeconomic shocks, future work should analyze the importance of
regional reallocation for monetary policy, trade shocks, productivity shocks, etc.
Appendix
A Theoretical Derivations
A.1 Proofs of Propositions in Section 2.2
Proposition 1. Under spatial equilibrium, the exact solution for regional output per
resident in response to government purchase shocks is given by
yj = y
? + ang · (gj − g?) + anx · (xj − x?)
and the exact solution for aggregate output is
Y = Y ? + ang · (
∑
j
Gj −G?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mean effect
+ anx ·
∑
j
(xj − x?)(µj − µ?)︸ ︷︷ ︸,
covariance effect
where regional per resident government purchases is gj = Gj/µj, construction spend-
ing is xj = µj/L, and equilibrium regional population is µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ).
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Proof: Assume that Gj are random shocks and asymmetric across regions. Given a
quadratic utility function u(c, n) = 1
2
(c− c)2 − λn
2
n2, inelastic demand with one unit
of house for each individual hj = 1, and a Cobb-Douglas housing production function
hj = (
L
µj
)
1
2 (xj)
1
2 , the equilibrium conditions with regional reallocation are given by
λnnj = a(c− cj),
anj = cj + xj +Gj/µj,
xj = µj/L,
U = u(cj, nj),
1 = Σjµj,
where U denotes the equalized utility across regions in a spatial equilibrium. Thus,
regional consumption and labor supply are equalized across regions in equilibrium.
High spending regions attract labor immigration such that regional population µj
is determined by the equalization of Gj/µj + µj/L across regions. The equilibrium
distribution of population is given by µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ), the equilibrium regional
labor supply function is given by
nj =
c+G+X
a+ λn/a
,
where X =
∑
j xjµj is total construction spending, xj = µj/L is regional construction
spending, and µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ) is equilibrium distribution of population. The
equilibrium distribution of population across regions is determined by the following
conditions: Gj/µj + µj/L = m equalizes for all j, and
∑
j µj = 1.
Therefore, the aggregate output is given by Y = an = c+G+X
1+λn/a2
. Since the aggregate
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output is linear in G and X, the first-order expansion equals to the exact solution,
Y = Y ? + a?ng · (G−G?) + a?nx · (X −X?),
where ng = (a + λn/a)
−1 and nx = (a + λn/a)−1 are the first-order derivatives with
respect to G and X. Using a covariance decomposition identity, the aggregate con-
struction spending X can be represented by
X = X? +
∑
j
x?(µj − µ?) +
∑
j
(xj − x?)µ?j +
∑
j
(xj − x?)(µj − µ?),
Due to
∑
j µj =
∑
j µ
? = 1 and xj = µj/L, the first and second terms are equal to
zero,
∑
j x
?(µj−µ?) = 0 and
∑
j(xj−x?)µ? = 0. Hence, the aggregate output Y can
be represented by
Y = Y ? + a?nG · (
∑
j
Gj −G?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mean effect
+ a?nX ·
∑
j
(xj − x?)(µj − µ?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariance effect
, (2.7)
where xj = µj/L and µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}l∈J ) indicating that high spending regions
attract more labor immigration.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. Under spatial equilibrium, the first-order approximation of the re-
sponse of regional output to government purchase shocks is given by
yj = y
? + ang · (gj − g?) + anx(xj − x?) + h.o.t
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and the second-order approximation to aggregate output is given by
Y = Y ? + ang(
∑
j
Gj −G?) + anx
∑
j
x˜µ(µj − µ?)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariance effect
+
1
2
angg(
∑
j
Gj −G?)2 + h.o.t.,
where x˜µ ≡ (xµ + 12xµµµ?) > 0, xµ and xµµ are first- and second-order derivatives of
construction spending with respect to regional population.
Proof: Assume that Gj are random shocks and asymmetric across regions. There-
fore, the equilibrium conditions are given by
vn(nj) = a · uc(cj),
anj = cj + xj +Gj/µj,
1 = h(L/µj, xj),
U = u(cj)− v(nj),
1 = Σjµj,
where U denotes the equalized utility across regions in a spatial equilibrium. Thus,
under spatial equilibrium, regional labor supply per resident is equalized across regions
as well as consumption per resident. It also implies that m ≡ xj + Gj/µj equalizes
across regions. Thus, the equilibrium labor supply function is nj = n(m) such that
anj = c(nj) + m. The regional output per resident is given by yj = a · n(xj + gj).
The first order expansion of regional output per resident around steady state can be
shown by
yj = y
? + ang · (gj − g?) + anx · (xj − x?) + h.o.t.,
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where ng and nx are the first-order derivatives of regional labor supply per resident
with respect to government purchases and construction spending per resident, and
h.o.t. denotes higher order terms. Knowing that uc is a decreasing function in c and vn
is an increasing function in n, this yields c is a decreasing function in n in equilibrium.
Therefore, ng > 0 and nx > 0 due to the implicit function theorem.
Given m =
∑
j xjµj +
∑
j Gj =
∑
j x(µj)µj + G, the aggregate output can be
represented by Y = a·n(X+G). The second-order expansion of aggregate output can
be shown by Y = Y ?+ang(G−G?)+anx(X−X?)+ 12angg(G−G?)2+ 12anxx(X−X?)2+
h.o.t., where ngg and nxx are the second-order derivatives of regional labor supply per
resident with respect to government purchases and construction spending per resident.
The second-order expansion of aggregate construction spending X =
∑
j x(µj)µj
is given by X = X? +
∑
j xµ(µj − µ?)µ? +
∑
j x
?(µj − µ?) +
∑
j xµ(µj − µ?)2 +
1
2
∑
j xµµµ
?(µj−µ?)2 +h.o.t. Due to the adding up condition
∑
j µj =
∑
j µ
? = 1, the
first-order terms wash out. Hence, the aggregate construction spending is given by
X = X? +
∑
j
x˜µ(µj − µ?)2 + h.o.t.,
where x˜µ ≡ xµ+ 12xµµµ?, xµ and xµµ are first and second order derivatives of construc-
tion spending with respect to regional population. Therefore, the Taylor expansion
of the aggregate output can be represented by
Y = Y ? + ang(
∑
j
Gj −G?) + anx
∑
j
x˜µ(µj − µ?)2 + 1
2
angg(
∑
j
Gj −G?)2
+
1
2
anxx
∑
j
∑
l
x˜2µ(µj − µ?)2(µl − µ?)2 + h.o.t.,
According to equilibrium population distribution µj = µ(Gj, {Gl}), the expansion
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of regional population is given by
µj = µ
? + µ1G(Gj −G?) +
∑
l
µ2G(Gl −G?) + h.o.t.,
where µ1G and µ2G are the first-order derivatives of µj with respect to Gj and Gl
respectively. Therefore,
∑
j(µj−µ?)2 corresponds to a second-order term µ21G
∑
j(Gj−
G?)2 + (Jµ22G + µ1Gµ2G) · (G−G?)2, while
∑
j
∑
l(µj − µ?)2(µl − µ?)2 corresponds to
a fourth-order term. As a result, the second-order expansion of the aggregate output
is given by
Y = Y ? + ang(
∑
j
Gj −G?) + anx
∑
j
x˜µ(µj − µ?)2 + 1
2
angg(
∑
j
Gj −G?)2 + h.o.t.
Alternatively, in terms of regional government spending shocks, we have
Y = Y ? + ang(
∑
j
Gj −G?) + anxx˜µµ21G
∑
j
(Gj −G?)2 + anxx˜µµ˜G(
∑
j
Gj −G?)2
+
1
2
angg(
∑
j
Gj −G?)2 + h.o.t.
where µ˜G ≡ Jµ22G + µ1Gµ2G.
Q.E.D.
A.2 The Equilibrium of Regional Housing Market
In the benchmark model in Section 4, an individual household in region j chooses
consumption and housing services at relative rental prices %hjt. Regional population
evolves according to µj,t+1 = (1−ψ)µjt+ψϕjt, where ψϕjt denotes the amount of new
immigrants. In each period a fraction δh of housing stock depreciates such that the
local housing stock evolves as Hjt+1 = (1−δh)Hjt+Y hjt , where Y hjt denotes the amount
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of houses built at time t. Assume that there is a continuum of competitive builders
whose size is the same as local population. Each builder operates a decreasing return
to scale housing production technology, yhjt = bx
ζ
jt, where ζ ∈ (0, 1) and xjt and b are
the construction input and the productivity of the housing sector. Thus, the total
amount of newly-built houses is Y hjt = y
h
jtµjt.
In order to generate hump-shaped responses of regional construction, the model
needs to introduce some frictions on regional housing supply. Permit restrictions are
a natural friction. In practice, the government issues a limited number of permits
to restrict the regional supply of housing due to political, environmental, and other
reasons. In this model, I assume that the government issues one unit of housing
permit for each new immigrant.30 I also assume that a fraction φh of the authorized
permit stock Sjt is completed in each period, where φh ∈ (0, 1) denotes the completion
rate. Thus, new houses built up at time t is not greater than the amount of completed
permits, Y hjt ≤ φhSjt . The stock of authorized permits Sjt is the sum of the unfinished
permits for the last period (1−φh)Sjt−1 and new issued permits Snjt = ψϕjt, given by
Sjt = (1− φh)Sjt−1 + ψϕjt.
Therefore, builders optimally choose the amount of houses to build subject to
permit restrictions, max : qjty
h
jt − xjt, s.t. yhjt = bxζjt and yhjtµjt ≤ φhSjt. The equi-
librium rental rate and housing prices are pinned down by the individual household's
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and housing and the user cost
equation.
The equilibrium conditions in regional housing markets are given by (i) the optimal
30Howard and Liebersohn (2018) establish an empirical fact that the change of population is nearly
one-for-one with the change of housing units, implying that labor reallocation is the main force for
cross-sectional housing demand. The one permit per immigrant assumption is consistent with this
empirical fact.
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condition for individual's housing demand is
uc(cjt) · %jt = uh(hjt), (2.8)
(ii) per capita housing services is
hjt = Hjt/µjt,
(iii) the resource constraint is
cjt + xjt + gjt = yjt,
(iv) housing construction restricted by completed permit is
φhSjt = bx
ζ
jtµjt, (2.9)
qjtζbx
ζ−1
jt > 1, (2.10)
(v) the user cost condition for housing prices and rents is
qjt = βEtΛt+1 (%jt+1 + (1− δh)qjt+1) , (2.11)
(vi) the evolution of local housing stock is
Hjt+1 = (1− δh)Hjt + φhSjt,
(vii) the evolution of authorized permit stock is
Sjt+1 = (1− φh)Sjt + ψϕjt,
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and (viii) the evolution of local population is
µjt+1 = (1− ψ)µjt + ψϕjt.
Given regional output yjt, regional government spending gjt and new immigrants
ψϕjt, the above equilibrium conditions pin down {cjt, hjt, %jt, xjt, qjt, Hjt, Sjt, µjt}.
Now focus on builders optimality conditions and check whether the permit re-
striction binds at (and around) steady state. Specify the utility function be u(c, h) =
log c+ χh log h. The equilibrium conditions at steady state are given by
%?j = χhc
?
j/h
?
j ,
h?j = H
?
j /µ
?
j ,
y?j = c
?
j + x
?
j + g
?
j ,
φhS
?
j = ψµ
?
j ,
ψµ?j = bx
?ζ
j µ
?
j ,
δhH
?
j = ψµ
?
j ,
q?j =
β%?j
1− β(1− δh) ,
q?j ζbx
?ζ−1
j > 1.
Thus, substitute all the equality conditions and the calibrated values in Section 6, we
have
q?j ζbx
?ζ−1
j =
βζ
1− β(1− δh)
%?jbx
?ζ
j
x?j
=
βζδhχh
1− β(1− δh)
c?j
x?j
=
0.97× 0.74× 0.03× 0.22
1− 0.97× (1− 0.03) ×
0.70
0.05
= 1.12 > 1.
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Figure 2.13: Regional Impulse Responses to a Localized Government Spending Shock
Notes: The blue curves represent the model-based regional impulse responses to 1 percent
localized government spending shock relative to steady state output, in the benchmark model
with migration frictions and regional housing markets.
Under the benchmark calibrated values of parameters, the builders would like to build
more houses than the amount of authorized permits issued by the government under
one person one permit assumption.
Figure 2.13 shows the regional impulse responses to a localized government spend-
ing shock based on the benchmark model with migration frictions and housing permit
restrictions. As more new immigrants move to the region, the housing stock increases
to maintain individual's housing consumption but not immediately. Under the limited
completion specification, the regional housing stock increases less than the regional
population does in the short run. Therefore, per resident housing consumption drops
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and housing rental rate rises, which leads to an increase in regional housing prices.
A.3 The Optimal Migration Policy
This subsection shows the derivation of optimal migration policy and Bellman equa-
tion.
A.3.1 The Optimal Migration Policy
Lemma 1. Given the household's optimization problem in the benchmark model,
Vj(st) = max{cjt,njt,hjt,ϕ?t }
:
u(cjt, njt, hjt) + κj + β
 ψ (maxl∈J : Et[Vl(st+1) + νlt])
+(1− ψ)EtVj(st+1)


subject to budget constraint, cjt+%
h
jthjt = (1−τt)(Wjt/Pjt)njt+Dt+Rmt −Tt. Under
Gumbel distribution assumption upon lt, the optimal migration policy is represented
by
ϕ?jt =
exp [EtVj(st+1)]
1
ν∑
l exp [EtVl(st+1)]
1
ν
.
Proof: (i) Denote V˜jt ≡ E[EtVjt+1 + νjt] by the expected future utility of an in-
dividual household locating in region j at period t + 1, where the expectation E
is taken over the location preference shocks. Assume that the location preference
shocks lt is i.i.d. across individuals and over time, and is a realization of a Gumbel
distribution with zero mean. In particular, F () = exp[− exp(−− γ)], and therefore
f() = ∂F/∂, where γ =
∫ +∞
−∞ x exp(−x − exp(−x))dx to Euler's constant. Then
denote the expected future value for an individual household who are able to relocate
in period t by
Φt = E
[
max
l∈J
: EtVlt+1 + νlt
]
.
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The optimal migration policy is the solution to achieve the above expected future
value.
(ii) Define λt ≡ log
∑
j exp{− 1v (EtVjt+1 − EtVlt+1)} and consider the following
change of variables, ξjt = jt + γ − λt . I now derive the optimal relocation policy.
Define ϕ?jt as the fraction of those who have relocation opportunity that relocate
to region j (no matter where they are in period t). This fraction is equal to the
probability that a given individual of relocation opportunity choose to locate in region
j at the end of period t; that is to say, the probability that the expected utility of
moving to j is higher than the expected utility in any other regions. Formally, this
yields
ϕ?jt = Pr
(
1
ν
EtVjt+1 + jt ≥ max
l 6=j
: {1
ν
EtVlt+1 + lt}
)
.
Given the Gumbel distribution assumption on the idiosyncratic location preference
shocks,
ϕ?jt =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(jt)Πl 6=jF (EtVjt+1 − EtVlt+1 + jt)djt.
Substituting for F () and f(), we have
ϕ?jt =
∫ +∞
−∞
exp(−jt − γ) exp
[
− exp(−jt − γ)
∑
l
exp(−1
ν
(EtVjt+1 − EtVlt+1))
]
djt.
Using the change of variable ξjt = jt + γ − λt, this yields
ϕ?jt = exp(−λt)
∫ +∞
−∞
exp[−ξjt − exp(−ξjt)]dξjt
and solving for this integral, we obtain the optimal migration policy,
ϕ?jt =
exp[EtVj(st+1)]
1
ν∑
l exp[EtVl(st+1)]
1
ν
.
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Q.E.D.
A.3.2 The Bellman Equation
Lemma 2. The Bellman equation of individual's value function is
Vj(st) = max{cjt,njt,hjt,ϕ?t }
:
u(cjt, njt, hjt) + κj + β
 ψ (maxl∈J : Et[Vl(st+1) + νlt])
+(1− ψ)EtVj(st+1)


Under Gumbel distribution assumption upon {lt}, the above Bellman equation can
be represented by
Vjt = u(c
?
jt, n
?
jt, h
?
jt) + κj + βψν
(
log
∑
l
exp
(
1
ν
EtVlt+1
))
+ β(1− ψ)EtVjt+1.
Proof: Given the definition of expected future value for an individual household
who is able to relocate in period t by
Φt = E
[
max
l∈J
: EtVlt+1 + νlt
]
,
where the expectation operator E is associated with the idiosyncratic location pref-
erence shock. According to the Gumbel distribution assumption on idiosyncratic
location preference shocks, this yields
Φt =
∑
j
∫ +∞
−∞
(EtVjt+1 + νjt)f(jt)
∏
l 6=j
F (EtVjt+1 − EtVlt+1 + jt)djt.
Substituting for F () and f(), we have
Φt =
∑
j
∫ +∞
−∞
(EtVjt+1 + νjt)e(−jt−γ)e[− exp(−jt−γ)
∑
l exp(− 1ν (EtVjt+1−EtVlt+1))]djt
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Using λt ≡ log
∑
j exp{− 1v (EtVjt+1 − EtVlt+1)} and the change of variable ξjt = jt +
γ − λt, this yields
Φt =
∑
j
exp(−λt)[EtVjt+1 + νjt]
Substitute the representation of λt, we have
Φt = ν
(
log
∑
j
exp
(
1
ν
EtVjt+1
))
and therefore, the current value in region j can be represented by
Vjt = u(c
?
jt, n
?
jt, h
?
jt) + κj + βψν
(
log
∑
l
exp
(
1
ν
EtVlt+1
))
+ β(1− ψ)EtVjt+1.
Q.E.D.
A.4 Regional and Aggregate Dynamic Systems
This subsection shows the aggregation result and the regional and aggregate dynamic
systems that represent the behavior of regional and aggregate variables in a locally-
perturbed economy around steady state.
A.4.1 The Regional Dynamic System
In the empirical investigation, the regional impulse responses are estimated by an
instrumental variable local projection method for panel data. The baseline regressions
include region and time fixed effects soaking up all region-specific time-invariant terms
as well as aggregate time series variation. Therefore, the regional impulse responses
are inferred from differential responses of local variables between two regions.
In order to make the model-base regional impulse responses conceptually consis-
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tent with the estimates, I log-linearize the equilibrium system around steady state31
and difference the whole system between two regions, where the differential regional
variables are denoted by a lower-case letter with tildes. Therefore, the aggregate vari-
ables are differenced out as in the fixed-effect regressions for panel data. This yields a
regional dynamic system only including regional variables {˜ˆyjt, ˜ˆcjt, ˜ˆijt, ˜ˆxjt, ˜ˆgjt, ˜ˆmjt, ˜ˆnjt,
˜ˆ
Pjt,
˜ˆ
Wjt,
˜ˆ
Vjt, ˜ˆϕjt, ˜ˆµjt, z˜jt}, shown as
y? ˜ˆyjt = c
?˜ˆcjt + i
?˜ˆijt + x
? ˜ˆxjt + g
? ˜ˆgjt, (2.12)
˜ˆy = α ˜ˆmjt + (1− α)˜ˆnjt, (2.13)
˜ˆijt = −η ˜ˆPjt, (2.14)
c?˜ˆcjt = w
?n?(
˜ˆ
Wjt − ˜ˆPjt + ˜ˆnjt), (2.15)
φn ˜ˆnjt = (
˜ˆ
Wjt − ˜ˆPjt)− σ˜ˆcjt, (2.16)
˜ˆ
Pjt = (1− α)( ˜ˆmjt − ˜ˆnjt), (2.17)
˜ˆ
Wjt − ˜ˆPjt = α( ˜ˆmjt − ˜ˆnjt), (2.18)
V ?
˜ˆ
Vjt = (c
?)1−σ ˜ˆcjt − λn(n?)1+φn ˜ˆnjt + λh(h?)1−σh ˜ˆhjt + β(1− ψ)V ?Et ˜ˆVjt+1,
(2.19)
˜ˆϕjt =
V ?
ν
Et ˜ˆVjt+1, (2.20)
˜ˆµjt+1 = (1− ψ)˜ˆµjt + ψ ˜ˆϕjt, (2.21)
˜ˆ
hjt+1 = (1− δh)˜ˆhjt + δhζ ˜ˆxjt − ˜ˆµjt+1 + ˜ˆµjt, (2.22)
˜ˆgjt = z˜jt, (2.23)
z˜jt = ρz z˜jt−1 + ε˜zjt, (2.24)
˜ˆxjt+1 = (1− φh)˜ˆxjt + (φh − ψ)ζ−1( ˜ˆϕjt − ˜ˆµjt), (2.25)
31Notably, the labor distribution {µ?j}j∈J and individual's value in regions {V ?j } at steady state
depend on local amenity {κj}.
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where (2.12) is the regional final goods clearing condition, (2.13) is the final goods
production function, (2.14) is the investment goods demand, (2.15) is the house-
hold's budget constraint, (2.16) the labor-consumption optimality condition, (2.17)
and (2.18) are firm's input decisions, (2.19) is the Bellman equation, (2.20) is the
optimal migration policy, (2.21) is the evolution of population distribution, (2.22) is
the evolution of regional housing per resident, (2.25) is the evolution of construction
spending subject to completion lags.
In equilibrium, individual agents guess the law of motion on regional population.
Given this law of motion, individual agents solve their own optimal migration policies.
Rational expectation implies that the realized evolution of regional population under
individual's optimal migration policy should be consistent with the perceived law of
motion.
Denote regional state variables by xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′. The solution for migra-
tion policy is given by ϕˆjt = Θ
′xˆjt and the regional state variables can be represented
as follows, xˆjt = Φ1xˆjt−1 + jt, where Θ = (θ1, .., θ4)′ and Φ1 are the coefficients solved
from the above regional dynamic system.
The expected future value can be represented by a linear approximation around
symmetric steady state with respect to aggregate and region-specific state variables,
Sˆt and xˆjt, EtVj(s′|s) ≈ V ssj + θsSˆt + θxxˆjt, where θs and θx are the first-order deriva-
tives with respect to aggregate state variables Sˆt and regional state variables xˆjt val-
ued at symmetric steady state. Under Gumbel distribution assumption, the optimal
relocation policy can be shown as
ϕ?jt =
exp[EtVj(st+1)]
1
ν∑
l exp[EtVl(st+1)]
1
ν
≈ exp(V
?
j )
1
ν exp(θsSˆt)
1
ν exp(θzxˆjt)
1
ν∑
l exp(V
?
l )
1
ν exp(θsSˆt)
1
ν exp(θzxˆlt)
1
ν
=
µ?j exp(Θ
′xˆjt)∑
l µ
?
l exp(Θ
′xˆlt)
,
where Θ is the coefficients solved from the regional dynamic system.
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A.4.2 The Aggregate Dynamic System
Flexible Perturbation. Given the discussion in Section 3, regional reallocation
gives rise to aggregate impacts through a covariance effect. This nonlinear aggre-
gate effect washes out in the standard first-order log-linearization approximation. To
characterize the covariance effects in a tractable way, I apply a flexible perturba-
tion method as follows. For any aggregate variable that is defined by the sum of
per-resident regional counterparts weighted by regional populations, e.g., aggregate
consumption Ct =
∑
j cjtµjt, and due to the fact that population shares across regions
add up to one,
∑
j µjt = 1, we have the following identity,
Ct − c?
c?
=
∑
j cjtµjt −
∑
j c
?µjt
c?
= Σj(
cjt − c?
c?
)µjt. (2.26)
Therefore, Cˆt =
∑
j cˆjtµjt, implying that the cross-sectional inner-products between
local variable exposures and population shares are equivalent to the aggregate coun-
terparts in log-deviation from steady state. In addition, expanding µjt around steady
state, i.e., µjt = (1+ µˆjt)µ
?
j , the log-deviation of aggregate consumption can be shown
by
Cˆt =
∑
j
cˆjtµ
?
j +
∑
j
cˆjtµˆjtµ
?
j . (2.27)
This equation indicates that the second-order term
∑
j cˆjtµˆjtµ
?
j captures the covari-
ance effect arising from regional reallocation. The major advantage of such a flexible
perturbation method is that it enables us to characterize the nonlinear covariance
effect in a linear manner, which significantly reduces computational intensity but
preserves the covariance effect.
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Aggregate Dynamic System. Aggregating up the locally-perturbed equilibrium
conditions weighted by regional populations, the aggregate dynamics in the bench-
mark model can be represented by the following aggregate dynamic system including
aggregate variables {Yˆt, Cˆt, Iˆt, Gˆt, Xˆt, Kˆt, Nˆt, Rˆt, Pˆt, Wˆt, Rˆkt+1, Qˆt, Qˆ?t , Zˆt},
y?Yˆt = c?Cˆt + i?Iˆt + g?Gˆt + x?Xˆt, (2.28)
Yˆt = αKˆt + (1− α)Nˆt, (2.29)
Kˆt+1 = (1− δ)Kˆt + δIˆt, (2.30)
−σCˆt = EtRˆt+1 − σEtCˆt+1 + ˆ˜Pt − Et ˆ˜Pt+1, (2.31)
φnNˆt = −σCˆt + (Wˆt − Pˆt) + Nˆt, (2.32)
EtRˆt+1 =
Rk?
Rk? + 1− δEt
(
Rˆkt+1 − Pˆt+1
)
+ Etpˆit+1, (2.33)
Qˆt = Pˆt − (1− α)Kˆt + (1− α)Nˆt, (2.34)
Wˆt = Pˆt + αKˆt − αNˆt, (2.35)
Qˆ?t = (1− βθ)Rˆkt + βθEtQˆ?t+1, (2.36)
Qˆt = θQˆt−1 + (1− θ)Qˆ?t , (2.37)
Rˆt = φpi(Pˆt − Pˆt−1), (2.38)
Gˆt = Zˆt, (2.39)
Zˆt =
∑
j
zjtµjt, (2.40)
Xˆt =
∑
j
xˆjtµjt, (2.41)
with localized government spending processes, zˆjt = ρz zˆjt−1 + zjt , law of motion in
local construction spending, xˆjt+1 = (1 − φh)xˆjt + (φh − ψ)ζ−1(ϕˆjt − µˆjt), evolution
of population distribution, µˆjt+1 = (1−ψ)µˆjt +ψϕˆjt, evolution of local housing stock
per resident, hˆjt+1 = (1− δh)hˆjt + δhζxˆjt − µˆjt+1 + µˆjt, and optimal migration policy,
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ϕˆjt = Θ
′xˆjt, where Θ = (θ1, .., θ4)′ can be solved from the regional dynamic system
and xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′ denotes regional economic state variables.
A.4.3 Proof of Proposition 3 in Section 2.4
Proposition 3 (Aggregate Dynamics) The behavior of aggregate variables in the
locally-perturbed economy is identical to that of an augmented representative economy
in the form of a linear dynamic system Γ0EtYˆt+1 = Γ1Yˆt + Γ2X˜t, where Γ0, Γ1, and
Γ2 are matrices of coefficients, Yˆt =
∑
j yˆjtµjt stands for aggregate variables and
X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt stands for reallocation summary statistics.
Proof: Aggregating up the locally-perturbed equilibrium conditions by regional
populations, the aggregate dynamics in the benchmark model can be represented by a
linear dynamic system consisting of equations (2.28) to (2.41). By solving the regional
dynamic system, the regional economic state variables can be represented as follows,
xˆjt = Φ1xˆjt−1 + jt, and the optimal migration policy is ϕjt =
µ?j exp(Θ
′xˆjt)∑
l µ
?
l exp(Θ
′xˆlt)
and the
evolution of regional population is µjt+1 = (1−ψ)µjt +ψϕjt, where Φ1 and Θ can be
solved from the regional dynamic system of (2.12) to (2.25) and xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′
denotes regional state variables. Denote Xˆ t =
∑
j xˆjtµjt as aggregate counterparts
of regional state variables. Plugging in the evolution of regional population and
regional state variables, this yields
Xˆ t =
∑
j
xˆjtµjt =
∑
j
(Φ1xˆjt−1 + jt)(µjt−1 + ψϕ˜jt−1)
= Φ1
∑
j
xˆjt−1µjt−1 + ψΦ1
∑
j
xˆjt−1ϕ˜jt−1 +
∑
j
jtµjt.
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Thus, the evolution of aggregate counterparts of regional state variables,
Xˆ t = Φ1Xˆ t−1 + Φ2X˜t−1 + Et,
where X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt is a function of regional state variables xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′.
Therefore, the behavior of aggregate variables in the locally-perturbed economy
can be represented by a linear dynamic system Γ0EtYˆt+1 = Γ1Yˆt + Γ2X˜t, where Γ0,
Γ1, and Γ2 are matrices of coefficients, Yˆt =
∑
j yˆjtµjt stands for aggregate variables
and X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt stands for reallocation summary statistics.
Q.E.D.
A.4.4 Proof of Proposition 4 in Section 2.4
Proposition 4 (Regional Dynamics) The behavior of regional variables in the log-
linearized economy is identical to that of a regional dynamic economy in the form of
Φ0Ety˜t+1 = Φ1y˜t + Φ2z˜t, where Φ0, Φ1, and Φ2 are matrices of coefficients, y˜t stands
for the differential regional variables, z˜t represents regional idiosyncratic shocks.
Proof: The regional dynamic system of (2.12) to (2.25) is a linear dynamic system
that represents the behavior of differential regional variables in the log-linearized
economy.
Q.E.D.
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B Details on Quantitative Analysis
B.1 The Solution Method
This subsection describes the numerical algorithm to solve both the regional and
aggregate dynamics of the model. The algorithm includes three steps.
 Step 1 solves the regional dynamic system of (2.12) to (2.25). This yields
the solution for optimal migration policy as well as the evolution of regional
population and other regional state variables.
 Step 2 represents the evolution of reallocation summary statistics to be a
linear difference system, given a vector of regional shocks.
 Step 3 solves the aggregate dynamic system of (2.28) to (2.41) by plugging in
the evolution of reallocation summary statistics.
Step 1. Solving the Regional Dynamic System
The regional dynamic system is given by equations (2.12) to (2.25), where the regional
state variables are denoted by xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′. While individual agents make
their own optimal migration policies, their decisions also depend on the expectations
about others migration decisions. In equilibrium, individual agents guess the law of
motion of regional population and the realized evolution of regional population should
be consistent with their perceived law of motion.
Guess a solution for optimal migration policy and substitute it into the evolution
of regional construction spending. Solve the regional dynamic system and obtain the
solution to optimal migration policy. Update the guess of the solution for optimal
migration policy such that the guessed solution is consistent with the realized solution.
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Step 2. Representing the Reallocation Summary Statistics
Denote aggregate counterparts of regional state variables by Xˆ t =
∑
j xˆjtµjt. Plug-
ging in the evolution of regional population and regional state variables, this yields
Xˆ t =
∑
j
xˆjtµjt =
∑
j
(Φ1xˆjt−1 + jt)[µjt−1 + ψϕ˜jt−1]
= Φ1
∑
j
xˆjt−1µjt−1 + ψΦ1
∑
j
xˆjt−1ϕ˜jt−1 +
∑
j
jtµjt.
Thus, the evolution of aggregate counterparts of regional state variables,
Xˆ t = Φ1Xˆ t−1 + ψΦ1X˜t−1 + Et,
where X˜t =
∑
j xˆjtϕ˜jt is a function of regional state variables xˆjt = (xˆjt, zjt, hˆjt, µˆjt)
′
and ϕjt =
µ?j exp(Θ
′xˆjt)∑
l µ
?
l exp(Θ
′xˆlt)
. Given a vector of regional shocks {εzjt}j∈J , the solution for
optimal migration policy and the evolution of regional state variables yield a set of
simulated data of the aggregate counterparts of regional state variables {Xˆ t}. Ac-
cording to the discussion about covariance effects in Section 3, the covariance effects
wash out in the first-order approximation. In order to capture the covariance effects,
I use the mean and the dispersion of regional government spending by zmt =
1
J
∑
j zjt
and zdt =
1
J
∑
j z
2
jt under the shocks {εzjt}j∈J to approximate the evolution of re-
allocation summary statistics {X˜t}. Therefore, the process of Xˆ t can be approxi-
mated by Xˆ t = Φ1Xˆ t−1 + A1zmt + A2z
d
t , where z
m
t = ρzz
m
t−1 + 
m
t and z
d
t = ρ
2
zz
d
t +
d
t .
The coefficients A1 and A2 can be estimated by running a regression of simulated
data{Xˆ t − Φ1Xˆ t−1} over {zmt , zdt }. Thus, the evolution of aggregate counterparts of
regional state variables can be represented by a linear difference system.
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Step 3. Solving the Aggregate Dynamic System
Knowing the representation of processes of Zˆt and Xˆt given a vector of regional
shocks {εzjt}j∈J as a linear system of {Xˆ t−1, zmt , zdt }, we can solve the aggregate
dynamic system of (2.28) to (2.41) by using standard methods to solve a linear rational
expectation system. This yields the aggregate impulse response functions to a vector
of regional shocks.
B.2 Quantitative Robustness
B.2.1 Model Fitness
Regional Construction and Immigration Shocks. Imposing an immigration
shock of one percent in regional population, the impulse responses of regional hous-
ing construction are shown in Figure 2.14. The left panel displays the state-level
construction spending in my calibrated model. The right panel displays the impulse
responses of MSA-level construction employment rate estimated by Howard (2018).
Estimated vs. Model-based Regional Impulse Responses of Localized Gov-
ernment Spending. Figure 2.15 plots the impulse responses to regional real mil-
itary spending per resident over various horizons. The blue circle denotes the point
estimates while the black dot represents the model-based impulse responses of state-
level government spending with AR(1) coefficient of 0.75 at an annual frequency,
which is equivalent to Nakamura and Steinsson's (2014) estimate of 0.933 at a quar-
ter frequency.
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Figure 2.14: Regional Construction Responses to Immigration Shocks
Notes: The left panel displays the impulse responses of state-level construction spending to
an immigration shock of 1 percent regional population in my calibrated model. The right
panel is the impulse responses of MSA-level construction employment rate estimated by
Howard (2018) (Figure 8 in Page 22) with 95 percent confidence interval where standard
errors are clustered by state.
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Figure 2.15: Estimated Impulse Response of Regional Military Spending
Notes: The circles are LP-IV estimates of regional impulse responses of regional military
spending to a national military buildup. The gray area is 95% confidence interval. Standard
errors are robust and clustered by state. The sample period is 1966-2006. The dotted line
is the AR(1) process with persistence coefficient 0.75 at an annual frequency.
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Figure 2.16: Aggregate Impacts of Locally-targeted Fiscal Policies
Notes: The figure reports the impulse responses normalized by the initial size of the shocks.
In particular, the size-normalized impulse response of an x% shock is the corresponding
impulse responses divided by x.
B.2.2 The Impacts of Locally-Targeted Fiscal Policies
This subsection analyzes the impacts of locally-targeted fiscal policies in which the
government purchases regional products in one particular region. For instance, the
federal government builds a new administration center in Maryland or launches a
highway upgrading program in Texas. The existing literature based on linearized
models without regional reallocation predicts that the aggregate impacts of a localized
government spending shock are proportional (or linear) to its size. I define a size-
normalized impulse response of an x percent shock by the impulse responses divided
by x. Therefore, existing linearized models predict the same normalized impulse
responses regardless of the size of the shock.
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Taking regional reallocation into account, I apply the calibrated model to quantify
the impacts of a localized government spending shock in 1 percent, 3 percent, and
5 percent in California where the steady state population is 10 percent. Figure 2.16
displays the size-normalized impulse responses with respect to 1 percent, 3 percent,
and 5 percent shocks. As the size of the shock gets larger, aggregate output, con-
sumption, housing construction, and hours worked respond at a greater rate than
the size of localized government spending expands. Take the 1 percent and 3 percent
shock as an example. The aggregate output in response to a 3 percent shock increases
more than three times of the aggregate output response to a 1 percent shock. Intu-
itively, if labor reallocation is allowed across regions, larger regional shocks lead to a
larger scale of net directed migration. Given a fixed amount of land, labor migrates
to booming regions and the regional housing construction increases more than the
increase of population. Therefore, the aggregate construction rises in response to a
larger scale of labor reallocation (Panel c) and the increase of aggregate construction
serves as a demand shifter and reduces aggregate consumption even more (Panel b).
As a result, both aggregate hours worked (Panel d) and aggregate output (Panel a)
increase even more.
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Chapter 3
Microeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Aggregation
To me, the most extraordinary thing regarded historically, is the complete
disappearance of the theory of the demand and supply for output as a
whole, [...] after it had been for a quarter of a century the most discussed
thing in economics.
John Maynard Keynes (1936)
3.1 Introduction
The behavior of aggregate economy as a whole stems from a large amount of heteroge-
neous microeconomic units and their interplay in the market. In order to understand
how an aggregate economy behaves, economists should, in principle, work out the
theories not only of how microeconomic units behave but also of how to aggregate
these microeconomic responses appropriately. An extensive body of literature studies
how to add micro production or demand functions into their aggregate counterparts.
Such methods exist, but they rely on assumptions that one should hardly expect to
be approximated in actual economies.1
1For example, Leontief (1947), Nataf (1948), Gorman (1953), and Fisher (1969) provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for aggregation. However, these conditions are in fact stringent; for a
comprehensive review, see Felipe and Fisher (2003).
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Instead, modern macroeconomics turns to a different sort of approachthe rep-
resentative agent modelthat works out theories how an individual behaves and
transfers these rules of behavior to the aggregate level. The neoclassical produc-
tion function and the aggregate consumption function are famous examples. This
approach enables us to deliver some useful aggregate relationships that can be empir-
ically identified or tested without knowing disaggregate details, while this approach
also shuts down the possibility of studying how micro heterogeneity matters for macro
impacts. It turns out that a recent literature builds on disaggregate models and sheds
new light on the aggregate implications of micro heterogeneity (e.g., Auclert, 2019;
Baqaee and Farhi, 2019). These studies apply aggregation to derive useful sufficient
statistics that can be identified or estimated with some but not all disaggregate de-
tails. However, most of these studies focus on the macro impact of transitory shocks
or comparative statics analysis. It is still an open question to what extent aggregation
can be implemented to analyze dynamic macro impacts in a disaggregate, recursive
stochastic dynamic context.
In this paper, we tackle the aggregation issue in the context of recursive stochastic
dynamic models and propose a new method to study the macro impact of micro het-
erogeneity. We show that, after differentiating disaggregate equilibrium conditions,
aggregation can be admitted to construct a recursive stand-in macro system that
displays the same aggregate dynamics as in the disaggregate model. This method
hinges on an insight that linearity makes aggregation tractable and convenient. The
reason why exact aggregation is difficult is because microeconomic responses are in
general nonlinearly interlaced in equilibrium conditions. However, as these nonlin-
ear equilibrium conditions can be decomposed by approximation order in a linear
manner, aggregation can be implemented as a linear combination and thus becomes
convenient. We bring this insight to a broad class of dynamic stochastic general equi-
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librium (DSGE) models with heterogeneous micro structures. This method provides
a sufficient-statistic characterization of macro shocks and aggregate relationships in
terms of heterogeneous micro shocks and structures. The first- and second-order
macro shocks can be sharply characterized by the average and the dispersion of micro
counterparts weighted by their impact intensities. We apply this method in a variety
of applications to illustrate the importance of micro heterogeneity and nonlinearity
in macroeconomics as well as how to implement it in different contexts.
In Section 3.2, we start with an illustrative example of production allowing for rich
sectoral or locational heterogeneity to i) show how to find the stand-in macro model
linking a list of macro variables to micro shocks but not the micro variables and ii)
highlight economic lessons about the macro impact of micro heterogeneity. The micro
production uses capital and labor as inputs with constant return to scale property
and allows for arbitrary functional forms, e.g., micro production functions may be not
additively separable between capital and labor. As pointed out by the early literature
on aggregation, it is unlikely to have a consistent aggregate production function that
exactly captures the aggregate behavior of output and factor inputs. However, it
is still plausible to construct a first-order approximate stand-in model, since micro
production functions turn to be log-linear in the first-order approximate model and
thus Gorman's aggregation conditions can be satisfied. The first lesson is that, to
the first order, the implications of the micro model with sectoral or locational hetero-
geneity are the same as those of a representative framework, only with economy-wide
factor shares and aggregate productivity playing the key role but without knowing
all disaggregate details. Although the aggregate production function generally holds
to the first-order, it is not legitimate to directly assume a representative firm with
optimizing behavior under the aggregate production function. This is because of the
second lesson that, even if there exists a unique inverse relationship between factor
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intensity and relative return rates of factor for all micro production function to the
first order, there may not be a unique inverse relationship at the aggregate level in
the presence of micro production heterogeneity. Put it another way, the aggregate
factor demand derived from a representative firm with an aggregate production func-
tion is barely equivalent to the aggregate factor demand derived from a disaggregate
model. We show that such deviation between micro and macro levels can be suffi-
ciently captured by a new but unfamiliar shock, which comes from the interaction of
fixed heterogeneity in the micro production structures and heterogeneity in the micro
shocks. Allowing for rich heterogeneity in micro production structures, a research
can make use of micro equilibrium conditions to derive a stand-in macro model that
links the behavior of macro variables to a set of aggregate shocks as sufficient statis-
tics, which potentially are averages of micro shocks weighted by their corresponding
impact intensities.
Although it is relatively easy to find the first-order approximate stand-in model
owing to the linearity of first-order approximation, aggregation can be difficult in
the second- and higher-order approximation. This is because, under standard Taylor
expansion, the variables in higher-order approximate model are quadratic functions
instead of linear functions. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a technique to
decompose the second- and higher-order terms via differentials in a linear manner.
For instance, the second-order deviation of a variable can be decomposed into its
first- and second-order differentials. In the second-order system, the quadratic terms
are only associated with the cross-product of first-order differentials but have nothing
to do with the second-order differentials. Under this decomposition, the second-
order differentials are linear in the second-order approximate system. This method is
also related to the literature of solving rational expectations models by using higher-
order approximation via either pruning terms of higher-order components than the
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considered approximation order or via differentials (e.g., Lombardo and Sutherland,
2007; Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims, 2008; Johnston, King, and Lie, 2014).
Our method applies familiar linear rational expectations techniques to successively
solve for higher-order approximation. Differently, we utilize this approach in the
context allowing for aggregating micro heterogeneity. The approximation by order
yields a linear representation and thus provides tractability for aggregation over micro
equilibrium conditions by approximation order. Using this method, we show how
to find the second-order stand-in model that links a list of macro variables to the
first- and second-order macro shocks, which can be shaped by the average and the
dispersion of the micro counterparts weighted by their micro impact intensities.
In Section 3.3, we apply this method in a broad class of DSGE models with micro
heterogeneity. In principle, adding up microeconomic behavior into the macro level
is very restrictive, because microeconomic behavior can be nonlinearly interlaced and
distribution evolution can be interdependent across microeconomic units in equilib-
rium. Two methods are prevailing in the modern macroeconomics literature: the
representative-agent approach and the numerical aggregation approach (e.g., applica-
tions of Krusell and Smith (1997) algorithm in disaggregate models with household's
or firm's heterogeneity). Although the relationships among aggregates can be studies
by the representative-agent approach, this approach is almost silent about how micro
heterogeneity affects aggregate responses. The numerical aggregation approach solves
macro models with heterogeneous micro units by using numerical methods. This ap-
proach can generate quantitative aggregate impacts of micro heterogeneity, but those
quantitative results are usually not easy to interpret qualitatively in the sense what
types of micro heterogeneity matter and through what channels. Our method combine
strengths of existing approaches. Using our method, aggregation becomes convenient
because microeconomic equilibrium conditions are decomposed by approximation or-
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der in a linear manner. To each order, the stand-in macro system is functionally
equivalent to a representative-agent model in which macro elasticities and shocks are
explicitly characterized in terms of micro elasticities and shocks. These macro elastic-
ities and shocks can be considered as sufficient statistics that characterize the macro
impact of micro heterogeneity.
In Section 3.4 and 3.5, we apply this method in a variety of applications to il-
lustrate the importance of micro heterogeneity and nonlinearity in macroeconomics
as well as how to implement it in different contexts. Most of existing studies on
the macro impact of micro heterogeneity using aggregation focus on the macro im-
pact of transitory shocks or comparative statistic analysis. In particular, Baqaee and
Farhi (2019) provide a sufficient-statistic characterization on the second-order macro
impact of micro productivity via input-output network. Although their character-
ization is a comparative statics analysis, it can be extended to a dynamic context
by re-indexing goods over time as in Arrow-Debreu framework. Thus, these suffi-
cient statistics become time-variant and conditional on the sequence of realizations
of all past and present random variables and shocks. This analysis is difficult to be
applied by standard time series methods, because their characterizations lack of a
recursive structure. One alternative approach proving useful is the recursive equi-
librium analysis (Prescott and Mehra, 1980). Applying our method, we can provide
an alternative characterization on the macro impact of micro shocks by a recursive
stochastic dynamic aggregate system. The sufficient statistics derived from aggrega-
tion can be summarized by a number of macro state variables which summarize the
effects of past decisions and current information but with a smaller dimension and
less requirements on disaggregate details.
In the first application, we explore the micro foundation of the aggregate consump-
tion function by providing a first-order decomposition of aggregate consumption in
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terms of micro consumer characters. Our result can be interpreted as a generalized
version of Auclert's (2019) work. His paper decomposes the aggregate consumption
effect of a transitory monetary shock in an economy with a fixed supply of capital
into a contribution from a variety of aggregate and redistribution channels. Using our
method, we provide a first-order decomposition of aggregate consumption response
in an economy allowing for varying capital investment and persistent shocks. All
the channels shown in Auclert's decomposition remain while a new redistribution
channelthe asset position adjustment (APA) channelis identified. This channel
captures the impact on consumption through individual household's adjustment of
asset position. The magnitude of the APA channel mainly depends on the variability
of capital investment and the persistence of shocks. Intuitively, the changes of real
value of capital asset holding can be decomposed into three parts: the changes of
nominal return rate, of general price level, and of capital asset position. Suppose
a shock is transitory, a consumer will only reevaluate the present discount value of
capital asset without any adjustment of his or her capital asset position. The APA
channel is deactivated in this case. However, as long as capital investment is allowed,
this channel kicks in. If a consumer's current capital asset is more than the desired
level, this consumer will reduce the asset position and consume more relative to the
one with less current asset than the desired.
In the second application, we revisit the classic issue on the macroeconomic con-
sequences of changing permanent income inequality. Over the past few decades, the
income inequality in the U.S. has been rising rapidly. In particular, a significant
share of risking income inequality is accounted by the fixed-effect component of labor
income. This component usually captures the returns to skill or ability, which can be
interpreted as the permanent income. Many well-known macroeconomic models pre-
dict that shifts in the distribution of permanent income are entirely or approximately
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neutral.2 Macroeconomic aggregates, such as consumption and interest rate, are in-
dependent of permanent income inequality, since consumption is a linear function of
permanent income. To break down this linearity property, the role of non-homothetic
preference has been emphasized in the literature. Although aggregate consumption is
not a linear function in permanent income any more in the presence of non-homothetic
preference, we show that the first-order macro impact on aggregate consumption re-
sponse can be still neutral to any shifts in the distribution of permanent income.
However, the impact of varying permanent-income inequality can show up at macro
second-order. We provide an explicit characterization on the first- and second-order
macro impact of aggregate consumption to a shift of permanent-income inequality,
which we refer to as the inequality multiplier. This multiplier is shaped by the mi-
croeconomic details of household's preferences and distribution of permanent income.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an illustrative
example to show the key idea of the method and related economic lessons. Section 3.3
describes the method for a class of recursive, disaggregate stochastic dynamic models.
Section 3.4 and 3.5 provide applications on how the micro heterogeneity of asset
position and permanent income inequality affect aggregate consumption responses.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 An Illustrative Example
In this section, we start with an illustrative example of production allowing for sectoral
or locational heterogeneity to investigate i) whether there exists a stand-in model that
links a specific list of macro variables to micro shocks but not the micro variables; ii)
2The macro models adhering to the permanent income hypothesis yield the neutrality result of
a linear consumption function in permanent income. Even canonical precautionary-savings models,
which are widely known to generate concave consumption functions in current income, also predict
a linear consumption function in permanent income. See Straub (2018).
115
if yes, how to find the first-order approximate stand-in model; iii) economic lessons
about the macro impact of micro heterogeneity; iv) what sufficient statistics for micro
shocks are; and v) whether it is possible to find higher-order approximate stand-in
models and how.
3.2.1 Model Setup
Suppose that there is an arbitrary number of firms indexed by j ∈ J , where J can be
a finite number or a continuum. The index j can be interpreted as sectors or locations
or others. Each firm uses capital and labor to produce output having a function of
the form
yj = zjf(kj, nj, j) (3.1)
where yj is output, kj is capital, nj is labor and zj is productivity. The production
function f is assumed to be differentiable and constant return to scale but may differ
across firms. Final goods are produced by an aggregator over {yj} as follows
Y = D({yj}j∈J ). (3.2)
Normalize the price of Y to be one, and then the relative price of yj is given by
pj =
∂D
∂yj
.
To keep things simple, suppose further that there is an exogenous level of demand
dj for each good j,
3 so that the equilibrium for good j is
yj = dj. (3.3)
The factors, capital and labor, are freely mobile across firms and have prices Q and
3This assumption can be relaxed to be endogenous demand but only complicates the expressions.
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W respectively. Cost minimization requires that, for each good j, the factor demands
Q
W
=
fk(kj, nj, j)
fn(kj, nj, j)
. (3.4)
Assume that there is an exogenous total endowment (supply) of capital KS and
labor NS, so that factor market clearing requires that the demands satisfy
KS =
∑
j
kj, (3.5)
NS =
∑
j
nj. (3.6)
While this setup is very simple, it can be used to illustrate the questions that a
researcher would naturally have in investigating models with multiple sectors or lo-
cations of economic activity and, more generally, in models with micro heterogeneity.
The first question is whether there exists a stand-in model that links a specified list of
macro variables (e.g., Y , N , and K in this model) to micro shocks (e.g., productivity
shocks {zj}), but not the micro variables (e.g., {kj} and {nj}), which is generic in
the sense that its existence does not depend on the chosen parameters.
In this particular model, the above question is equivalent to ask whether there ex-
ists an aggregate production functiona consistent aggregation of micro production
functionsthat is capable of characterizing the equilibrium behavior of the macro
variables. This issue has been intensively investigated by the early literature on ag-
gregation in production functions (e.g., Leontief, 1947; Nataf, 1948; Gorman, 1953;
Fisher, 1969). However, the answer is somewhat negative in the sense that the as-
sumptions that make aggregation possible are very stringent and hardly expected to
be approximated in actual economies. Take Gorman's (1953) aggregation conditions
as an example. He shows that, if the marginal rates of substitution between two
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types of inputs are the same for all firms, then a necessary and sufficient condition for
the consistent aggregate of micro production functions to the aggregate production
function Y = F (K,N) is possible if the expansion paths for all firms at a given set
of input prices are parallel straight lines through their origins. In order to make sure
the expansion paths for all firms are parallel straight lines, micro production func-
tions are additively separable in capital and labor, e.g., log-additive Cobb-Douglas.
This condition is in fact an extremely restrictive condition for intersectoral or even
interfirm aggregation (Felipe and Fisher, 2003). Therefore, an exact aggregation in
production functions is very difficult to reach in general.
3.2.2 The First-order Approximate Stand-in Model
Though an exact stand-in model may be impossible, it is still plausible to have a first-
order approximate stand-in model, since micro production functions are log-linear to
the first-order approximation and thus they satisfy Gorman's aggregation conditions.
In this subsection, we show how to find the first-order approximate stand-in model.
Assume that there is a unique steady state and thus denote the variables with
a superscript ? as the corresponding steady state values. Log-linearizing of the
equilibrium conditions for each good, this yields
yˆj = zˆj + αj kˆj + (1− αj)nˆj,
yˆj = dˆj,
Qˆ− Wˆ = ξj[nˆj − kˆj],
where αj ≡ ∂fj/f
?
j
∂kj/k?j
=
Q?k?j
p?j y
?
j
is the capital share at the steady state and ξj is the
reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution between nj and kj.
4
4Notably, since the micro production functions are constant return to scale, this yields QW =
118
Also log-linearizing the aggregation conditions around steady state, this yields
Yˆ =
∑
j
θyj yˆjt,
Kˆ =
∑
j
θkj kˆjt,
Nˆ =
∑
j
θnj nˆjt,
where θyj =
∂D/D?
∂yj/y?j
=
p?j y
?
j
Y ?
is the Domar weight for intermediate good j at steady state.
This also implies that θkj =
k?j
K?
=
p?j y
?
j
Y ?
· Qk?j
p?j y
?
j
· Y ?
Q?K?
= θyj
αj
α
where α =
∑
j θ
y
jαj denotes
the aggregate capital share. Similarly, θnj =
n?j
N?
= θyj
(1−αj)
(1−α) .
3.2.2.1 Implications for Aggregate Production
These expressions make it easy to obtain the approximate behavior of aggregate
output Yˆ =
∑
j θ
y
j yˆjt with the following representation,
Yˆ = Aˆ+ αKˆ + (1− α)Nˆ , (3.7)
where Aˆ ≡ ∑j θyj zˆjt denotes aggregate productivity. That is, to the first order, the
implications of the micro model with sectoral or locational heterogeneity are the same
as those of a representative-firm framework, with economy-wide factor shares α and
1−α and aggregate productivity Aˆ playing the key role. This result is consistent with
the classic findings of Solow (1957) and Hulten (1978). As long as a researchre has
the knowledge about aggregate factor shares and aggregate productivity but without
knowing all details of micro heterogeneity, it is sufficient to characterize the behavior
of production and factor input to the aggregate level.
fk(kj ,nj ,j)
fn(kj ,nj ,j)
= Φ(
kj
nj
, j).
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3.2.2.2 Implications for Aggregate Factor Demand
A researcher may also ask a relevant question: given that the first-order aggregate pro-
duction function (3.7) holds in general, is it legitimate to assume a representative firm
with optimizing behavior under an aggregate production function of Cobb-Douglas
form and then make inferences on the first-order macro impacts? The answer is neg-
ative. Although the aggregate production function generally holds to the first-order,
the factor demand implications are more subtle. Even if there exists a unique inverse
relationship between factor intensity and the rates of factor return for all micro pro-
duction functions to the first order, i.e., Qˆ− Wˆ = ξj[nˆj − kˆj] for all j, there may not
be a unique inverse relationship at the aggregate level, i.e., Qˆ− Wˆ = ξ[Nˆ − Kˆ] does
not hold.
To demonstrate this point, let's first consider the factor demands at micro level.
Conditional on market prices of factors and micro level productivity and demand
shocks, the micro-level factor demands satisfy
nˆj =
αj
ξj
(Qˆ− Wˆ ) + (dˆj − zˆj),
kˆj = −(1− αj)
ξj
(Qˆ− Wˆ ) + (dˆj − zˆj).
Therefore, this yields the aggregate factor demands
Nˆ =
b
1− α(Qˆ− Wˆ ) +
1
1− α
∑
j
θyj (1− αj)(dˆj − zˆj),
Kˆ = − b
α
(Qˆ− Wˆ ) + 1
α
∑
j
θyjαj(dˆj − zˆj),
where b =
∑
j θ
y
j
(1−αj)αj
ξj
.
Suppose that all the micro production functions f(·) are the same, the aggregate
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factor demands specialize to
Nˆ =
α
ξ
(Qˆ− Wˆ ) + (Yˆ − Aˆ),
Kˆ = −1− α
ξ
(Qˆ− Wˆ ) + (Yˆ − Aˆ).
This directly implies a unique inverse relationship at the aggregate level
Nˆ − Kˆ = 1
ξ
(Qˆ− Wˆ ).
In this scenario, if a researcher assumes a representative firm with a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate production function with factor shares α and 1− α and aggregate produc-
tivity A. The factor demand as an optimizing behavior of the representative firm will
be consistent with the above inverse relationship at the aggregate level.
However, in the presence of micro heterogeneity on production functions, the
general expression of the relationship between factor intensity and relative return
rate of factors is given by
Nˆ − Kˆ = b
α(1− α)(Qˆ− Wˆ ) +
1
α(1− α)Xˆ, (3.8)
with the difference
Xˆ =
∑
j
θyj (α− αj)(dˆj − zˆj),
where b
α(1−α) denotes the aggregate elasticity of substitution between labor and cap-
ital, and the difference captures the interaction of fixed heterogeneity in the micro
production structures and heterogeneity in the micro shocks. Therefore, at the aggre-
gate level, the factor intensity depends not only on the rates of factor return inversely
but also on some other shocks, e.g., Xˆt. Thus it is still possible that, in equilibrium,
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the factor intensity Nˆ − Kˆ and the relative rate of factor return Qˆ − Wˆ can both
increase, simply because of a positive aggregate factor demand shock Xˆ > 0. This
point was also mentioned by Wicksell (1893) and restated by Robinson (1953) which
kicked off the famous Cambridge-Cambridge controversy.
3.2.2.3 The First-order Stand-in Model and Sufficient Statistics
The above analysis suggests that, allowing for rich heterogeneity in micro produc-
tion structures, a researcher can make use of micro equilibrium conditions to derive
a stand-in macro model that links the behavior of macro variables to a set of aggre-
gate shocks which potentially are weighted averages of micro shocks. This subsection
provides two lessons. From the view of production functions, although micro produc-
tion functions are not additively separable, an aggregate production function can be
somewhat robustly derived to the first-order. But from the view of factor demands,
even if the law of diminishing marginal product holds for all micro production func-
tions, there may not exist a unique inverse relationship between factor intensity and
the relative rate of factor return at aggregate level. Therefore, to study the macro
impact of micro shocks, a research can establish such a stand-in model and gather the
information of aggregate elasticities (e.g., factor shares at the aggregate level) and
aggregate shocks (e.g., aggregate productivity shocks Aˆ and aggregate factor demand
shocks Xˆ) as sufficient statistics to make macro inferences.
3.2.3 The Second-order Approximate Stand-in Model
3.2.3.1 Standard Second-order Taylor Approximation
Owing to the linearity of first-order approximation, it is relatively easy to find the first-
order approximate stand-in model. But aggregation can be difficult to the second-
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and higher-order approximation. This is because, under standard Taylor expansion,
the higher-order systems are no long linear and thus aggregation cannot be applied
in general. To see why, let us take the second-order approximation as an example to
illustrate the difficulty.
Denote ∆y
(s)
j = (y
(s)
j − y?j )/y?j as the log deviation of firm j's output from its
steady state to the second-order approximation, where the superscript (s) denotes
the second-order approximate variables. The second-order approximation of firm j's
micro production function is given by
∆y
(s)
j = ∆z
(s)
j + αj∆k
(s)
j + (1− αj)∆n(s)j
+
1
2
ϕkk(∆k
(s)
j )
2 +
1
2
ϕnn(∆n
(s)
j )
2 + ϕkn(∆k
(s)
j )(∆n
(s)
j ),
where ϕkk =
∂ϕ2
∂k˜2j
is the second-order derivative of ϕ(k˜j, n˜j, j) ≡ f(exp(k˜j), exp(n˜j), j)
with respect to k˜j = log kj around steady state and similarly for ϕnn and ϕkn.
The second-order approximations of the aggregate conditions are given by
∆Y (s) =
∑
j
θyj∆y
(s)
j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δyjyl(∆y
(s)
j )(∆y
(s)
l ),
∆K(s) =
∑
j
θkj∆k
(s)
j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δkjkl(∆k
(s)
j )(∆k
(s)
l ),
∆N (s) =
∑
j
θnj ∆n
(s)
j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δnjnl(∆n
(s)
j )(∆n
(s)
l ),
where δyjyl =
∂δ2
∂y˜j∂y˜l
is the second-order cross derivative of δ({y˜j}) ≡ D({exp(y˜j)})
with respect to y˜j = log yj around steady state and similarly for δkjkl and δnjnl .
In the second-order approximations, the micro variables are quadratic function
and thus no longer additively separable. The Gorman's aggregation conditions in
general fail and therefore one cannot apply the method in the previous subsection to
123
construct a stand-in model that links a list of macro variables to micro shocks up to
the second-order.
3.2.3.2 Second-order Approximation via Differentials
In this subsection, we show a technique to decompose the second-order terms in a
linear manner. Owing to the linearity under this decomposition, we can apply linear
aggregation in the second-order approximate system tractably. The technique to
decompose the second-order terms borrows from the literature of solving nonlinear
rational expectations models. Loosely speaking, the second-order difference of micro
variables ∆y
(s)
j can be decomposed as its first- and second-order components, ∆y
(s)
j =
dy˜j +
1
2
d2y˜j, either in the notion of differentials (Johnston, King, and Lie, 2014) or in
the notion of pruning method (Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims, 2008; Andreasen
et al., 2018). The following analysis employs the notion of differentials to decompose
the second-order terms and then construct a stand-in model to the second-order.
Taking the second-order differentials of the equilibrium conditions for each good
j, this yields
d2y˜j = d
2z˜j + αjd
2k˜j + (1− αj)d2n˜j + 1
2
ϕkk(dk˜j)
2 +
1
2
ϕnn(dn˜j)
2 + ϕkn(dk˜j)(dn˜j),
d2y˜j = d
2d˜j,
d2Q˜− d2W˜ = ξj[d2n˜j − d2k˜j] + 1
2
φkk(dk˜j)
2 +
1
2
φnn(dn˜j)
2 + φkn(dk˜j)(dn˜j),
where φkk =
∂2φ
∂k˜2j
is the second-order cross derivative of φ(exp(k˜j), exp(n˜j)) ≡ Φ( kjnj , j)
with respect to k˜j around steady state and similarly for φnn and φnk.
The second-order differentials of the aggregation conditions around steady state
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are
d2Y˜ =
∑
j
θyj d
2y˜j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δyjyl(dy˜j)
2,
d2K˜ =
∑
j
θkj d
2k˜j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δkjkl(dk˜j)
2,
d2N˜ =
∑
j
θnj d
2n˜j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
δnjnl(dn˜j)
2,
and the second-order approximate macro variables are given by
∆Y (s) = dY˜ +
1
2
d2Y˜ ,
∆K(s) = dK˜ +
1
2
d2K˜,
∆N (s) = dN˜ +
1
2
d2N˜ ,
Notably, all of the above first-order components (e.g., dy˜j, dk˜j, and others) can be
sufficiently solved by the first-order approximate equilibrium system as in Subsection
3.2.2. Therefore, when it comes to the second-order approximate system, the first-
order components can be treated as given. Therefore, the second-order components
of the micro equilibrium conditions are
d2y˜j = d
2z˜j + ω
(s)
yj
+ αjd
2k˜j + (1− αj)d2n˜j,
d2y˜j = d
2d˜j,
d2Q˜− d2W˜ = ξj[d2n˜j − d2k˜j] + ω(s)njkj ,
where ω
(s)
yj ≡ 12ϕkk(dk˜j)2+12ϕnn(dn˜j)2+ϕkn(dk˜j)(dn˜j), ω(s)nk,j ≡ 12φkk(dk˜j)2+12φnn(dn˜j)2+
φkn(dk˜j)(dn˜j) are denoted as the new second-order micro shocks; and the second-order
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components of the macro variables are
d2Y˜ =
∑
j
θyj d
2y˜j + ω
(s)
Y ,
d2K˜ =
∑
j
θkj d
2k˜j + ω
(s)
K ,
d2N˜ =
∑
j
θnj d
2n˜j + ω
(s)
N ,
where ω
(s)
Y ≡ 12
∑
j
∑
l δyjyl(dy˜j)
2, ω
(s)
K =
1
2
∑
j
∑
l δkjkl(dk˜j)
2, and ω
(s)
N =
1
2
∑
j
∑
l δnjnl(dn˜j)
2
are denoted as the new second-order macro shocks.
3.2.3.3 The Second-order Stand-in Model and Sufficient Statistics
The above decomposition method yields two advantages to construct the second-
order stand-in model. On the one hand, the second-order micro and macro shocks
are known functions of the cross-product terms of the first-order differentials, which
can be treated as given after solving the first-order system. On the other hand, the
second-order approximate system has a similar algebraic structure to the first-order
approximate system. Therefore, a research can directly apply the way to construct
the first-order stand-in model to the second-order one.
Implications for Aggregate Production. Using the second-order relationships
between micro and macro output, the second-order differential of aggregate output is
given by
d2Y˜ = αd2K˜ + (1− α)d2N˜ + [
∑
j
θyj (d
2z˜j + ω
(s)
yj
) + ω
(s)
Y − αω(s)K − (1− α)ω(s)N ],
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This directly implies the second-order approximate behavior of aggregate output
∆Y (s) = α∆K(s) + (1− α)∆N (s) + ∆A(s), (3.9)
with second-order aggregate productivity
∆A(s) =
∑
j
θyj∆z
(s)
j +
1
2
[
∑
j
θyjω
(s)
yj
+ ω
(s)
Y − αω(s)K − (1− α)ω(s)N ].
That is, to the second order, the implications of the micro model with sectoral or
locational heterogeneity are the same as those of a representative framework but with
new interpretations on aggregate productivity shocks. Besides the weighted average
of micro productivity shocks, the second-order aggregate productivity shocks also
include the dispersion (or cross-product term) of first-order micro variables.
Implications for Aggregate Factor Demand. Similar to the case of first-order
approximation, the second-order aggregate factor demand relationship can be repre-
sented by
∆N (s) −∆K(s) = b
α(1− α)(∆Q
(s) −∆W (s)) + ∆X(s), (3.10)
with the second-order aggregate factor demand shocks
∆X(s) =
1
α(1− α)
∑
j
θyj (α− αj)[(∆d(s)j −∆z(s)j )−
1
2
(ω(s)yj − αj(1− αj)ω(s)njkj)].
Similarly, to the second order, the dispersion (or cross-product terms) of first-order
micro responses to micro shocks emerges as a second-order shock.
To sum up, the above analysis suggests that, even allowing for rich heterogeneity
in micro production structures, one can make use of micro equilibrium to derive a
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second-order stand-in model that links the behavior of macro variables to a set of
aggregate shocks which are the average and dispersion of micro shocks weighted by
their corresponding impact intensities.
3.3 From Micro to Macro: A General Approach
This section describes the general approach in a class of recursive stochastic dy-
namic systems. We show under what conditions a disaggregate stochastic dynamic
equilibrium model can be mapped into a stand-in macro model with a recursive rep-
resentation. This method also provides a guidance of constructing sufficient statistics
to characterize the macro impact of micro heterogeneity. Applications are given in
Section 3.4 and 3.5.
3.3.1 Models of Interest
Consider the following class of rational expectations models
EtF(xt+1,xt, et+1) = 0, (3.11)
where xt = {xjt}j∈J denotes a vector of microeconomic unit's decisions and state
variables with index j over an arbitrary number of types J , et = {ejt}j∈J represents a
vector of microeconomic exogenous variables or shocks across types. Et is expectation
operator conditional on microeconomic unit's information set at time t. The vector-
valued function F is possibly, and in general, nonlinear. There are nx variables in the
system, which are contained in the vector xt. The number of exogenous shocks in the
system is ne and the distribution of the exogenous shocks is unspecified for now. So
far the only assumptions required are i) the differentiability of F and ii) the existence
and uniqueness of steady state such that F(x?,x?, 0) = 0.
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An Example of a Multi-sector Real Business Cycle Model.
Throughout this subsection, we also provide a multi-sector real business cycle model
as an example to display how to apply this method. Consider a horizontal economy
with multiple sectors indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., J . Each sector uses labor njt and
capital kjt as inputs to produce sectoral goods following yjt = zjtk
αj
jt n
1−αj
jt , where
zjt is sectoral productivity and αj is the capital share in sector j which is allowed
to be heterogeneous across sectors. Sectoral stock of capital evolves kj,t+1 = (1 −
δ)kjt + ijt, where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The final goods production
function is a CES aggregator over sectoral goods yt = (Σjy
ε−1
ε
jt )
ε
ε−1 , where ε is the
elasticity of substitution across sectoral goods. The final goods can be allocated to
household's consumption or sectoral firms' investment. In the demand side, there is
a representative household who decides aggregate consumption and labor supply to
maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t[u(ct) − v(nt)]. The resource constraint of final goods is given
by yt = ct +
∑
j ijt. Assume that labor is freely mobile across sector and the labor
market clears, nt =
∑
j njt.
Now we display the general structure of approximate-model restrictions and solu-
tion forms by approximation order as follows. Then we use the first- and second-order
approximate system to illustrate more details about how the method works.
The n-th Order Solution.
Using Talyor series expansion, the approximate solution to the system (3.11) to the
n-th order is of the form
xt ≈ x?[1 + y(1)t +
1
2
y
(2)
t + ...+
1
n!
y
(n)
t ], (3.12)
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where x? is the vector of deterministic steady-state values of xt, satisfying F(x?,x?, 0) =
0, and y
(i)
t , i = 1, .., n, denotes the i-th order element in logarithmic form of the solu-
tion. Our approach follows Johnston, King, and Lie (2014) to solve y
(i)
t successively,
starting from i = 1. y
(i)
t is in fact the solution to the restrictions imposed by the i-th
differential of the system (3.11).
General Forms of Approximate-model Restrictions.
The restrictions for the n-th order approximation solution can be shown as a linear
system and given by
AEty(i)t+1 = By
(i)
t +C
(i)Etz(i)t+1, (3.13)
with the driving process evolves according to
z
(i)
t = γ
(i) +D(i)z
(i)
t−1 +G
(i)v
(i)
t , (3.14)
where the driving variables z
(i)
t are treated as exogenous for each i, but are not
necessary exogenous for the whole system (3.11). A and B are nx × nx matrices
associated with the differentials of the system at steady state. Notably, the matrices
A and B have no superscript i and hence, are identical for all i. But the matrices C(i),
D(i), and G(i) and the vector γ(i) are i-th order-specific. The vector of innovations,
v
(i)
t , has zero mean and a variance-covariance matrix.
Constructing Restrictions for n-th Order Stand-in Macro System.
Now since the system of restrictions is linear, this property provides huge convenience
for aggregation. Denote Y
(i)
t as the macro variables to n-th order, which is a nY × 1
vector and Hy as an nY × nx linear aggregator. For instance, in the illustrative
example, the first-order aggregate labor can be shown by nˆt =
∑
j
n?j
n?
nˆjt. Using
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aggregation relationship among variables Y
(i)
t = Hyy
(i)
t , this yields the n-th order
stand-in macro dynamic system
A˜EtY(i)t+1 = B˜Y
(i)
t + C˜
(i)EtZ(i)t+1, (3.15)
where the aggregate driving variables Z
(i)
t are some linear combinations over micro
driving variables to n-th order, such that Z
(i)
t = [i
(i)
z ]′z
(i)
t . A˜, B˜, and C˜
(i) are matrices
associated with the differentials of the system at steady state. The restrictions above
are familiar from the literature on linear approximation literature. The solution to
Y
(i)
t can be easily obtained and be expressed in a linear state-space form.
Similarly, the n-th order micro dynamics can be shown by the following form
A˘jEt
 y(i)j,t+1
Y
(i)
t+1
 = B˘j
 y(i)jt
Y
(i)
t
+ C˘(i)j Et
 z(i)j,t+1
Z
(i)
t+1
 , (3.16)
where A˘j, B˘j, and C˘
(i)
j are matrices associated with the differentials of the system
at steady state. Knowing the solution to the n-th order macro impacts, it is easy to
plug in the solution to Y
(i)
t into the n-th order micro system and thus, to solve y
(i)
jt
for each j. The solution to y
(i)
jt can be expressed in a linear state-space form too.
General Forms of Solution to the Stand-in Model.
Given the above model restrictions, the solution to n-th order macro variables can be
written in a linear state-space form,
Y
(i)
t = θ
(i)
Y + θ
(i)
Y KK
(i)
t ,
K
(i)
t = θ
(i)
K + θ
(i)
KKK
(i)
t−1 + θ
(i)
KVV
(i)
t ,
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for aggregate states K
(i)
t (including endogenous and exogenous state variables). The
solution to n-th order micro variables is given by a linear state-space representation,
y
(i)
jt = θ
(i)
y,j + θ
(i)
yk,jk
(i)
jt + θ
(i)
Y K,jK
(i)
t ,
k
(i)
jt = θ
(i)
k,j + θ
(i)
kk,jk
(i)
jt−1 + θ
(i)
kK,jK
(i)
t−1 + θ
(i)
kv,jv
(i)
jt ,
for micro states k
(i)
jt , which also include endogenous and exogenous state variables.
3.3.2 The First-order Stand-in System
Total differentiation of the model EtF [exp(yt+1), exp(yt), exp(ut+1)] = 0 yields a set
of model restrictions on equilibrium dynamics to the first-order,
Et[F1dyt+1 + F2dyt + F3dut+1] = 0, (3.17)
where the matrices F1, F2, and F3 are the partial derivatives with respect to yt+1,
yt, and ut+1, respectively, evaluated at deterministic steady state. The above system
can be solved using standard linear rational expectations solution methods (e.g., King
and Watson, 1998; Sims, 2002) in the following form
AEtdyt+1 = Bdyt +C(1)Etdut+1, (3.18)
whereA = −F1, B = F2, and C(1) = F3. In line with this literature, a stable solution
exists and is unique if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) there exists a number
χ such that |Aχ−B| 6= 0 and the no-unit-root condition requires that |A−B| 6= 0;
(ii) the relevant generalizations of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) rank and order
conditions must be satisfied.
The standard solution method may subject to a high-dimensionality issue when
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the model includes a large number of micro heterogeneity. Instead of solving the
system (3.18) directly, we propose to construct stand-in macro dynamic systems by
order of approximation respectively to reduce dimensionality and then solve these
system successively by order or approximation.
In principle, an aggregation can be considered as a linear projection to reduce
the rank of the original system. Algebraically speaking, a stand-in macro dynamic
system can be constructed if there exists a linear transformation T such that such that
TA = A˜Hy and TB = B˜Hy. Therefore, aggregate variables are defined by dYt =
Hydyt and the first-order macro system can be shown by
A˜EtdYt+1 = B˜dYt + EtU(1)t+1, (3.19)
where U
(1)
t = TC
(1)dut denotes the first-order macro shocks, which are also a linear
combination of micro shocks.5 Therefore, the solution to the first-order stand-in
macro system (3.19) can be written in a recursive, state-space form,
dYt = Π
(1)dKt,
dKt+1 = Φ
(1)
K dKt + Φ
(1)
U U
(1)
t+1,
where dKt denotes a vector of macro state variables (including endogenous state
variables and exogenous state variables). Similarly, a stable solution exists and is
unique if (i) there exists a number χ such that |A˜χ − B˜| 6= 0 and the no-unit-root
condition requires that |A˜− B˜| 6= 0; (ii) the relevant generalizations of the Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) rank and order conditions must be satisfied at the aggregate level.
5A trivial solution of T always exists such that T = I and thus A = A˜, B = B˜, i
′
y = I, which
means that no aggregation is applied to reduce dimensionality.
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The Example of the Multi-section RBC Model.
Denote xˆt = d log xt as the first-order log-approximation around its steady state.
Applying the method to the example of multi-sector real business cycle, the first-
order stand-in macro system can be constructed through a linear projection such
that
φnˆt = wˆt − σcˆt,
yyˆt = ccˆt + iˆit,
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δiˆt,
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − σ−1 r
R
Etrˆt+1,
yˆt = (Σjλjzjt) + α · kˆt + (1− α) · nˆt,
Etrˆt+1 = Etyˆt+1 − xˆt+1,
xˆt+1 = (ε− 1) · (ΣjλjEtzˆjt+1)− ε[α + 1
ε
(1− α)] · Etrˆt+1
+ Etyˆt+1 − (ε− 1)(1− α) · Etwˆt+1,
αkˆt+1 = (ε− 1) · (ΣjλjαjEtzˆjt+1)− ε{Σjλjαj[αj + 1
ε
(1− αj)]} · Etrˆt+1
+ α · Etyˆt+1 − (ε− 1){Σjλjαj(1− αj)} · Etwˆt+1,
where xˆt+1 ≡ Σjλj kˆjt+1 is the augmented aggregate state variable and α ≡ Σjλjαj.
The first-order aggregate system has 2 endogenous and 2 exogenous aggregate state
variables. The above first-order aggregate system indicates that there are two en-
dogenous aggregate state variables kˆt and xˆt and two exogenous aggregate shocks,∑
j λj zˆjt and
∑
j λjαj zˆjt.
Intuitively, kˆt comes from the aggregate production function, yˆt = (Σjλjzjt) + α ·
kˆt + (1 − α) · nˆt, indicating that a larger kˆt will lead to a larger aggregate output
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change yˆt. In terms of aggregate output, what really matters is the mean of capital
stock across sectors. The distribution of capital doesn't play a direct role in affecting
aggregate output in this model economy.
However, the distribution of capital across sectors affects the capital rental rate,
even holding the mean as constant. This is because the equilibrium capital rental
rate is pinned down by Etrˆt+1 = Etyˆt+1 − Σjλj kˆjt+1 and xˆt+1 =
∑
j λj kˆjt+1 6= kˆt+1 =
1∑
l λlαl
∑
j λjαj kˆjt+1 if capital shares are not identical across sectors. In fact, the
distribution of capital stock across sectors affect the allocative efficiency of input
factors, and thus matters for the capital return rate and ultimately influences the
consumption path over the dynamics.
Roughly speaking, kˆt governs the effect of capital on aggregate production, while xˆt
controls the effect of capital on aggregate demand through intertemporal substitution.
To get more details, let's discuss two special cases: (i) the case of symmetric capital
shares across sectors with αj = α; and (ii) the case of Cobb-Douglas aggregator with
ε = 1.
In the case of symmetric capital share across sectors with αj = α, since there is
no heterogeneity of capital shares across sectors, we have kˆt+1 =
∑
j λj kˆjt+1 = xˆt+1.
This directly shuts down the effect of capital distribution on the allocative efficiency of
input factors. It turns out that only the mean of capital stock across sectors governs
both the effects on aggregate production as well as on aggregate demand through
capital rental rate. Therefore, the mean of capital turns to be the only sufficient
statistic.
Now consider the case of Cobb-Douglas aggregator with ε = 1. This case mimics
the Long-Plosser RBC model with heterogeneous output elasticities of input factors.
The reason why xˆt+1 = kˆt+1 is because of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. Knowing
that the capital rental rate follows Etrˆt+1 = 1εEtyˆt+1 + (1 − 1ε)Etyˆjt+1 − kˆjt+1, the
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elasticity ε controls the effects of sectoral prices pjt. Under Cobb-Douglas aggregator
with ε = 1, the effects of sectoral prices are fully offset by the effects of sectoral output.
Therefore, the equilibrium capital rental rate will only depend on the mean of capital
stock across sectors, such that Etrˆt+1 = Etyˆt+1− 1∑
l λjαj
∑
j λjαj kˆjt+1 = Etyˆt+1− kˆt+1.
Taking into stock, most of the traditional literature assumes either CES aggrega-
tor with homogeneous capital shares over intermediate goods production (e.g., New
Keynesian models) or Cobb-Douglas aggregator but allowing for heterogeneous pro-
duction elasticity of input factors (e.g., Long-Plosser RBC models with production
network). These types of models behave as a standard RBC model with aggregate
productivity shocks zˆt ≡
∑
j λj zˆjt. As long as the two assumptions are relaxed simul-
taneously, micro-level productivity shocks can affect aggregate dynamics differently
from the standard RBC model. The macro impacts of micro shocks depend not only
on the mean of the shocks but also on its distribution, given heterogeneous micro-level
production structures.
First-order Micro Dynamic System.
Extracting type j's micro dynamics from the original system (3.18), this yield the
first-order micro dynamic system for type j:
A˘jEt
 dyj,t+1
dYt+1
 = B˘j
 dyjt
dYt
+ C˘(1)j Et
 duj,t+1
U
(1)
t+1
 , (3.20)
Since the first-order dynamics of aggregate variables can be solved as a recursive,
state-space system, the solution to the first-order micro system can be expressed as
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follows,
dyjt = θ
(1)
y,j + θ
(1)
yk,jdkjt + θ
(1)
Y K,jdKt,
dkjt = θ
(1)
k,j + θ
(1)
kk,jdkjt−1 + θ
(1)
kK,jdKt−1 + θ
(1)
kv,jdujt,
where dkjt denotes a vector of micro state variables which also include endogenous
and exogenous state variables.
3.3.3 The Second-order Stand-in System
Total differentiation of the first-order restrictions provides the second-order restric-
tions on equilibrium dynamics,
Et[F1d2yt+1 + F2d2yt + v(2)t+1] = 0, (3.21)
where the second-order driving force v
(2)
t+1 can be expressed as a function of various
cross products of the elements of the first-order differentials and driving force,
v
(2)
t+1 = F11(dyt+1 ⊗ dyt+1) + 2F12(dyt+1 ⊗ dyt) + 2F13(dyt+1 ⊗ dut+1)
+ F22(dyt ⊗ dyt) + 2F23(dyt ⊗ dut+1) + F33(dut+1 ⊗ dut+1).
Unlike the first-order driving force dut, the second-order driving force is endogenous
from the perspective of the whole model. However, as the first-order differentials can
be solved by the first-order macro and micro systems, the second-order driving force
can be considered as exogenous to the second-order differentials. The above second-
order system (3.21) can be also solved using standard linear rational expectations
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solution methods in the following form,
AEtd2yt+1 = Bd2yt + Etv(2)t+1.
Notably, the coefficient matrices A and B are the same as in the first-order system
(3.18); the only difference comes from the driving process. This property yields a huge
advantage on aggregation. The aggregation operator T in fact can be applied to the
second- or higher order approximate stand-in systems. Therefore, the second-order
stand-in macro system can be represented by
A˜Etd2Yt+1 = B˜d2Yt + EtV(2)t+1, (3.22)
where the second-order aggregate components are defined by d2Yt = i
′
yd
2yt and the
second-order driving process is given by V
(2)
t = Tv
(2)
t . The solution to the second-
order macro system () can be written in a recursive, state-space form,
d2Yt = Π
(2)K
(2)
t ,
K
(2)
t+1 = Φ
(2)
K K
(2)
t + Φ
(2)
U V
(2)
t+1,
where K
(2)
t denotes a vector of macro state variables. Since the coefficient matrices
to the second-order stand-in macro system are identical to the ones to the first-order
stand-in macro system, a stable second-order solution exists and is unique if the
required conditions for the first-order stand-in macro system are satisfied.
Similarly, extracted from the second-order dynamic system, the second-order mi-
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cro dynamic system for type j can be shown as follows,
A˘jEt
 d2yj,t+1
d2Yt+1
 = B˘j
 d2yjt
d2Yt
+ C˘(1)j Et
 v(2)j,t+1
V
(2)
t+1
 . (3.23)
The solution to the second-order micro system can be expressed by
d2yjt = θ
(2)
y,j + θ
(2)
yk,jk
(2)
jt + θ
(2)
Y K,jK
(2)
t ,
k
(2)
jt = θ
(2)
k,j + θ
(2)
kk,jk
(2)
jt−1 + θ
(2)
kK,jK
(2)
t−1 + θ
(2)
kv,jv
(2)
jt ,
where k
(2)
jt denotes a vector of micro state variables for second-order.
3.3.4 Discussions on Higher-order Stand-in Systems
It is in fact straightforward to extend to the third- and higher order by following
similar steps as the above. To obtain the n-th order differential restrictions, one
needs to take the total differentiation to the restrictions in the (n− 1)-th order. The
whole procedure of aggregation and solution are convenient due to the following two
advantages. On the one hand, these model restrictions have similar form to those in
any lower order, i.e., the coefficient matrices A and B are order-invariant. Therefore,
the aggregation matrix T can be repeatedly used for any order of approximation. On
the other hand, the n-th order driving process is a function of cross products of lower
order differentials and driving process, which are solved in (n−1)-th order restrictions.
The whole dynamics thus can be solved by order of approximation successively.
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3.4 Application I: The Aggregate Consumption Function
This section provides a first-order decomposition of the aggregate consumption func-
tion and identify a new redistribution channelthe asset position adjustment (APA)
channelwhich captures the impact on consumption through the adjustment of asset
position. This decomposition can be interpreted as a generalized version of Auclert's
(2019) result. The magnitude of the APA channel mainly depends on the variability
of capital investment and the persistence of shocks. Our analysis starts with a stylized
consumption-saving problem in a partial equilibrium model. We then characterize the
first-order responses of both individual and aggregate consumption to shocks.
3.4.1 A Stylized Consumption-Saving Problem
Consider a stylized consumption-saving problem in a dynamic, incomplete-market
partial equilibrium setting. A typical consumer i faces idiosyncratic income uncer-
tainty and chooses consumption cit and asset position for next period ait+1 to maxi-
mize his or her life-time expected utility E0
∑
j β
tu(cit). Assume that each individual
supplies one unit of labor inelastically.6 The real wages {wit} follow a stochastic pro-
cess. The consumer can only trade risk-free nominal assets subject to some trading
frictions. The consumer's budget constraint at date t is given by
Ptcit + ait+1 = Ptwit +Rtait, (3.24)
and the trading of asset is limited by a generic borrowing constraint
λ(ait+1) ≥ 0,
6It can be relaxed to be elastic labor supply. The main results still preserve.
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where Pt is the general level of prices and Rt is the nominal interest rate.
The individual's consumption Euler equation is uc(cit)/Pt = βEtuc(cit+1)/Pt+1Rt+1+
φit, where φit is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the borrowing constraint.
Because φit can be zero at some states, the standard log-linearization method can
not be applied. To make it work, let's define a change of variable to represent the
slackness of borrowing constraint, θit ≡ 1− φituc(cit)/Pt , the consumption Euler equation
can be represented by
θit · uc(cit)/Pt = βEtuc(cit+1)/Pt+1Rt+1, (3.25)
for any individuals and at any states, θit ∈ (0, 1], thus θit are well-defined in terms
of log-deviation at local values. The complement-slackness condition for borrowing
constraint is given by
(1− θit) · uc(cit)/Pt · λ(ait+1) = 0. (3.26)
3.4.2 The First-order Response of Individual Consumption
To keep notations compact, let's define σ(ci) ≡ −ucc(ci)·ciuc(ci) as the local intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and λa(ai) ≡ ∂λ∂aai as the local marginal intensity of borrowing
constraint. Denote cˆit = d log cit = dc˜it as log-deviations of the variables at their
local values. The first-order logarithmic approximation of individual's optimality
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conditions around the local values (ci, ai, θi, wi, R, P ) are
θˆit − σ(ci) · cˆit − Pˆt = −σ(ci) · Etcˆit+1 − EtPˆt+1 + EtRˆt+1
θˆit =
1− θi
θi
(
λa(ai) · aˆit+1 − σ(ci) · cˆit − Pˆt
)
Pci(cˆit + Pˆt) + aiaˆit+1 = Pwi(wˆit + Pˆ ) +Rai(aˆit + Rˆt).
To explicitly characterize the consumption responses to a perturbation of the
economic environment, let's assume that Rˆt, Pˆt, and wˆit are exogenous AR(1) process
with persistence ρr, ρp, and ρwi, respectively. Applying the undetermined-coefficient
method to solve this linear rational expectations model, the solution of consumption
and asset position for next period are
cˆit = γ
?
ca,iaˆit + γ
?
cw,iwˆit − γ?cP,iPˆt + (γ?cR1,i − γ?cR2,i)Rˆt (3.27)
aˆit+1 = γ
?
aa,iaˆit + γ
?
aw,iwˆit + γ
?
aP,iPˆt + γ
?
aR,iRˆt (3.28)
where {γ?h,i} are coefficients associating the local values and structural parameters in
the model. The solution to these coefficients are shown in the Appendix.
Before characterizing the first-order response of individual's consumption, let's
provide the definition of individual's disposable income and marginal propensities to
consume. Denote individual's disposable income in real terms by yit ≡ wit +Rtait/Pt
and the marginal propensity to consume (in dollar-to-dollar sense) as
MPCi ≡ dcit
dwit
=
ci
wi
· γ?cw,i.
Now the first-order response of individual consumption is shown by the following
proposition.
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Proposition 1 (First-order Micro Consumption Responses). The first-order
response of individual's consumption in response to Rˆt, Pˆt and yˆit is
cicˆit = MPCi
[
yiyˆit −NNPi · Pˆt + UREi · Rˆt + APAi · aiaˆit
]
− SUBi · Rˆt, (3.29)
where MPCi =
ci
wi
γ?cw,i represents individual i's marginal propensity to consume,
NNPi =
wiγ
?
cP,i
γ?cw,i
− Rai
P
represents the Fisher channel, UREi =
wiγ
?
cR1,i
γ?cw,i
− Rai
P
repre-
sents the unhedged interest rate exposure channel, APAi =
wiγ
?
ca,i
aiγ?cw,i
− R
P
represents the
asset position adjustment channel, and SUBi = ciγ
?
cR2,i represents the substitution
channel.
Broadly speaking, the above decomposition can be classified into two effects: the
wealth effect and the substitution effect. The substitution effect is associated with
the IES and represented by SUBi · Rˆt. The wealth effect is related to several parts:
yiyˆit + APAiaiaˆit −NNPiPˆt + UREiRˆt. The first term yiyˆit is the traditional effect
from the change in disposable income.
The second term NNPi · Pˆt, where NNP is short for net nominal position, rep-
resents the effect from an increase in the level of nominal prices. If the consumer is a
nominal lender, his or her NNP should be negative, then an increase of nominal price
hurts his or her real returns, leading to a reduction on net wealth. Conversely, if the
consumer is a nominal borrower, he or she gains when facing an increase of nominal
price. This is so called the Fisher channel.
The third term UREi · Rˆt, where URE is short for unhedged interest rate ex-
posure, characterize the effect from the change in the real interest rate, holding the
asset position unchanged. If the consumer is a real lender, his or her URE should be
positive, then he or she will benefit from an increase of real interest rate.
The fourth term APAi · aiaˆit, where APA is short for asset position adjustment,
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captures the effect from the change in asset (or capital) position. Intuitively, the
changes of real value of asset holding Rtait/Pt can be decomposed into three parts:
Rˆt + aˆit − Pˆt. Suppose a shock is transitory, the consumer will only reevaluate the
present discount value of asset holding but have no incentive to adjustment his or her
asset position. Therefore, in this case, the APA channel is deactivated, which is in
line with Auclert's (2019) findings. However, if a shock is persistent, instead of being
transitory, then the consumer may have incentive to adjust the asset position. If the
consumer's current asset position is positive, it means that he or she has relative more
asset holding than the desired level. Therefore, the consumer will reduce the asset
position and consume more relative to the one with negative asset position.
3.4.3 The First-order Response of Aggregate Consumption
3.4.3.1 Economic Environment
Consider a closed economy populated by I heterogeneous types of agents, in which
each type i has a unit mass of individuals and each in an idiosyncratic state sit ∈ Si.
I use the notation EI(zit) for the cross-sectional average of any variable zit, taken
over individual types I and idiosyncratic states Si. Therefore, aggregate (per capita)
consumption Ct is equal to average individual consumption EI(cit), and thus, the
log-deviation of aggregate consumption has the relationship to the one of individual
consumption as follows CCˆt = EI(cicˆit).
Consumers. Each consumer type i in state sit has a stochastic endowment of ei(sit)
efficient units of work, and thus receives a wage of wit = wt ·ei(sit), where wt is the real
wage per efficient unit of labor. The agent's gross-of-tax income is yit = wit+Rtait/Pt.
The economy has a varying stock of aggregate capital Kt with a depreciation rate
δ ∈ (0, 1). The aggregate amount of asset equals to the stock of aggregate capital
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PtKt = EI(ait). The stock of aggregate capital evolves as Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It.
Consumers choose consumption cit and asset holding ait+1 to maximize their life-time
expected utility E0
∑
t β
tu(cit). Individual's trading on asset holding is limited by a
generic borrowing constraint, λ(ait+1) ≥ 0.
Firms and Production. Assume there is a competitive firm that produces a final
good by using capital and labor following a production function: Yt = AtF (Kt, Nt),
where Nt = EI(eit) and At are the aggregate amount of labor and aggregate produc-
tivity level. Assume At following a stochastic process. In competitive factor markets,
the market wage rate equals to marginal product of labor and the capital rental rate
equals to marginal product of capital.
Government and Market Clearing. A government issues nominal short-term
debt Bt and levies lump-sum tax to finance its expenditure Gt. Thus, its nominal
budget constraint is QtBt+1 = PtGt + Bt − PtEI(tit), where Qt = 1Rt PtPt+1 is the
one-period nominal discount rate and Pttit are lump-sum tax for type i agents. In
equilibrium, the markets for capital, labor and final goods all clear. The resource
constraint of final goods is Yt = Ct + It +Gt. Under the assumptions made here, all
consumers in this economy essentially solve the problem in section 4.1.
3.4.3.2 First-order Response of Aggregate Consumption
We are interested in the first-order aggregate consumption response to a perturbation
of this environment in which individual gross incomes yˆit, nominal prices Pˆt, and the
interest rate Rˆt change at t = 0. The shocks are unexpected but can be transitory
or persistent. The decomposition of the first-order aggregate consumption response
is characterized by the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 (First-order Aggregate Consumption Responses). The first-
order response of aggregate consumption in response to Rˆt, Pˆt, Yˆt and yˆit is
CCˆt = EI [MPCi]Y Yˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate income channel
+ CovI
(
MPCi, (yiyˆit − Y Yˆt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Earnings heterogeneity channel
+ EI [MPCi · APAi]KKˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate capital channel
+ CovI
(
MPCi · APAi, (aiaˆit −KKˆt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset position heterogeneity channel
− CovI (MPCi, NNPi) Pˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fisher channel
+ CovI (MPCi, UREi) Rˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest rate exposure channel
− EI [SUBi] Rˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
Substitution channel
(3.30)
This proposition shows that the first-order response of aggregate consumption to
a macroeconomic shock can be decomposed into several channels and these channels
can be characterized by a small set of sufficient statistics.
To understand these channels better, we first analyze the channels that show up in
a textbook-style representative agent model (I = 1). In this case, there is no earning
heterogeneity, no asset position heterogeneity, no net nominal position heterogeneity,
and no heterogeneous exposure of unhedged interest rate. Therefore, the first-order
response of aggregate consumption is given by
CCˆt = MPC · Y Yˆt +MPC · APA ·KKˆt − SUB · Rˆt
The first termMPC ·Y Yˆt stands for income effect, the second termMPC ·APA·KKˆt
represents the effect from capital stock, and the third term SUB · Rˆt is a substitution
effect. If aggregate capital is fixed, then the aggregate capital channel is deactivated.
In contrast, if aggregate capital is varying, then aggregate consumption responses are
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amplified through the aggregate capital channel. If aggregate capital stock is higher
than its steady state level, the representative consumer will reduce capital stock for
next period and thus consume more.
Away from this benchmark, now consider the case with different marginal propen-
sities to consume. CovI (MPCi, NNPi) represents the Fisher channel. Usually, net
nominal borrowers have higher marginal propensities to consume than net nomi-
nal lenders. Thus, an increase of price level (i.e., inflation) will increase aggregate
consumption relative to the representative-agent benchmark. CovI (MPCi, UREi)
stands for the unhedged interest rate exposure channel. Since agents with unhedged
real borrowing generally have higher MPCs than unhedged savers. Aggregate con-
sumption rises more in response to a decline of real interest rate relative to the
representative-agent benchmark. CovI(MPCi, (yiyˆit − Y Yˆt)) characterizes the earn-
ings heterogeneity channel. Low-income agents generally have high MPCs. Suppose
income inequality is dampened in response to a macro shock, this shock can am-
plify the response of aggregate consumption, and vice verse. Finally, CovI(MPCi ·
APAi, (aiaˆit − KKˆt)) shows the asset position heterogeneity channel. Agents with
low asset position tend to have high MPCs and APAs. Suppose asset dispersion is
dampened in response to a macro shock, this shock can also amplify the response of
aggregate consumption.
3.5 Application II: Inequality Multipliers
Applying our method, this section reevaluates the macro impact of income inequality.
The income inequality has been rising in the U.S. over the past few decades. In
particular, a significant share of the rising income inequality is accounted by the
fixed-effect component of labor income. This component usually captures the returns
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to skill or ability, which can be interpreted as the permanent component and thus we
refer to it as permanent income in this section.
Many well-known macroeconomic models, which include a broad set of macro
models with homothetic preference over consumption, predict that shifts in the dis-
tribution of permanent income are entirely or approximately neutral (Straub, 2018).
Macroeconomic aggregates, such as consumption, are independent of permanent in-
come inequality since consumption is a linear function of permanent income.7 To
explore the macro impact of permanent income inequality, we break down this linear-
ity relationship by emphasizing the role of non-homothetic preferences. This section
studies a simple macro model with heterogeneous returns to skill, which mimics the
distribution of permanent income to analyze both the first- and second-order macro
impacts of aggregate consumption responses.
Although aggregate consumption is not a linear function in permanent income in
the presence of non-homothetic preference, we show that the first-order macro impact
on aggregate consumption response can still be neutral to a shift in permanent income
inequality. However, the major impact of permanent income inequality shows up at
macro second-order. We provide an explicit characterization on the second-order
macro impact of aggregate consumption response to a shift of permanent income
inequality, which we refer to as the inequality multiplier.
3.5.1 Basic Structure
Households and Preferences. Consider an economy populated by a continuum
of individual households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each household supplies one unit of
labor inelastically but with heterogeneous labor productivity zi. The labor produc-
7The canonical precautionary-savings models (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Carroll, 1997), which are
widely known to generate concave consumption functions in current income, still predict a linear
consumption function in permanent income.
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tivity is drawn at the initial period, following a cumulative density function G(z),
and remains the same for each individual permanently. Households decide their con-
sumption stream to maximize their life-time expected utility E0
∑
t β
tu(cit) subject
to the budget constraint cit + kit+1 = ziWt + Rtkit, where Wt and Rt are market
wage rate and capital rental rate. To normalize aggregate labor productivity, assume∫
zidi = N = 1.
Firms and Production. Assume a representative producing final goods with a
Cobb-Douglas production function, Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
, where At is aggregate produc-
tivity level following a stochastic process. The capital evolves asKt+1 = (1−δ)Kt+It,
where δ is the capital depreciation rate. Competitive factor markets imply market
wage and capital rental rate asWt = (1−α)AtKαt and Rt = αAtKα−1t +1−δ. Notably,
the heterogeneous labor productivity can be also interpreted as the labor income share
of skill types. Assume the final goods production function to be Yt = AtK
α
t Πil
(1−α)zi ,
where l = 1 is the one unit of labor inelastically supplied by households. Under this
specification, the market wage rate for type i worker is wit = ziWt. In this section,
our main focus will be a shift in the distribution of labor income share {zi}, which
induces a shift in the distribution of skill wages {wit}, i.e., the permanent income
inequality. Assume there is no government activity. The final goods market clears
such that Yt = Ct + It.
3.5.2 The First-order Macro Impacts: A Neutrality Result
Now let's turn to the first-order macro impacts of permanent income inequality. To
keep notations compact, define σ(ci) ≡ −ucc(ci)·ciuc(ci) as the inverse of the micro in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) for household i, where ci is household
i's consumption level at steady state. The first-order micro and macro consumption
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Euler equations are shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. To the first-order, the micro and macro consumption Euler equations
are, respectively,
cˆit = Etcˆit+1 − 1
σ(ci)
EtRˆt+1
and
Cˆt = EtCˆt+1 −
(∫
ci/C
?
σ(ci)
di
)
EtRˆt+1,
where γ ≡ ∫ ci/C?
σ(ci)
di can be interpreted as the macro intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution.
Let's first compare the cases of two commonly-used functional forms: CRRA util-
ity u(cit) =
c1−σit
1−σ and Stone-Geary utility u(cit) =
(cit−c)1−σ
1−σ . In the CRRA utility case,
the inverse of micro IES is constant and identical across households with possibly
different income or wealth levels, σ(ci) = σ. Thus, the macro IES is also a constant,∫ ci/C?
σ(ci)
di = 1
σ
, which is independent of the distribution of household's consumption.
Therefore, any shift in the distribution of permanent income plays no role in affecting
aggregate consumption responses. This result is expected because a large set of macro
models with homothetic preference over consumption predicts that consumption is a
linear function of permanent income. In the Stone-Geary utility case, the inverse of
micro IES is dependent of household's consumption level as well as his or her perma-
nent income, σ(ci) = σ
ci
ci−c , which implies that high income households (i.e., high zi
and thus high ci) have relative low IES and thus small micro consumption responses
to an interest rate shock. However, under the Stone-Geary utility specification, the
macro IES is still a constant,
∫ ci/C?
σ(ci)
di = 1
σ
(C? − c), which is also independent of the
distribution of permanent income. Although consumption is not a linear function of
permanent income in the presence of non-homothetic preference, this result indicates
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that the distribution of permanent income does not affect aggregate consumption
responses to first-order neither.
Furthermore, the above neutrality result of the first-order macro impact still holds
in case of heterogeneous preferences across households. Suppose that household's
utilities over consumption are allowed to be heterogeneous, e.g., u(cit) =
c
1−σi
it
1−σi for
CRRA utility or u(cit) =
(cit−ci)1−σi
1−σi for Stone-Geary utility, where {σi, ci} are drawn
from a cumulative density function H(σ, c) at the initial period. As long as the
distribution of household's heterogeneous utility is independent of the distribution of
permanent income across households, the first-order aggregate consumption responses
are still neutral to any shift in the distribution of permanent income.
Although the homotheticity of preference does play a role in affecting whether
aggregate consumption is linear function in permanent income or not, the neutrality
of first-order macro consumption responses actually depends on the micro structure
of household's intertemporal preferences. The following proposition summarizes the
neutrality result of first-order aggregate consumption responses to a change of per-
manent income distribution.
Proposition 3. If individual household's instantaneous utility satisfies the following
condition: the inverse of absolute risk aversion coefficient γi(z) is an affine function
in permanent income, i.e.,
γi(z) ≡ uc(ci(z))
ucc(ci(z))
= ai · z + bi
where ai and bi are independent of household's permanent income z, then the first-
order macro consumption Euler equation is independent of any shift in the distribution
of permanent income across households.
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In the homogeneous Stone-Geary utility case, the inverse of individual's absolute
risk aversion is an affine function in his or her steady state consumption or permanent
income, γ(ci) =
1
σ
(ci − c). Therefore, it immediately implies that the macro IES,
1
C?
∫
γ(ci)di =
1
σ
(1 − c
C?
), is independent of the distribution of permanent income.
In the heterogeneous Stone-Geary utility case, the inverse of individual's absolute
risk aversion is also an affine function, γi(ci(z)) =
1
σi
(zC? − ci), where σi and ci
are independent of z. This implies that the macro IES is also independent of the
distribution of permanent income, γ = 1
C?
∫
γi(z)di = EI( 1σi ) · EI(z)− 1C?EI(
ci
σi
).
3.5.3 The Second-order Macro Impacts: Inequality Multipliers
Although the first-order macro consumption can be neutral to permanent income
inequality in the presence of non-homothetic preference over consumption, perma-
nent income inequality may affect macro consumption to higher orders. This subsec-
tion provides a second-order characterization on macro consumption response. The
second-order micro and macro consumption Euler equations are shown by the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 2. To the second-order, the micro and macro consumption Euler equations
are,
d2c˜it = Etd2c˜it+1 − 1
σ(ci)
Etd2R˜t+1 +
σ
′
(ci) · ci
[σ(ci)]2
· cˆitEtRˆt+1
and
d2C˜t = Etd2C˜t+1 −
(∫
ci/C
?
σ(ci)
di
)
Etd2R˜t+1 +
(∫
σ
′
(ci) · c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆitdi
)
EtRˆt+1, (3.31)
where the terms of σ
′
(ci)·ci
[σ(ci)]2
cˆitEtRˆt+1 and
∫ σ′ (ci)·c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆitdiEtRˆt+1 represent the second-
order micro and macro consumption-wedge shocks respectively.
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Lemma 2 provides two properties. First, the coefficients associating the second-
order terms, e.g., d2c˜it, d
2C˜t and others, are the same as the ones in the first-order sys-
tem (see Lemma 1). Second, relative to the first-order system, the second-order sys-
tem contains cross-product terms among the first-order counterparts, e.g., cˆitEtRˆt+1,
which functions as second-order shocks. These two properties jointly provide a huge
advantage on analysis. The second-order driving process is endogenous from the per-
spective of the whole model, it can be treated as exogenous for the purpose of solving
the solution to the second-order terms, since the first-order system has been solved
up to this point. In fact, this advantage still preserves to any higher-order.
Imagining the first-order micro and macro systems are solved, the evolution of the
second-order macro shocks
∫ σ′ (ci)·c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆitdiEtRˆt+1 can be characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The second-order macro consumption-wedge shocks in macro con-
sumption Euler equation,
∫ σ′ (ci)·c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆitdiEtRˆt+1, have the following relationship,
(∫
σ
′
(ci) · c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆitdi
)
= Et
(∫
σ
′
(ci) · c2i
C?[σ(ci)]2
cˆit+1di
)
−
(∫
σ
′
(ci) · c2i
C?[σ(ci)]3
di
)
· EtRˆt+1.
(3.32)
where M2Ineq ≡ −
∫ σ′ (ci)·c2i
C?[σ(ci)]3
di is defined as the second-order income inequality mul-
tiplier.
Let's again use the CRRA utility and Stone-Geary utility to illustrate how the
second-order income inequality multiplier works. In the CRRA utility case, since the
micro IES is a constant, the first-order derivative of micro IES is zero, i.e., σ
′
(ci) = 0.
Therefore, under CRRA specification, both of the second-order micro and macro
discount-rate shocks vanish completely. This implies that permanent income inequal-
ity does not play any role to second-order or even higher orders.
153
In contrast, under the Stone-Geary utility specification, the second-order macro
Euler equation can be represented by
d2C˜t = Etd2C˜t+1 − 1
σ
(1− c
C?
)Etd2R˜t+1 +
c
σ
(∫
cˆitdi
)
EtRˆt+1
with (∫
cˆitdi
)
= Et
(∫
cˆit+1di
)
+M2Ineq · EtRˆt+1
where the second-order income inequality multiplier isM2Ineq = − 1σ
(
1− c
C?
∫
z−1i di
)
.
These two equations are very useful to illustrate how non-homothetic preferences
and permanent income inequality change aggregate consumption responses to the
second-order. If there is a zero substance level, i.e., c = 0, the second-order macro
consumption-wedge shocks all vanish. If the distribution of permanent income be-
comes more disperse, then, by Jensen's inequality,
∫
z−1i di will be larger and thus
inequality multiplierM2Ineq will be larger as well.
To understand how aggregate consumption responds at the second-order, let's
consider two types of shocks: aggregate productivity shocks on At and real interest
rate shocks on Rt+1.
Aggregate Consumption Response to Productivity Shocks. Consider a pos-
itive productivity shock, Aˆt > 0. The interest rate to the first-order rises as well as
individual consumption, that's, Rˆt > 0 and
∫
cˆitdi > 0. This implies that the second-
order consumption wedge shock is positive on impact, given the first-order responses
of interest rate and the average of individual consumption. Therefore, d2C˜t < 0,
which means that the second-order aggregate consumption declines. Non-homothetic
preferences and permanent income inequality jointly dampens aggregate consumption
responses to a productivity shock to the second-order.
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Aggregate Consumption Response to Real Interest Rate Shocks. Consider
a negative real interest rate shock, Rˆt+1 < 0. As the real interest rate declines,
individual consumption rises to the first-order, that's,
∫
cˆitdi > 0. This implies a neg-
ative correlation between the changes of interest rate and average consumption to the
first-order. Therefore, a negative second-order consumption wedge shock generates
an increase of aggregate consumption response to the second-order, d2C˜t > 0. As
a consequence, non-homothetic preferences and permanent income inequality jointly
amplifies aggregate consumption responses to a real interest rate shock. For instance
at the zero-lower bound, deflation, which pushes a drop of real interest rate, will have
more powerful damage in the presence of more sever income inequality.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new method to tackle aggregation in recursive stochastic dy-
namic models with micro heterogeneity. This method enables us to derive sufficient
statistics that can characterize explicitly how micro heterogeneity affects aggregate
dynamics. To the first- and second-order, these sufficient statistics usually can be
shaped by the average and the dispersion of the micro counterparts weighted by their
micro impact intensities. This method can be potentially applied in different contexts
to shed light on the implications of micro heterogeneity in macroeconomics.
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